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vForeword
Sylvie Lemmet 
Director 
Division of Technology, Industry and Economics 
United Nations Environment Programme 
I am pleased to introduce the first edition in the new Technology Transfer Perspectives series, which aims to share 
different views about enabling frameworks and best practices for technology transfer in the area of climate change. 
This publication is being released in parallel with one entitled Technologies for Adaptation. Both publications 
stem from the global Technology Needs Assessment (TNA) project that UNEP and the UNEP Risø Centre 
are implementing in 36 countries in Africa, Asia, Commonwealth of Independent States and Latin America. 
Funding for the project is provided by the Global Environment Facility. 
This publication directly relates to one of the main outputs of the TNA process – the Technology Action Plan, 
or TAP. These TAPs comprise essential elements of an enabling framework for specific sectors and technologies; 
that is they bundle for a country the realistic and appropriate set of actions and policies that can help overcome 
barriers to deployment and diffusion of prioritised existing technologies. Because the TNA process uses flexible, 
participatory methods that allow countries to adapt to meet their particular circumstances, TAPs can also help 
countries developing Low Carbon Development Strategies and Nationally Appropriate Mitigation Actions. 
The case studies and arguments presented in this edition provide insights for governments on how to reform their 
policies and institutions so as to provide clear and stable incentives that promote diffusion of climate-friendly 
technologies. What emerges is that there is no ‘one-size-fits-all’ solution to the successful transfer and diffusion 
of modern technologies. Context clearly matters, particularly when it comes to expanding the use of renewable 
energy resources with their site-dependent characteristics. 
The transfer of mitigation and adaptation technologies to developing countries is enshrined in the United 
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change. UNEP has for the last decades provided both international 
leadership and direct policy and technical support to developing countries seeking transfer of climate-relevant 
technologies. With this new series we continue that tradition. 
Sylvie Lemmet

vii
Editorial
This publication is the first in a series entitled 
Technology Transfer Perspectives, which is intended to be 
a forum for collecting and sharing experiences among 
researchers, practitioners and policy-makers involved 
in technology transfer and diffusion in the context of 
climate change. For this first edition, we bring together 
a number of case studies from around the world, all of 
which concern themselves with the basic question of 
how to create an ‘enabling framework’ for the transfer 
and diffusion of renewable energy technologies (RETs) 
in developing countries. While this is relevant to 
policy-makers in most developing countries, we hope 
the publication will be of special value for the national 
Technology Needs Assessment (TNA) committees and 
national consultants in 36 developing countries, who 
are currently in the process of developing such enabling 
frameworks as part of their Technology Action Plans.
Despite the global economic recession, total investment 
in renewable energy reached an all-time high of $211 
billion in 2010, more than seven times the figure 
invested in 2004 (REN21, 2011). In addition, global 
investment in new renewable energy generation 
capacity in 2010 exceeds that of new fossil-fuel based 
electricity generation. For the first time, developing 
countries overtook developed countries in terms of 
investments in renewable energy companies, utility-
scale generation and biofuel projects (UNEP-GTREI 
2011; REN 21, 2011). Thus, while investment in 
renewable energy has traditionally been dominated by 
OECD countries, in particular the countries of the EU 
and North America, the recent boom is also occurring 
in developing countries (REN21, 2010).
However, this optimistic-sounding picture should be 
balanced by an awareness of mainstream forecasting 
for global energy demand growth. Chief among these 
is the International Energy Agency’s (IEA) flagship, 
the World Energy Outlook publication, which suggests 
that non-OECD countries will account for 93% 
of projected energy demand growth under their 
‘New Policies Scenario’ (2008-2035). These figures 
show that, while CO2 emissions in most developing 
countries are currently of little importance for global 
emissions, this picture may change in the future, and it 
calls for progressive action to de-couple the relationship 
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between energy consumption and CO2 emissions. 
Therefore future economic growth and development 
must be achieved by a transition to the use of low-
carbon technologies in developing countries, which will 
include an accelerated transfer and diffusion of RETs 
and other climate mitigation technologies, as well as a 
significant scaling-up of associated investments.
In countries that have high net energy imports, there 
is a greater need and justification for expanding the 
role of domestic renewable energy sources. Examples 
from a recent study conducted by the Global Network 
on Energy for Sustainable Development (GNESD) 
suggest that governments should establish dedicated 
and authorised agencies responsible for promoting, 
initiating and financing renewable energy projects and 
programmes. In addition, it is known that a proven 
government commitment and clearly set government 
targets are fundamental in giving confidence to private 
investors who are seeking to develop renewable energy 
projects. The oft-cited success of the Brazilian biofuel 
programme was mainly due to clear and consistent 
policies and targets, as well as government subsidies, 
set at an early stage (GNESD, 2010). However, as 
some of the articles in this edition argue, in order to 
achieve the rapid transfer and diffusion of RETs more 
targeted and dedicated action is needed.
As a concept ‘technology transfer’ has various definitions, 
many of them technical and specific. Generally, 
technologies comprise ‘hardware’ and ‘software’ 
elements and also incorporate the management 
systems, human resources and institutional 
infrastructure necessary for the successful operation of 
any given installed technology, sometime referred to 
as ‘orgware’. Thus, the transfer of technology involves 
both the exchange of codified proprietary knowledge, 
tacit know-how and organisational practices, as well as 
technical artefacts, machinery and components (IPCC, 
2000). Technology transfer is made up of transactions, 
often between private companies, for the purchase, 
franchising or licensing of technology hardware and/
or software intended to meet a specific need. In the 
context of climate change the International Panel on 
Climate Change (IPCC) defines technology transfer 
as ‘a broad set of processes covering the flows of 
know-how, experience and equipment for mitigating 
and adapting to climate change amongst different 
stakeholders…’ (IPCC, 2007). Here, the concept of 
technology transfer denotes the international or cross-
border exchange and flows of the above-mentioned 
technological artefacts, knowledge and organisational 
capacities. Furthermore, technology transfer is 
understood as comprising the introduction of a new 
or relatively unfamiliar technological concept in the 
recipient country. Although such technology flows 
have conventionally been conceptualised as mainly 
North-South, the importance of South-South and 
South-North technology transfer has increasingly 
become apparent under the continuing processes of 
economic and cultural globalisation.  
The articles in this edition focus mainly on policies 
aimed at promoting technology ‘diffusion’, which itself 
both depends upon and drives technology transfer. By 
diffusion we understand the dissemination or uptake of 
specific RETs, for example, wind turbines in a national 
context. In contrast to technology transfer, therefore, 
the concept of diffusion concerns the (accelerated) 
spread of an existing or relatively familiar technology 
within national borders. However, it is clear that such 
conceptual categorisations may be problematic, for 
example, regarding large countries such as China or 
India, where the flow of technology and knowledge 
between sub-national states may be categorised 
more appropriately as technology transfer. It may 
also be difficult to distinguish technology transfer 
from diffusion in cases where a new technological 
concept is introduced gradually and therefore becomes 
increasingly familiar, characterised by a gradual uptake 
in a given country. However, we find it useful to 
distinguish the two concepts in the present edition to 
provide some clarity and simplicity in addressing the 
complex issues at hand. 
The main focus of the work presented in this edition 
concerns how to establish a viable ‘enabling framework’ 
conducive to enhancing and facilitating the accelerated 
diffusion of RET’s in developing countries. Here, we 
understand an enabling framework as something 
broader than a set of specific policies, to include the 
country-specific circumstances that encompass existing 
market and technological conditions, institutions and 
practices. Throughout the individual articles in the 
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present edition, the concept of an ‘enabling framework’ 
is used interchangeably with ‘enabling environment’, 
which we understand as being essentially the same. 
While recognising that the success of any given 
enabling framework is context-dependent, it is argued 
that an effective framework for scaling up RET-related 
investments can be constructed in any country through 
the implementation of specific policies, adapting 
the lessons of what has worked elsewhere. Therefore, 
establishing an enabling framework means thinking 
more about creating markets, not projects (Martinot, 
2002). It is important to clarify that markets are rarely 
‘free’ in the true sense of economic liberalism, and in 
developing countries energy markets are often heavily 
regulated and subsidized. To enable RETs to meet an 
increasing proportion of the demand, markets need 
to be freed, created or stimulated, supported and 
regulated by governments and wider stakeholders. As 
such, a market can be thought of as a self-sustaining 
mechanism to achieve technological change over time 
(Haselip, 2007). Developing stable market conditions 
for renewable energy is an inherently more sustainable 
means of achieving a transition to a low-carbon 
economy than a series of externally financed projects.
So how can developing countries create the enabling 
framework for self-sustaining markets in renewable 
energy? First of all, a systematic approach must be 
taken to understanding the barriers that exist to the 
deployment and diffusion of specific technologies. The 
exact barriers that countries face depend upon national 
circumstances, but can be classified in political, 
economic, financial, legal, regulatory, technical, 
institutional or socio-cultural terms (Boldt et al., 
2011; Painuly, 2001). A thorough understanding of 
the barriers and knowledge of policy measures having 
been successfully applied in other countries is a good 
basis for conceptualising and proposing efficient and 
context-specific measures or elements of an enabling 
framework for the transfer and diffusion of RETs. By 
adding to a bulk of literature on the experiences with 
enabling frameworks for specific renewable energy 
technologies, such as biofuels in Tanzania (Romijn and 
Canidls, 2011), solar PV in Africa (Nygaard, 2009) 
or a national programme for renewable energy in Sri 
Lanka (WB, 2006), we believe this edition provides 
valuable input to understanding the challenges and 
opportunities involved through the example of policy 
measures applied elsewhere. 
The edition presents nine articles, which cover case 
studies from Africa, Asia and Latin America. The first 
section consists of four articles that address enabling 
frameworks for the transfer and diffusion of specific 
technologies, including solar water heaters, cookstoves 
and wind turbines. 
The edition is opened by Samantha Ölz, (formerly 
International Energy Agency, France) who provides 
an encouraging account of how a long-term effort and 
a combination of investment subsidies and consumer 
loans managed and guaranteed by the state-owned 
utility, alongside other accompanying measures, have 
enabled Tunisia to achieve growth rates in the Solar 
Water Heater (SWH) market of more than 25% for 
several years. In her analysis of South Africa’s support 
for SWHs, Ölz concludes that the mixed experience 
with investment cost subsidies highlights the risk of 
unpredictable changes to subsidy levels due to their 
dependence on public budgets and the importance of 
streamlined administrative procedures to attract end-
users. She argues that when direct financial incentives 
are implemented they should offer incentives by 
energy (kWh) or capacity (kW or m2) rather than as a 
percentage of installed cost. This reduces the likelihood 
of market-price distortions and the prevalence of 
oversized installations.
The second article by Emi Mizuno (Climate Strategies, 
Cambridge, UK) investigates the development of the 
wind energy industry in India, with a special focus on 
the factors that determine what she calls a replicable 
technology transfer between European and Indian 
companies. She argues that foreign direct investment, 
the formation of technology partnerships and 
technology capacity-building do not automatically 
guarantee continuous technology upgrading and 
replicable technology transfer. It is equally important 
to create what she calls a sizable and performance-
oriented market, as well as to avoid market fluctuations 
by stop–go politics. She argues that technology transfer 
is process-oriented and therefore sensitive to market 
fluctuations. Consequently, she calls for an overall 
long-term consistency of policy frameworks, albeit one 
xwhich allows for sound adjustments. This is to achieve 
efficient diffusion of wind technology, but certainly 
also to achieve an efficient transfer to and uptake in 
Indian companies.
Following this, Robert Bailis and Jasmine Hyman 
(Yale School of Forestry and Environmental Studies, 
USA), discusses the barriers to and drivers for the 
dissemination of what they term clean-burning fuel-
efficient cookstoves. They point to the fact that, while 
the threat of deforestation was a main driver in the 
1970s, the main concern now is the need to reduce 
indoor air pollution and GHG emissions. As these 
benefits are ‘public goods’ not directly acknowledged 
by the cookstove users, programme developers 
need to understand the complex social factors that 
determine user preferences for stoves. Stoves need 
to be attractive to the consumer. Further, because of 
the higher price, subsidies of some form are generally 
needed to enhance the diffusion of clean-burning fuel-
efficient cookstoves. In this respect, carbon finance 
mechanisms are seen as a promising financing option. 
Finally, the authors point to some opportunities for 
the large-scale industrial production of stoves in 
contrast to small-scale artesanal production, which 
has been the norm for the last thirty years of stove 
dissemination. 
Wind energy technology is again the topic of analysis by 
Isaac Dyner, Yris Olaya and Carlos J. Franco (National 
University of Colombia), who propose elements of 
an enabling framework to accelerate investment in 
the technology in Colombia. Their article provides an 
account of existing policy measures for wind energy in 
a number of South American countries and an analysis 
of the gaps in the current Colombian framework for 
wind power, arguing principally for the use of feed-in 
tariffs and portfolio standards.
Following these four articles, which focus on specific 
technologies, the next section comprises five articles 
that analyse enabling frameworks for multiple RETs. 
Here, the opening article by James Haselip (UNEP 
Risø Centre) focuses on the design and relative 
success of renewable energy feed-in tariffs in various 
countries, with the aim of identifying useful lessons 
for developing countries. The author stresses that FITs 
are not the ‘be all and end all’ of renewable energy 
policies, but rather should be seen as a framework 
to build wider support for RETs. Nonetheless, if 
FITs are properly designed and backed by a stable 
and committed government, they provide a simple, 
transparent and efficient measure to increase the share 
of electricity generated by RETs. In a developing 
country context it should be remembered that, 
despite the long term rise in fossil-fuel prices, most 
grid-connected RETs require financial support in 
order to compete with conventional fossil-fuel sources 
and large-scale hydro. This means that sustainable 
financing needs to be ensured, either by cross subsidies 
within the grid, by subsidies from government or by 
external sources, such as climate finance mechanisms. 
Continuing the analysis of feed-in tariffs, Anna 
Pegels (German Development Institute), focuses on 
the challenges involved in implementing this policy, 
which is popular in many OECD countries, in South 
Africa, where a FIT was in place for two years before 
it was abandoned in favour of a competitive bidding 
process in 2011. According to the author, this occurred 
because the government had social priorities other than 
the deployment of renewable energy technologies. 
Secondly she points to the lack of coordination and 
capacity at the policy-making level, as well as the strong 
fossil-fuel lobby groups that were able to influence the 
policy-making process. 
Judith Cherni (Imperial College, London) addresses 
renewable energy policies and lessons from Latin 
America, in particular Argentina, Brazil and Peru. 
Her article looks specifically at how feed-in tariffs, 
quotas and competitive bidding have developed in 
the region, and while noting the limited expansion 
of RET in the region she draws some lessons from 
their experience. The author makes the point that, 
while emission reductions are an important objective 
of the promotion of renewables in OECD countries, 
this is of less importance in Latin America. Instead, 
she argues that developing positive market conditions 
for independent power producers, addressing regional 
shortfalls in energy supply and tackling the problem 
of energy poverty among poor rural populations 
determine the character of renewable energy policy in 
Latin America. 
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Focusing on India, Darshini Ravindranath and 
Srinivas Shroff Nagesha Rao (UNDP, New Delhi) 
provide an analysis of experiences with the diffusion 
of bioenergy technologies. Over the last two decades, 
the government of India has developed a number of 
policy instruments to support bioenergy development, 
including tariff support, capital and interest subsidies. 
The country currently derives 25% of its net primary 
energy from biomass. Despite this, the authors 
consider the rate of spread of bioenergy technologies in 
India to have been relatively slow due to institutional, 
technical informational, market and financial barriers. 
In addition to fine-tuning existing measures, the 
authors identify a list of new concrete actions aimed at 
accelerating the use of bioenergy technology. 
In our final article, Krishna Ravi Srinivas (RIS, New 
Delhi) addresses the role of intellectual property rights 
(IPR) in the context of technology transfer. The article 
reviews the various scholarly positions on the role of 
IPR in facilitating or hindering technology transfer. 
Srinivas argues that, while at the political level there 
are proponents for both extreme positions regarding 
the role and importance of IPR, scholars have 
advanced more nuanced positions, mainly claiming 
that it should be evaluated on a case-by-case basis. On 
this basis, the article examines how open innovation 
or open source models, whereby market actors share 
intellectual property rights within a larger group, 
could play an important role in facilitating the transfer 
of climate-friendly technologies. 
Overall, the nine articles presented in this edition 
provide a wealth of detail, which is worth studying 
because, as is often the case with policy-making, the 
devil lies in the detail. By drawing lessons from the 
transfer and diffusion of various technologies across all 
three continents, a general pattern emerges which can 
be summerised in six general points, highlighting the 
need for:
1. A combination of measures
Most of the contributors urge that a combination 
of measures to build a coherent policy or enabling 
framework is important to ensure cost-efficient 
transfer and diffusion of a specific technology. Barriers 
may be political, economic, financial, legal, regulatory, 
technical, institutional and not least cultural, and 
therefore measures need to respond to the same 
categories to achieve change.
An illustrative example of the effect of a programme 
comprising a combination of measures is the solar 
water heater programme in Tunisia. This programme 
combines financial incentives such as a 20% investment 
subsidy, subsidized interest rates and consumer loans 
managed and guaranteed by the state-owned utility 
and paid back through electricity bills. Added to this 
are measures such as quality standards, certification 
schemes, supplier accreditation schemes, extensive 
public awareness-raising campaigns, practical training 
for installers and capacity-building programmes for 
government officials and financiers.
2. External financing mechanisms
Except for countries that are highly dependent on 
electricity from diesel generators, RET-generated 
electricity is in general more expensive than electricity 
from traditional fossil fuel-based technologies or from 
large-scale hydropower. This means that financial 
measures are often necessary in the first stages of 
technology diffusion, when market actors are few and 
there are limited opportunities to develop economies 
of scale. In most developed countries the burden of 
economic incentives has been paid by taxpayers (direct 
subsidies) or electricity consumers (cross subsidies). 
While this has politically viable in most developed 
countries and in some developing countries such as 
India, developing countries will often not be able to 
mobilise the political will to meet such extra costs, 
especially if the subsidised share of renewable energy 
become considerable. 
Although several authors have mentioned carbon 
finance schemes as an important source of finance, this 
will only partly meet the financing gap. The Tunisian 
SWH programme was partly financed by carbon 
credits, but for non-Least Developed Countries (LDCs) 
the conditions in the post-Kyoto regime are uncertain. 
However, LDCs will remain eligible to benefit from 
both the voluntary and the European carbon trading 
scheme after 2012, and Bailis and Hyman see carbon 
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finance as an important financing source for subsidizing 
improved stoves. Also, as noted by Cherni, FIT or 
investment subsidies can be partly financed by carbon 
credits. However, several authors in this edition have 
made reference to the need for international support 
to finance programmes in part, and there is a built-
in obligation to provide international finance to the 
GET FIT initiative targeting renewables, an example 
discussed by Haselip. 
In this regard, the ongoing negotiations under 
the UNFCCC have developed a framework for 
international technological and financial support to 
developing countries. Thus, the Nationally Appropriate 
Mitigation Actions (NAMAs) being implemented by 
developing countries under a new post-2012 climate-
change regime should be conducive on the transfer of 
technological and financial resources from developed 
countries (UNFCCC, 2007). Although many issues 
remain uncertain at present regarding the future of 
NAMAs, it would appear that such country-defined 
international mechanisms are most likely to provide 
the means for establishing viable enabling frameworks 
for RETs in developing countries.
3. Simple and transparent financing
Successful economic incentives can take many forms, 
though any given enabling framework is of little 
value if it fails to provide the clear, transparent and 
stable conditions necessary to attract investors. Several 
contributions in this issue urge that financial measures 
should be transparent and simple, and it is these two 
features that are the key to understanding the success 
of the feed-in tariffs. FITs are easy to communicate 
and provide a predictable means to reduce the cost of 
support for RETs gradually by moving towards market 
parity. Simplicity and transparency are also central 
in the Tunisian SWH programme, where investment 
and loan subsidies are the same for all consumers, 
regardless of the size of households or incomes. 
Supporting the same argument, Mizuno laments that 
financial measures for wind power in India were too 
complicated, consisting of feed-in tariffs, third-party 
sales, tax reductions and wheeling1 benefits, with 
the effect that in practice the feed-in tariff was never 
used. Tax reductions, options for wheeling and high 
industrial tariffs in India made it more profitable for 
industries to invest in wind power and use it for internal 
consumption (captive power) than to sell electricity to 
the grid with the support of a feed-in tariff. 
4. Identify and address non-financial barriers
Non-financial barriers to scaling up the transfer and 
diffusion of RETs is equally, if not more important 
than the financial barriers. To quote Deutsche Bank, ‘it 
is useful to outline international financial incentives, 
but such interventions will not be successful on their 
own if they do not fit within national regulatory, legal 
and policy frameworks’ (DBCCA, 2011). 
Non-financial barriers can include complex cultural 
barriers to applying certain technologies, as noted by 
Bailis in the case of improved cookstoves. They can 
also be relatively simple, reflecting a paucity of public 
information and awareness regarding RETs and their 
proper applications and benefits, or they can comprise 
inappropriate and non-enabling regulatory, legal and 
institutional frameworks, which may be technically 
easy, but politically difficult to change. As such, many 
countries will need customised technical assistance, 
capacity-building and planning assistance to conduct 
detailed assessments of the specific regulatory and non-
market barriers to developing an enabling framework 
for investment in renewable energy. To a large extent, 
the global TNA project is designed to address these all-
important activities at the pre-investment stage.
5. Careful design, tailored for each country
An enabling framework should aim to ‘de-risk’ 
renewable energy projects for investors and ensure a 
profitable investment. At the same time, contributors 
to this publication emphasise that consideration must 
be given to safeguarding governments and consumers 
in developing countries against policies that would 
lead to unnecessary increases in energy prices and/
or an inequitable distribution of the energy access 
benefits that result from an expanded use of renewable 
technology. To ensure that measures are carefully 
designed, there may be a need for targeted technical 
assistance in the design phase, as there is plenty of 
experience to draw on from both OECD countries 
xiii
and developing countries themselves in how to 
design financial support mechanisms so that they do 
not provide unrealistically high profits for investors 
at the expense of low-income consumers. Regarding 
the careful design of measures, Cherni emphasises 
that policy will be more attractive to both private and 
international aid organisations if renewable energy 
schemes incorporate aspects such as access to energy in 
rural areas and social equity components that do not 
necessarily respond to free-market ideology. 
6. Measures that are stable and predictable
Most contributors touch on the need for predictability 
and long-term stability of policy measures in order 
to attract investment. Mizuno claims that stop–
go policies in support of wind energy in India have 
negatively influenced not only the rate of diffusion of 
wind technology in the country, but also the level of 
technology upgrading and uptake by Indian producers. 
Ölz shows how stop–go policies in the initial phases of 
the Tunisian SWH programme negatively affected the 
diffusion of SWH, while Pegels shows how lacking a 
standard PPA, a general mistrust of the stability of the 
FIT regime and a radical change in feed-in tariffs early 
on put off investors from signing renewable energy 
contracts in South Africa. The predictability and 
long-term stability of any given enabling framework 
is crucial to attract investment in renewable energy. 
Equally, the longevity, or political sustainability, of 
the enabling framework is all the more important 
given that RETs tend to have high up-front capital 
costs, meaning that cost recovery or pay-back times 
are generally longer than they are for non-renewable 
energy projects. 
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Endnote
1. Wheeling refers to power transmission, for example, when private 
investors in a wind farm are allowed to use the public grid to 
transport their wind-produced electricity for internal company 
consumption placed elsewhere. The utility usually charges a fee 
per kWh for the wheeling service.
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Abstract
This paper assesses experiences with the implementation 
of policy support for solar water heater (SWH) 
technology in Tunisia and South Africa, with the aim 
of drawing lessons from these two illustrative cases 
for other developing and emerging economies whose 
interest in tapping this zero-fuel renewable heat option 
for domestic hot water and low-temperature industrial 
processes is burgeoning. Worldwide, SWH technology 
is the largest contributor to global supply of all solar 
energy technologies, with an installed operating 
capacity of 172 GW by the end of 2009, established 
markets in China and Europe, and rapidly expanding 
penetration in other emerging economies, such as 
Turkey, India and Brazil. 
Tunisia and South Africa are two countries with 
detailed policy commitments to encouraging SWH. 
While both countries have substantial solar resources, 
which could potentially satisfy a large share of their 
increasing hot water needs and contribute to managing 
growing electricity demand (peak shaving), solar hot 
water currently still only meets a small, if growing share 
of their respective heat demand. Notwithstanding 
similar policy objectives, Tunisia and South Africa 
have followed different implementation paths and 
encountered varying levels of success in encouraging 
the uptake of SWH, with Tunisia playing an important 
role as a pioneer in North Africa. 
This article explores these two countries’ different 
policy choices and the economic and non-economic 
barriers that stand in the way of greater SWH market 
penetration. The analysis concludes by identifying 
the effective policy options that can be drawn from 
the two countries’ experiences for developing and 
industrialised country contexts.
4Introduction
Important drivers for policy interest in SWH, as for 
most renewable energy technologies, include energy 
security concerns, fuel mix diversification, climate 
change mitigation effects, and industrial and economic 
development opportunities. Nevertheless, to date 
policies encouraging the development and deployment 
of renewable heat technologies are, in general, less 
widespread than for renewables-based electricity or 
biofuels for transport. Moreover, progress has been 
comparatively modest in many developing countries, 
although where policies exist, SWH is a major focus. 
This article analyses experiences with the 
implementation of policy support for solar water 
heater (SWH) technology in Tunisia and South Africa. 
The two countries, which both benefit from substantial 
solar resources, have made different policy choices to 
encourage the market uptake of SWH which could 
potentially satisfy a large share of their increasing 
hot water needs, as incomes rise and contribute to 
managing growing electricity demand. These two cases 
illustrate lessons for other developing and emerging 
economies for creating a favourable environment to 
foster this zero-fuel renewable heat option for domestic 
hot water and low-temperature industrial processes in 
the African context. 
The article is structured as follows. The first section 
discusses the relevance of heat in energy use and the 
potential contribution of SWH in satisfying growing 
heat demand in non-OECD countries. The second 
section sets the context with a brief description 
of the global trends in SWH markets, economics 
and policies. A third section compares the policy 
experiences of Tunisia and South Africa in supporting 
SWH, their achievements and the economic and non-
economic barriers encountered. The fourth and final 
section derives the lessons learned for effective policy 
implementation and proposes recommendations for 
stimulating and sustaining SWH market penetration 
in Africa.
Demand for heat and the contribution  
of SWH
Heat represents the largest share of final energy 
use worldwide – 47% in 2008 – with the largest 
contributions stemming from industrial demand 
for process applications and residential demand for 
cooking, water and space heating (IEA, 2010a). Even 
countries with warm climates show high shares of final 
energy use for heat, such as 57% in Tunisia and 45% 
in South Africa, despite their relative lack of space 
heating demand. This is mainly due to a climate-
independent need for heat in industrial processes and 
cooking and a relatively climate-independent heat 
demand for domestic hot water (IEA, 2010b). 
Fossil fuels continue to dominate the fuel mix for 
heat in many countries, e.g., in South Africa, where 
coal (54%) and oil (11%) dominate final energy 
consumption for heat, and Tunisia, with 44% of oil 
and 30% of natural gas in the heat fuel mix (IEA, 
2010a). Moreover, the traditional use of biomass 
(in the residential sector) represents a large share of 
residential energy consumption in many developing 
countries, including South Africa and Tunisia (IEA, 
2010a). The traditional use of biomass refers to the 
unsustainable management of biomass resources, such 
as wood, charcoal, crop residues and animal dung, 
and their use for cooking and water heating at low 
efficiencies with conventional stoves, which causes high 
particulate emissions with serious health impacts. The 
use of modern renewables, i.e., excluding traditional 
biomass, can alleviate the concerns relating to energy 
security, fuel mix diversification, climate change, and 
the social and health impacts of continued reliance on 
fossil fuels and inefficient biomass for heat.
While the potential for renewable energy technologies 
(RETs) to supply heat is substantial in many countries, 
modern renewables satisfied a mere 10% (312 Mtoe1) 
of total global heat demand in 2008 (IEA, 2011a). 
Renewable heat (RES-H) can be produced more 
efficiently and sustainably by the use of biomass in 
efficient stoves or installations, solar thermal heat 
and geothermal heat. Worldwide, biomass plays the 
predominant role in renewable heat production: for 
example, in OECD countries, 94% of renewable heat 
5Figure 1. Total capacity in operation [GWel
v; GWth
2] and energy production [TWhel; TWhth], 2010
          Source: Weiss and Mauthner, 2011
(produced in commercial plants and decentralised 
systems) came from biomass in 2009 (IEA, 2011b). 
While still only representing 3% of modern renewable 
heat in 2008, solar thermal heat has grown rapidly 
from a low base, mainly due to solar water heaters in 
China (IEA, 2011a). 
In non-OECD developing and emerging economies, 
heat demand is expected to increase significantly to 
2050 as the buildings and industrial sectors grow 
rapidly. In the buildings sector, which encompasses 
the residential and service sectors, global final energy 
demand is projected to grow by 60% between 2007 
and 2050 in the IEA’s business-as-usual scenario (IEA, 
2010d). The bulk of this demand increase stems from 
developing countries, as their building stock expands 
in line with their growing populations, household 
numbers and higher building stock turnover 
rates (ibid.). 
Moreover, countries with limited space heating 
demand, such as South Africa and, to a lesser extent, 
Tunisia, often lack the energy infrastructure to address 
this demand, which means that the demand for 
domestic hot water is often satisfied with electric water 
heaters. Rising affluence is often related to a rising 
demand for services such as domestic hot water. This 
often imposes additional peak demands on electricity 
grids that can be already overburdened by regular 
power demands, which also increase as economies 
develop. Renewable heating technologies, especially 
decentralised applications such as SWH, can help 
tackle this threat to grid stability. 
Global trends for SWH
SWH market status
At the global level, solar water heating (SWH) is a 
technically and commercially mature renewable heat 
option for domestic hot water and low-temperature 
industrial processes. An overview of the main aspects 
concerning SWH technologies is available in Annex 
1. Worldwide, SWH is the largest contributor of 
all solar technologies to global energy supply, as 
illustrated by Figure 1 with estimated operational 
capacity for 2010.
6Figure 2. Total capacity of glazed flat-plate and evacuated tube collectors in operation, end of 2009 [MWth]
   Source: Weiss and Mauthner, 2011
Around 60 million households worldwide use solar 
thermal collectors, and global market growth averaged 
21% between 2000 and 2009 (Fawer and Magyar, 
2009; Weiss and Mauthner, 2011). The solar thermal 
collector capacity in operation worldwide at the end 
of 2009 equaled 172.4 GWth.
3,4 Between 2004 and 
2009, the annually installed glazed water collector 
area worldwide almost tripled, and the average annual 
growth rate between 2000 and 2009 was 20.9%. The 
market has seen a major shift, with very high growth 
rates in China, where capacity now amounts to 101.5 
GWth or 59% of the global total. While small-scale, 
single-family domestic applications represented 90% 
of the operational Chinese SWH market in 2009, large 
SWH systems for broader and more sophisticated uses 
are rapidly gaining market share. Together, applications 
in apartment buildings, tourism-sector installations 
(e.g., hotels), public-sector institutions (e.g., hospitals), 
combination hot water and space heating systems 
and low-temperature industrial processes constituted 
30% of newly installed 2009 capacity (Weiss and 
Mauthner, 2011). 
Other significant markets exist in Europe (32.5 
GWth), e.g., Germany, Italy, Spain, Austria and France, 
and the United States and Canada (15.0 GWth). 
Emerging economies show rapidly expanding market 
penetration, such as Turkey (8.4 GWth), Brazil (3.7 
GWth) and India (2.2 GWth). In 2009 the worldwide 
market grew by 25.3%, with 36.5GWth of newly 
installed capacity. China installed 89% (29.4 GWth) of 
the total compared with 10% (3.7 GWth) in Europe 
(ibid.). Figure 2 displays the total operational capacity 
for glazed collectors, that is, excluding unglazed 
collectors for swimming-pool heating.5
In contrast, in per capita terms (per 1000 inhabitants), 
several small countries continue to rank highest. In 
2009, Cyprus had a per-capita operational capacity 
of 554 kWth, followed by Israel (391 kWth), Barbados 
(324 kWth), Austria (315 kWth) and Greece (266 kWth) 
(Figure 3). Especially Austria’s position as a leader in 
per-capita and total operational capacity underscores 
the crucial role of targeted and coherent policy support 
in building a sustainable SWH market, despite 
7Figure 3. Total capacity per 1,000 inhabitants of glazed flat-plate and evacuated tube collectors in 
operation, end of 2009, [kWth/ 1000 inhabitants]
Source: Weiss and Mauthner, 2011
relatively unfavourable solar irradiation levels (1126 
kWh/ M2/ year). 
Germany’s long-standing leadership in the global solar 
photovoltaic market6 constitutes a parallel example of 
renewable electricity. Strong and predictable policies 
and incentives underpin Germany’s success despite 
the country’s relatively poor solar resources (for more 
information, see article by Haselip on ‘feed-in tariffs’ 
in this volume).
In terms of the supply chain, European and Chinese 
producers dominate the global solar thermal industry. 
While Chinese collector production was estimated to 
eclipse that of European manufacturers by a factor of 
six in 2008 (28 million M2 versus 4.8 million M2), 
most of this is destined for the domestic market. 
Exports, though increasing in absolute terms, represent 
only 5-10% of production volume (Fawer and Magyar, 
2009; Li and Ma, 2009). Nevertheless, concerns 
persist among industry analysts about the inferior 
collector quality offered by many Chinese producers, 
though these are being addressed by stringent 
product standards recently imposed by Chinese 
regulators (ibid.).
The solar thermal industry is relatively labour-
intensive, with more than half of total employment 
in the installation and maintenance phases, so it offers 
significant potential for macroeconomic benefits 
(Hardie, 2011). Global employment in 2009 was 
estimated at 270,000 jobs in production, installation 
and maintenance (Weiss and Mauthner, 2011). 
Cost trends7
The costs of providing heat from solar collectors 
depend heavily on: 
(i)  the collector energy yield, which is a 
function of the solar resource available in a 
8   Table 1. Cost comparison of water heaters in China
   Source: Li and Ma, 2009
particular location and of the efficiency of the 
SWH system, 
(ii)  the system purchase price and installation costs, 
which in turn depend on the availability of a 
supply chain operating at sufficient scale to 
provide low cost collectors, and 
(iii)  the solar fraction, which indicates the 
proportion of the total hot water load provided 
by solar thermal collectors. 
In favourable conditions, the technology can be 
cost-effective and offers payback periods comparable 
with conventional water heaters. For example, a cost 
comparison of water heaters in China indicates that, 
although the upfront cost of solar water heaters is 
higher than electric or gas water heaters, the average 
annualised life-cycle cost over the heater lifetime is 
considerably lower (Table 1).
Tropical and sub-tropical countries, such as South 
Africa and Tunisia, with high insulation levels ranging 
from 1700-2600 kWh/M2/ year (Edkins et al., 2010a; 
GTZ, 2009), can generally benefit from relatively low 
average costs of thermosiphon systems, which can 
be mounted on building roofs in frost-free climates, 
and from relatively high average solar fractions due 
to high solar energy yields and small hot water loads, 
which translate into lower system life-cycle costs and 
payback periods.
SWH policy environment 
Policy support for renewable heat is low compared with 
renewables-based electricity or biofuels for transport. 
Policy design for renewable heat differs from renewable 
electricity due to a number of key differences between 
the delivery and trade of heat and electricity (Connor 
et al., 2009). 
Some countries, such as China and Israel, which 
both have substantial solar resource potentials and 
relatively high commercial energy prices now have 
high market shares for SWH systems without relying 
on continuing incentive support. In China, by 2008 
the market share for SWH systems had reached over 
50% in urban areas, more than tripling from about 
15% in 2001 (IEA, 2010b). In 2007, Israel had 
over 1.3 million solar water heaters in about 90% of 
residences, covering about 4% of the country’s energy 
demand and reducing its electricity consumption 
by 8%. In both countries, the market was enabled 
by a combination of concerted R&D efforts, energy 
efficiency and building regulations, the development 
of an integrated domestic supply chain, favourable 
resource conditions which promoted market-driven 
growth, energy security concerns relating to high and 
volatile conventional energy prices and major cost 
reductions for SWH technology (ESTIF, 2007; Li and 
Ma, 2009; IEA and RETD, 2007). In Israel, due to 
the solar obligation9 for new buildings introduced in 
1980, solar thermal has reached the critical market size 
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 Electric water 
heater 
Gas water heater Solar water heater 
Hot water supply 
(litres/day) 
100 100 100 
Equipment investment 
(USD)8 
186 155 279 
Annual operating cost 
(USD) 
78 54 0.78 
Lifetime (years) 8 8 10 
Average annual cost (USD) 101 87 29 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
9necessary to generate self-sustained growth without 
any subsidies (ESTIF, 2007). 
Capital grants, i.e., direct financial subsidies for 
purchasing SWH systems, are the most widely 
implemented financial mechanism to date for this 
technology option. In successful cases, a range of other 
supporting financial and non-financial measures has 
backed up these investment incentives.10 For example, 
in Austria, where 20% of all single-occupancy residences 
have solar heating, solar energy has been given priority in 
R&D programmes and regional strategies for over twenty 
years, backed up with accompanying socioeconomic 
research and supported by regional investment 
subsidies. Less widespread financial instruments used 
to support SWH deployment are fiscal incentives and 
low-interest loans. Complementary regulatory measures 
include solar obligations, which require a certain 
proportion of heat to come from solar energy. 
Besides well-designed financial support to foster SWH 
market uptake, non-financial measures, including 
concerted awareness-raising among end consumers 
and the finance sector, adequate training for installers 
and maintenance technicians, and stringent quality 
standards for system hardware, are fundamental 
ingredients in the different ‘recipes for success’ 
implemented by market leaders, such as Austria, 
Germany, Greece and Israel (for detailed information, 
cf. IEA and IEA-RETD, 2007; IEA-RETD, 2010; 
Connor et al., 2009). This underscores the crucial 
importance of embedding incentive support in a 
coherent overall policy framework that tackles non-
economic barriers, such as administrative hurdles, lack 
of information and training, and social acceptance 
issues (IEA, 2008b). 
Though the largest policy-driven SWH markets remain 
primarily (net energy importing) industrialised/
OECD countries, developing and emerging 
economies, especially those with good solar resources, 
are also increasingly introducing targets and policies to 
encourage the use of SWH. Countries with solar hot 
water targets include Morocco, Mozambique, Uganda, 
China and India. Municipal governments in developing 
countries are expanding their role in promoting SWH, 
mirroring similar trends for renewable electricity 
and low-carbon transport technologies, and often 
stimulating national or federal policy implementation. 
Besides demonstration projects, regulatory policies 
mandating the use of SWH in new constructions are 
a key measure advocated by local governments, linked 
to the desire to exploit their communities’ low-carbon 
development potential. Relevant examples include 
Cape Town in South Africa (discussed in the South 
Africa case study below), several large cities in Brazil, 
such as Porto Alegre, Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo, 
China, e.g., Kunming and Dezhou, and India, e.g., 
Nagpur (REN21, 2011).
The subsequent case studies exploring experiences in 
promoting SWH in two developing countries with 
high solar resource potentials, Tunisia and South 
Africa, illustrate the fundamental importance of 
creating supportive framework conditions which 
enable the SWH market to grow sustainably 
and eventually become self-supporting without 
incentive support.   
Case studies: Tunisia and South Africa
Tunisia is an example of a country showing marked 
success with its SWH policy support programme, 
which has spurred similar policy initiatives in 
neighbouring developing countries such as Egypt, 
Morocco and Algeria, as well as in other world regions, 
for example, Mexico. In comparison, South Africa’s 
more recently introduced SWH policy measures, 
though impressive on paper, have had a less marked 
impact on market growth to date, with slower progress 
towards the established policy targets. 
The impacts of the SWH policy programs in Tunisia 
and South Africa are evaluated here according to several 
key qualitative criteria and quantitative indicators:
Assessment of the support policies 
(adapted from Hack, 2006)
• Administrative ease: 
o For applicants: a high administrative burden 
involved in accessing the support incentive 
can represent a strong disincentive for 
potential applicants. 
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o For the implementation body or programme 
provider: related transaction costs include 
costs of administration and monitoring, 
and possibly the establishment of a new 
implementation agency.
• Institutional capacity: regulatory bodies 
and implementing agencies need sufficient 
competence to ensure effective and cost-efficient 
policy implementation towards achieving 
market targets.
• Public awareness and acceptance: The main 
beneficiaries of support incentives, namely the 
end consumers, require adequate information 
in order to be sufficiently interested in accessing 
the promoted incentives on the scale targeted 
by policy-makers. A comprehensive and 
transparent discussion of the socioeconomic 
impacts of large-scale SWH use can foster 
public acceptance.
• Stringent quality assurance: to instill public 
confidence in the technical maturity and 
quality of SWH systems and help establish a 
viable national SWH supply chain, appropriate 
training for installation and maintenance 
personnel and stringent system certification 
with strong technical standards and regular 
monitoring are crucial.
• Market orientation and private-sector 
participation: it is important for private-sector 
stakeholders (suppliers, installers, financial 
intermediaries) to be involved in policy design 
and implementation, e.g., as information and 
delivery channels for financial incentives. This 
will allow the policy to be suitably aligned with 
industry needs and financial sector capacities.
• Credibility and predictability of the policy 
measure: this ensures that potential investors 
have adequate confidence in the stability of 
the support system, which in turn reduces the 
perceived risk and the risk premium required by 
them (IEA, 2008b).
• Sustainable impact on market development: policy 
support should be designed in such a manner 
as to build market competitiveness towards 
the goal of making SWH market growth self-
sustaining without promotional incentives. 
Incentives should be transitional, decreasing 
over time, to encourage earlier deployment 
but encourage market competitiveness 
(IEA, 2008b). 
Quantitative policy impacts
• Capacity additions since inception of policy 
support
• Average market growth rate since inception of 
policy support
• Investment volume
• Carbon emission reductions
• Domestic industry growth
• Employment creation
Table 2 compares key market, policy and resource data 
relevant for evaluating the SWH policy experiences 
of the two countries examined. In order to place the 
SWH framework conditions and market performance 
of Tunisia and South Africa more fully in context, 
summary data for Austria, one of the global market 
leaders, is also provided.
Tunisia
Background
Tunisia’s energy market is relatively small, with a 
population of 10.5 million in 2010. With its high 
standard of living (e.g., literacy and education) the 
country has the third highest human development 
index ranking in Africa and ranks as the most 
competitive economy on the continent (40th in the 
World Economic Forum’s global competitiveness 
ranking 2011-12).21
Tunisia has excellent solar irradiation levels (see Table 
2), with more than 3200 hours of sunshine per year, 
and estimates suggest that SWH could meet about 
70-80% of Tunisia’s residential hot water demand 
(Menichetti and Touhami, 2007). However, despite 
the large potential that SWH presents, the country 
continues to rely heavily on (subsidised) conventional 
11
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 Tunisia South Africa Austria 
Success indicators11 
Total installed solar 
thermal collector area 
[m2]/ capacity [MWth] in 
operation (2009) 
405 000 m2/  
283.5 MWth
 
1 063 360 m2/  
744.4 MWth 
4 305 792 m2/ 3014.3 
MWth 
Share of glazed : 
unglazed collectors in 
operation (2009) 
100% : 0% 29% : 71% 86% : 14% 
Additional glazed12 
collector area [m2]/ 
capacity [MWth] 
installed in 2009 
85 000 m2/  
59.5 MWth
 
34 000 m2/  
23.8 MWth
 
356 544 m2/  
249.6 MWth 
Penetration of glazed 
collectors (per 1000 
inhabitants) [kWth] 
(2009) 
2713 4.414 314.5 
Policy support 
Start of SWH policy 
support 
Stop-and-go sporadic 
nature: 
- Initial policy 
strategy: early 1980s 
- GEF/Belgian 
programme: 1996-
2001 
- Current incentive 
framework 
(PROSOL): since 2005 
2008 Mid-1980s 
SWH-related target 2010: 255 000 m2 
collector area 
installed 
2011 (2007-2011 11th 
Five-Year 
Development Plan):  
540 000 m2 collector 
area installed 
2014 (2010-2014 12th 
Development Plan):  
750 000 m2 collector 
area installed 
- RE Target by 2013 
(set in Renewable 
Energy White 2003): 
10 000 TWh by 2013  
(13-23% SWH:  
1 300-2300 TWh)  
National Solar Water 
Heating Programme: 
- 2014:  
1 million SWH systems 
installed (approx. 
equivalent15 to min. 
2 500 000 m2) 
- 2020: 
5 million SWH systems 
installed (approx. 
equivalent to min. 
12 500 000 m2) 
- Overall RE targets by 
2020 (EU Directive):  
34.2% share of RE in 
gross final energy 
demand. 
- Official estimate of 
2020 share of RE 
heating and cooling: 
32.6%  
- Official estimate of 
2020 share of solar 
heating in RE heating 
and cooling: 6.4% 
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fuels, with import levels continually rising (IEA, 
2010a), as well as electricity for water heating 
(Figure 4). 
This contrasts sharply with Israel, another country 
with similar solar resources in the Middle East and 
North Africa (MENA), which has, since the 1980s, 
installed a large amount of SWH. By 2009, close to 
a million systems, nearly exclusively for domestic hot 
water, with an installed capacity of 2848 MWth were 
calculated to be in operation in Israel (cf. Figure 2), 
that is, ten times Tunisia’s operational capacity (cf. 
Table 2) (Weiss and Mauthner, 2011).
Principal strategic drivers for Tunisia’s policy interest 
in promoting SWH are (i) improved energy security 
4 
Main SWH policies and 
incentives 
- Renewable energy 
framework law 
(2004), revised in 
2009 
- Incentive 
programmes 
(grouped as PROSOL) 
since 2005: 
Capital grants, low-
interest loans (via 
SWH suppliers) by 
commercial banks 
- Mandatory use of 
solar water heaters 
in new public 
buildings 
- Solar Water 
Programme (2008) 
(i) Capital cost rebates 
and insurance to 
replace broken electric 
water heaters (for high 
income households) 
(ii) Bulk purchasing by 
dedicated SWH 
organization for mass 
rollout to low- and 
middle-income 
households through 
energy service 
companies (ESCOs)  
- Federal level: 
Capital/invest
ment grants 
- State/Provinci
al level: capital 
grants, 
concessional/ 
low-interest 
loans and 
extended loan 
periods 
 
 
External factors 
Annual average Global 
Horizontal Irradiance 
[kWh/m2/year] 
(Rating)16 
1 980 (H) 2 282 (H) 1 126 (L) 
Relative conventional 
energy costs 
(electricity/ gas or coal) 
M/L L/L M/H 
Relative cost of SWH 
technology17 
H H H 
Electrification rate 
(2009)18 
100% 75% 100% 
GDP (PPP19) per capita 
(2010) in USD 
9,454 10,518 39,761 
Human Development 
Index (HDI) ranking 
(2010) 20 
83rd (of 172 
countries) 
113th (of 172 countries) 25th (of 172 countries) 
 
 
 
 
Based on (IEA-RETD, 2010) and (Hardie, 2011)
Sources: UNDP, 2011; IEA, 2010b; Weiss and Mauthner, 2011
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          Figure 4. Shares of water heater types, Tunisia
          Note: LPG refers to liquid petroleum gas
          Source: Menichetti and Touhami, 2007
by reducing reliance on fossil fuel imports and 
diversifying the country’s fuel mix, (ii) stemming the 
projected growth in electricity demand, especially 
peak load, which is partly due to the increasing use 
of electric water heaters, especially among the urban 
population, and (iii) providing industrial growth and 
employment opportunities in the face of a high 19% 
total unemployment rate, especially among generally 
highly educated young adults.
SWH market and policy experiences in Tunisia
Tunisia has a long-standing interest in exploiting its 
renewable energy resources, which is visible in the 
creation of a dedicated National Renewable Energy 
Agency (ANRE) in 1985, which was replaced by the 
National Energy Management Agency (ANME) in 
2004. Tunisia’s policy support for SWH can roughly 
be divided into five phases (cf. the different colored 
phases denoted by numbers in Figure 5).
Figure 5 illustrates the marked impact on market 
growth in Tunisia of the ‘stop-and-go’ implementation 
of SWH policy programs.
The country first introduced a solar thermal strategy 
in 1984, though it showed little success in the absence 
of joined-up incentives and due to persistent system 
quality issues relating to the poor quality of the SWH 
hardware and a weak maintenance and after-sales 
service network (Alcor and Axenne, 2004). By the 
1990s, the nascent SWH industry was in decline. 
In a second phase, from 1996 onwards, the government 
aimed to revitalise the SWH market by improving the 
competitiveness of SWH relative to the dominant 
conventional LPG option, with a USD 7.3 million 
project financed through multilateral cooperation 
(the Global Environment Facility and the Belgian 
government). The involved capital cost subsidies (35% 
of the system capital cost) stimulated further SWH 
market growth. By the end of 2001, when the available 
subsidy budget (USD 6.6 million) had been exhausted 
two years ahead of schedule, 50,000 M2 of new solar 
thermal panels had been installed, and eight suppliers 
(including three manufacturers) and over 130 installers 
were operating in the market, with a total of 260 new 
jobs created (Missaoui and Amous, 2003; Menichetti 
and Touhami, 2007). 
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Figure 5. SWH market development in Tunisia, 1985-2009
Note: The data for 1985-1996 refer to the cumulative installed collector area as of the end of 1996
Source: Menichetti and Touhami, 2007; Weiss and Mauthner, 2011
In the third phase, which followed the abrupt 
termination of the GEF project due to the depletion 
of its earmarked funds, the Tunisian SWH market 
dropped off dramatically, with annual sales more than 
halving from 17,000 square metres (M2) in 2001 to 
7,500 M2 in 2005. This negative growth phase can 
be attributed to (i) the SWH market not yet having 
reached commercial maturity, i.e., still requiring 
incentive support, and (ii) persistent non-technical 
barriers, such as the lack of consumer financing options 
for SWH, the continued subsidisation of conventional 
fossil fuel options and the negative perception of 
domestically manufactured systems, despite the 
introduction of a quality control system (MVV decon 
and Wuppertal Institute, 2010). 
In a fourth phase from 2005, the persistence by Tunisia’s 
energy management agency ANME in improving 
the framework conditions to ensure a sustainable 
SWH market led to the PROSOL end-user financing 
facility for SWH, initiated by ANME and the (former 
monopoly) state-owned utility Société Tunisienne de 
l’Electricité et de Gaz (STEG) with support from the 
United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) 
through the Italian-backed Mediterranean Renewable 
Energy Programme (MEDREP). The objective 
of PROSOL was to accelerate the penetration of 
solar water heating in Tunisia by targeting domestic 
financial institutions. 
The innovative aspect of PROSOL lies in its efforts 
to actively involve all sector stakeholders, particularly 
the finance sector. By identifying new lending 
opportunities with the aid of targeted capacity-
building, domestic banks started building dedicated 
loan portfolios. 
The main features of the PROSOL financing 
scheme were:
• The provision of loans by commercial banks 
to residential consumers (via accredited system 
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suppliers), covering about 70% of SWH system 
costs, which were repaid through the electricity 
bill. The monthly loan repayments were 
structured to match current monthly spending 
on other forms of energy.
• The commercial banks involved agreed to 
subsidised interest rates, gradually phased out 
after eighteen months, and extended five-year 
consumer loan periods, based on a guarantee 
by STEG.22 
• A 20% capital cost subsidy, funded by the Italian 
government, for 200-litre and 300-litre systems 
up to TND 100 (USD 71.9)23 per square metre 
(M2) of collector surface.
• Consumer eligibility for PROSOL was linked 
to having an existing electricity supply contract 
with STEG, which was authorised to cut 
electricity provision in case of non-payment, 
which in turn led to low levels of payment 
default. This utility-channeled billing helped 
reduce the loan default risk perceived by 
banks, which accepted lower-than-commercial 
loan repayment rates for residential SWH 
system owners.
In this manner, end-users only paid a small part 
(approximately 10%) of the SWH system costs. SWH 
suppliers, on the other hand, were exposed to high 
debt levels, as they were the banks’ intermediaries and 
passed on the financial support to their residential 
customers, the final beneficiaries of PROSOL. 
A series of supportive accompanying measures 
were introduced, consisting of quality standards, 
certification and supplier accreditation schemes, 
extensive public awareness-raising campaigns, capacity-
building programs for ANME officials, financiers and 
installation training (GTZ, 2009). 
The cost of the two-year programme amounted to 
USD 2.4 million funded by the Italian government, 
with USD 1 million used by UNEP for the interest 
rate subsidies and USD 1.4 million by ANME 
for the capital cost subsidies and public awareness 
campaigns (Hack, 2006). An independent third party 
audited the programme in early 2007, which ensured 
transparent monitoring. 
The initial PROSOL programme, which lasted until 
the end of 2006, had a rapid and visible impact on 
market development:
• The SWH market tripled within PROSOL’s first 
year to 23,000 M2 (7,500 systems) installed by 
the end of 2005. In 2006, the 34,000 M2 annual 
surface area installed surpassed the cumulative 
capacity installed between 1985-1996 (cf. Figure 
5). Flat-plate collectors constituted the majority 
of systems, although evacuated tube collectors 
are steadily increasing in market share, from 
2.5% of new installed collector area in 2007 to 
17.4% in 2009 (Weiss and Mauthner, 2011). 
According to the available data, the whole SWH 
collector area is used for hot water production in 
the residential and commercial sectors, with no 
surveyed solar swimming-pool heating (Weiss 
and Mauthner, 2011).
• The supply chain expanded substantially after 
the GEF project (phase 2): the number of SWH 
equipment suppliers increased to 14, among 
them six manufacturers, while there were 
384 installers. 
• Bank loans (by two partner financial 
institutions) to 20,000 households represented a 
value of more than USD 12 million, leveraging 
the programme cost five-fold. Tunisia’s 
sophisticated financial and credit markets and 
highly educated work force certainly played an 
important role in ensuring the rapid expansion 
of credit-based financing for SWH.
An important external factor contributing to the 
sustained market growth for SWH in Tunisia is the 
large size of the country’s middle class,24 representing 
45.6% of the population in 2010 (AfDB, 2010), with 
relatively high levels of disposable income and high 
education levels, as indicated by its HDI ranking (cf. 
Table 2). Home ownership averages 80% of households, 
thanks to affordable mortgages and low interest rates. 
Owner-occupiers are more likely to purchase an SWH 
system with high upfront capital costs or to obtain a 
relevant loan, as the benefits of reduced fossil energy 
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consumption accrue directly to them. The opposite 
is the case for landlords and tenants, who have 
‘split incentives’.25
In a fifth phase, which continues to date, the successful 
outcomes of PROSOL and the enhanced capacity in 
its implementation agencies prompted the Tunisian 
government to set ambitious deployment targets and 
institute a similar SWH support framework, with 
several improvements, as well as additional financing 
measures in national legislation. Policy support for 
SWH is embedded in Tunisia’s wider energy efficiency 
and climate change strategy, which aims (i) to reduce 
the country’s energy intensity by 3% per year between 
2008 and 2011, and (ii) to reduce primary energy 
consumption by 20% over the same period relative 
to a business-as-usual baseline scenario assuming no 
energy efficiency measures.
In 2005, the Tunisian government promulgated 
a framework law, which introduced wide-ranging 
support for energy efficiency and renewable energy 
activities, including solar water heating projects in the 
residential and commercial sectors:
• A 20% capital cost subsidy, up to TND 100 
(USD 71.9) per square metre (M2), for all new 
SWH installations. 
• The interest rate for bank loans for residential 
use was set at the ‘Tunisian money market 
monthly average rate (TMM) + 1.5%’. Thus, in 
July 2011 for example, the interest rate charged 
would have been 4.25% (TMM) + 1.5% 
= 5.75%.
• The financial support for SWH systems 
stems from a newly implemented energy 
efficiency fund FNME. These incentives are 
funded by tax revenues from motor vehicle 
registrations and VAT and custom duties on 
air-conditioning systems.
• Indirect tax benefits: exemption of SWH 
systems from VAT and reduced 10% 
customs duties.
• Regulatory policy mandating the use of SWHs 
in new public buildings.
These measures have helped level the playing field 
between SWH systems and the subsidised fossil fuel 
alternatives, LPG-fueled and electric boilers.
Since 2007, Tunisia has developed three new 
financial support mechanisms based on PROSOL 
for the residential, tertiary (service and tourism) and 
industrial sectors:
1. The ‘PROSOL II’ programme introduced 
improvements to the existing residential 
PROSOL initiative co-financed by UNEP. 
The main changes include the direct granting 
of loans to residential customers to reduce 
the debt burden on suppliers, a wider choice 
of loan/credit levels and the simplification 
of administrative procedures. By the end of 
2008, 80,000 M2 of collector surface had been 
installed, and a network of 30 suppliers and 733 
installation and service professionals created. 
The programme aims to install 390,000 M2 
of solar collectors in the residential and small 
business sectors by 2011.
2. The ‘PROSOL Tertiary’ programme, 
implemented in late 2007, targets SWH system 
penetration in tourism-related complexes, such 
as hotels, public bathhouses and collective 
buildings, e.g., private clinics. An innovative 
component is an incentive to cover maintenance 
costs, the absence of which had contributed 
to a substantial share of earlier SWH systems 
installed during the GEF project no longer 
functioning by 2007. Nevertheless, contrary 
to the success of the residential PROSOL 
programme, PROSOL Tertiary failed to achieve 
its installation target of 45,000 M2 collector area 
in 80-100 hotels between 2007-2009, having 
installed only some 2,000 M2 in 19 hotels by 
early 2011 (MEDREC, 2008; CFO, 2011).
 The lower demand in the tertiary sector than 
in the residential sector, despite a higher 
30% investment cost ceiling, is due to 
several challenges:
o Higher administrative burdens.
o The incentives only include capital cost 
subsidies: no bank loans are offered.
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o Hotels remain skeptical about the technical 
maturity of SWH systems in the face of 
constant hot water demand. 
o Commercial installations can obtain 
subsidised natural gas, which is cheaper 
than the LPG alternative for residential 
consumers.
o An additional obstacle might be the 
possibility of insufficient carbon finance 
revenues (detailed below), which were 
expected to replace the financing from 
the Italian government and UNEP from 
2009 onwards.
3.  The ‘PROSOL Industrial’ initiative, introduced 
in 2008, targets industries able to use solar 
thermal heat in their processes, e.g., food 
processing. Forty prefeasibility studies had been 
completed by the end of 2010. 
Recognizing that annual SWH market growth 
was averaging 20-30% (cf. Figure 5) and that the 
installed SWH collector area in 2009 (405,000 M2) 
was fast approaching the earlier target of 540,000 
M2 by 2011, the Tunisian government set a much 
more ambitious target of installing 750,000 M2 over 
the period 2010-2014. Such a market expansion to 
approximately 1 million M2 cumulative capacity by 
2014 would involve market growth rates comparable 
to those in much larger and more populous 
countries such as Spain or Italy (Menichetti and 
Touhami, 2007).  
In late 2009, the government boosted the ambition 
level of its solar energy promotion with the launch 
of the first Tunisian Solar Plan (TSP) 2010-2016. 
The TSP aims to increase the country’s share of (non-
biomass) renewable energy in primary energy from 
0.8% in 2008 to 4.3% in 2014, within an overall 
objective to reduce energy consumption by 20% and 
reduce annual greenhouse gas emissions by 1.3 million 
tonnes of CO2 eq. (representing 6.3% of the country’s 
2008 fuel combustion-related CO2 emissions) between 
2010 and 2016. This is a tacit acknowledgement on 
the part of the previous Tunisian government that the 
previous policy framework had been insufficient to 
achieve the earlier target of 11% renewable energy in 
primary energy demand by 2011. The USD 2.6 billion 
strategy, relying heavily on private-sector participation 
and foreign developers, covers forty projects relating 
to the use and manufacturing of SWH systems, solar 
photovoltaic systems, and concentrating solar power 
units for electricity generation. 
Notwithstanding the change in regime in January 
2011, the new Tunisian government is showing a 
commitment to continue supporting the widespread 
adoption of energy efficiency and renewable energy 
policies towards achieving their targets. 
Tunisia’s involvement in international cooperation 
projects on renewable energy and climate change 
serves to complement and reinforce the sustainability 
of its existing national policy efforts. ‘PROSOL II’ and 
‘PROSOL Tertiary’ programs have both been approved 
as a programmatic Clean Development Mechanism 
(CDM) activity. Revenues from the sale of CDM 
carbon credits from both programs will be used to 
fund the PROSOL tertiary programme. International 
donor funding also forms part of the TSP.
The successful establishment of a self-sustaining SWH 
market through PROSOL has stimulated a new 
multilateral initiative to transform and strengthen 
SWH markets globally, established in 2009 in five 
countries (Algeria, Lebanon, India, Mexico and 
Chile) (Usher, 2010). The programme focus, as 
in PROSOL, is on designing and implementing 
tailored financing mechanisms to make capital-
intensive SWH competitive with conventional heating 
systems in the different markets and on building 
stakeholders’ capacity. 
Assessment of Tunisia’s SWH policy support 
Tunisia’s experience with the PROSOL umbrella of 
SWH policy programs is assessed against the different 
evaluation criteria. Due to a lack of consistent data 
on programme monitoring and verification, Table 3 
uses qualitative scores – positive (+), neutral (o) and 
negative (-) – to make the assessments comparable 
between Tunisia and South Africa.
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Table 3. Evaluation of Tunisia’s SWH policy promotion
6 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Indicator Score Details 
Administrative ease for the 
applicant 
+ Very simple mechanism 
Administrative ease for the 
implementation agency 
+ - The pre-existing infrastructure of the public utility 
STEG can be used for the loan payback 
- Low bureaucratic effort, because banks and 
producers can be involved as well 
Institutional capacity + The Tunisian energy agency ANME already had long 
experience of managing renewable energy and energy 
efficiency programs before the introduction of 
PROSOL. The emphasis on capacity-building within the 
initial PROSOL program helped further enhance the 
ability of the Tunisian implementing body to effectively 
manage and monitor the policy promotion for the 
large-scale deployment of SWH systems. 
Public awareness and 
acceptance 
+ The wide-ranging and focused information campaigns 
across all communication media in Tunisia, which 
formed part of the PROSOL program design and were 
organized by ANME with support from the 
international project partners, have helped inform the 
educated population about the costs involved and the 
benefits gained from using SWH.   
Stringent quality assurance + Current situation: SWH products must meet technical 
requirements, efficiency and performance standards 
set by ANME 
Quality labels are gradually being introduced: 
- PROSOL installers: require Qualisol certification 
- PROSOL suppliers: no product quality label yet 
implemented in the Tunisian market. Ongoing national 
regulatory move to make EU quality label for collectors 
Solar Keymark mandatory for PROSOL accreditation. 
Private sector participation and 
market orientation 
+ Participation of banking sector, producers, the national 
energy agency as well as the public utility STEG 
Credibility and predictability  + • Credible framework, because incentive framework 
remains unchanged for households for the 
duration of support 
• Predictable policy with targets and policy support 
embedded in multi-year economic development 
plans 
• The financial sector gained confidence, so that 
banks finally began to offer credits directly to 
households to purchase SWHs. 
contd.
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South Africa
Background
South Africa has an excellent solar resource (cf. Table 
2), with up to 3800 hours of sunshine per year, 
even in large metropolitan areas, where most of the 
projected energy demand growth is concentrated 
(Edkins et al., 2010a). SWH’s very high technical 
potential could meet about 80% of South Africa’s 
residential hot water demand (ibid.). Water heating 
represents a relatively large 40% share of residential 
electricity use, which in turn constitutes 17% of 
the country’s total electricity consumption (Hardie, 
2011). However, despite the large potential that SWH 
presents, the country continues to rely heavily on 
7 
Sustainable impact on market 
development 
o • PROSOL has fostered the establishment of solar 
thermal industry 
• The credit-based system and market growth has 
become self-sustaining with the phase-out of 
interest subsidy on the residential (and small 
business) loans. 
• However, the medium-term funding for the SWH 
capital cost subsidies needs to be placed on a more 
sustainable footing, because the revenue stream 
from the national energy efficiency fund FNME is 
highly cyclical. The dependence on the public 
budget and therefore on economic cycles presents 
a high risk of diversion of revenue for other 
purposes. 
Capacity additions since 
inception 
+ • PROSOL-linked results (end of 2009): 285 000 m2 
installed collector surface (95 000 units)  
• Total cumulative capacity installed in Tunisian 
market (end 2009): 405 000 m2  
Average annual market growth 
rate 
+ Since PROSOL inception (2005-2009):  
29% average annual growth rate  
Investment volume + • Total SWH market value for period 2005-2008: USD 
80 million 
• Bank loans: USD 47 million (end 2009), compared 
with USD 2.4 million cost of initial PROSOL program  
• Avoided LPG subsidies: about USD 17 million (TND 
19.7 million) in 2005-6. 
Carbon emission reductions + PROSOL results: 0.55 million tonnes of CO2 equivalent 
(2.7% of Tunisia’s carbon emissions from fuel 
combustion in 2008)  
Domestic industry growth o 2009: 1000 qualified installers (tenfold increase rel. to 
2002); 42 suppliers (fourfold increase rel. to 2002);  
6 manufacturers (as of 2008) – the current market 
seems to still depends on imported systems, e.g. from 
China 
Employment creation + As of end 2010: approximately 5000 jobs in 
manufacturing, importing and supplying SWH systems 
 
 
 
Sources: author’s own analysis; Hack, 2006; Usher, 2010; Menichetti and Touhami, 2007; Weiss and 
Mauthner, 2011; IEA, 2010e
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electricity for water heating in urban electrified areas26 
and traditional unsustainable use of biomass in rural 
non-electrified areas.
South Africa’s energy market is relatively large, with a 
population of 49.3 million in 2010. Its medium human 
development ranking is lower than Tunisia’s, with high 
levels of inequality in terms of income and access to 
education (cf. Table 2). The country ranks as the third-
most competitive economy on the continent (50th in 
the World Economic Forum’s global competitiveness 
ranking 2011-12).27
The country’s electricity sector is characterised by:
• a monopoly supplier, Eskom, which also 
dominates generation capacity;
• a history of supplying cheap electricity, 
generated by domestic coal resources, with non-
cost recovering tariffs and high levels of non-
payment by customers;
• a lack of investment in generation and 
transmission capacity and resulting electricity 
shortages. This led to a wave of rolling blackouts 
and power rationing after 2008; and
• a relatively low 75% overall electrification rate 
in 2008 (88% in urban areas, 55% in rural 
areas) (Edkins et al., 2010a).
South Africa’s principal driver for promoting SWH 
systems is the aspiration to reduce energy consumption, 
as electric water heaters, which are the main heating 
option, contribute to peak power demands and 
frequent power rationing. Notwithstanding the 
energy-intensive nature of South Africa’s major 
economic sectors, electricity demand has increased 
disproportionately (53% between 1990 and 2008), 
while no new generating capacity was commissioned 
between 2000 and 2006. 
Additional strategic reasons for introducing a SWH 
policy framework are (Hardie, 2011):
• Reducing the economy’s carbon intensity: 
South Africa’s reliance on domestic cheap fossil 
fuel sources has meant that the country is an 
inefficient energy user and one of the world’s 
leading contributors to greenhouse gas (GHG) 
emissions (13th largest global emitter and 
eighth highest per capita emitter (IEA, 2010e)). 
• Industrial growth strategy: Large-scale SWH 
market and industry development has a high 
potential to generate wide socio-economic 
benefits, including job creation to combat high 
unemployment28 (which is prevalent among 
disadvantaged black youth), local manufacturing 
capacities and export opportunities (Edkins et 
al., 2010b). 
• Energy poverty reduction and social uplift: 
There is growing policy awareness that SWH 
use can alleviate energy poverty by reducing the 
vulnerability of low-income households, which 
often do not have access to electricity, and 
increasing their social, financial and physical 
capital stock (Wlokas, 2011).
SWH market and policy experiences in  
South Africa
South Africa’s solar water heating market is made up 
of a large share of unglazed collectors (cf. Table 2), 
which, because of their low efficiency (no thermal 
insulation nor physical protection), are mostly used 
for swimming-pool heating. This market segment, 
which shows relatively constant growth, is generally 
not supported by incentive policies and therefore is 
not the focus of this article. 
In comparison, the glazed collector (flat-plate and 
evacuated tube) market sector has not experienced 
smooth and constant growth in the past thirty years. 
Following an early growth spike in 1979-1983, the 
market stagnated until 2005. While a general renewable 
energy target of 10,000 TWh by 2013 (about 4% of 
projected electricity demand) was set in the 2003 
Renewable Energy White Paper, towards which SWH 
was projected to contribute 13% (or 1,300 TWh), the 
target was not accompanied by a policy framework.
Instead, rapid SWH market growth (see Figure 6), with 
system sales increasing by 42% annually, coincided 
with the extended period of power curtailment and 
load shedding between 2005 and 2008, due mainly to 
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a concerted information campaign by Eskom (Edkins 
et al., 2010a). However, domestically manufactured 
supply lagged considerably behind demand growth 
at that time, with a national manufacturing supply of 
10,000 M2 compared to 30,000 M2 of glazed collector 
demand in 2008 (Edkins et al., 2010a).
Successful municipal strategies to support SWH 
paved the way for a national SWH programme. In 
2006 Cape Town implemented its energy and climate 
change strategy, which included a 2010 goal of a 
10% penetration of SWH in all households and in 
municipality-owned housing. In total, this represented 
approximately 88,000 systems. To achieve its target, 
the city government has drafted an energy-efficient 
water-heating by-law or building regulation requiring 
the installation in new housing, public buildings and 
extensions to existing buildings of SWHs or other 
energy-efficient water-heating equipment using a 
maximum of 30% of the energy of a standard electric 
standard hot water boiler. However, legal challenges 
have delayed the building regulation’s implementation 
since 2007.
Pilot projects in the Cape Town metropolitan region, 
e.g., Kuyasa (2,300 SWH systems), the first South 
African CDM project and the first Gold Standard 
CDM project worldwide, and in Nelson Mandela Bay 
Municipality (60,000 SWH systems), tested innovative 
financing mechanisms. In a leasing model, accredited 
energy service companies (ESCOs) or a municipal 
SWH entity install SWH systems for participating 
customers, who pay a fixed municipal service levy 
through their monthly water bill to repay the SWH 
investment cost. The ESCO or municipal SWH entity 
remains the owner of the system until the initial cost 
outlay is recovered. Municipal SWH entities, which 
are responsible for mass rollouts of SWH system for 
low-income groups, have the benefit of being able to 
buy down individual system costs.
In response to the electricity supply crisis, Eskom initiated 
a demand-side management (DSM) programme 
in 2008, which also comprised a National Solar 
Water Heating Program (NSWHP) to contribute to 
achieving the 2013 renewable energy target. Revenue 
from annual average electricity tariff increases of 25% 
between 2010 and 2013 is partly dedicated to financing 
the government’s renewable energy strategy, including 
Eskom’s SWH subsidy scheme, detailed below.
The phased programme objectives are to (i) install 
1 million SWH systems by 2014, and (ii) 5 million 
systems by 2020, which is projected to be equivalent to 
a 50% share of residential water heating. The NSWHP 
adopts a phased approach in order to increase national 
SWH production capacity and create a high-quality 
supply chain, which is anticipated to benefit from 
industrial financing:
• Annual installation capacity should 
increase from 35,000 units in 2009 to 
250,000 units by 2013/14.
 Annual manufacturing capacity should increase 
from currently 20,000 units per year to 200,000 
units by 2013/14 (Hardie, 2011).
The NSWHP divides the potential SWH market into 
three target segments by income bracket: 
1. High-income group (income levels above ZAR 
16 000 – USD 232229), with a market size of 
approximately 1.2 million households. 
o The target in terms of installed systems is 
210,000 by 2014 and 560,000 by 2020. 
o The main incentives applied are (i) an 
Eskom-administered capital cost subsidy 
or rebate scheme, and (ii) compulsory 
replacement of phased-out electric water 
heaters by SWH systems by home insurers. 
o Rebates are available for (domestically 
manufactured and imported) systems 
supplied by accredited producers and 
installers, which satisfy the minimum 
standards set by the national standards 
bureau. Rebate levels are subject to 
decreases depending on the evolution of 
market growth.
2. Middle-income group (income levels ZAR 6,000-
16,000 – USD 871-2322xxviii), with a market 
size of approximately 3 million households. 
o The target in terms of installed systems is 
450,000 by 2014 and 1,750,000 by 2020. 
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o The main measure with which to achieve 
these ambitious targets is the introduction 
of a dedicated SWH entity, with a national 
mandate to procure SWH systems for mass 
rollout. The main aim of such a SWH 
‘champion’ is to provide affordable systems 
by bulk-buying low-cost quality units, e.g., 
through standard offers, tendering large 
supply contracts and carefully managing 
the supply chain. This delivery mechanism 
is expected to make use of leasing schemes 
with energy service arrangements, as in the 
Cape Town pilot project.
3. Low-income group (income levels below ZAR 
6,000 – USD 871), with a market size of about 
6.6 million households.
o The target in terms of installed systems is 
340,000 by 2014 and 2,690,000 by 2020. 
 As under 2. (Hardie, 2011).
Thus, the South African government is evidently 
focusing its policy efforts in the first phase of the 
NSWHP to 2014 on expanding the SWH market 
among high- (and middle-income) households, 
which can more easily afford to purchase the capital-
intensive systems on an individual basis. This focus 
is meant to allow the domestic industry to scale up 
sufficiently so as to meet the mass rollout objectives 
for the low- and middle-income population segments 
in the second programme phase to 2020. As of mid-
2011, the planned national SWH entity had not yet 
been instituted, threatening the achievement of up 
to 75% (i.e., the low- and middle-income market 
segments) of the envisaged 1 million installed systems 
by 2014. 
However, market growth for glazed collectors since 
implementation of the NSWHP has not been smooth 
(Figure 6). 
It is important to note that in the initial phases of the 
NSWHP (2008-2009) most SWH market growth 
occurred outside the Eskom rebate scheme. This trend 
is probably linked to the lengthy waiting period for 
testing SWH equipment to obtain approval to qualify 
for the Eskom subsidy scheme. 
As Figure 6 shows, the entire glazed collector market 
more than doubled between 2007 and 2008 to 39,000 
M2 of new collector area, but then declined in 2009 to 
34,000 M2. This downward trend was probably due to 
a combination of the economic downturn and public 
mistrust of the inadequate quality of hardware (e.g., 
low-quality Chinese imports) and faulty installations 
not accredited under the Eskom rebate scheme.
The Eskom subsidy scheme did not have a significant 
impact when it was first introduced at the beginning 
of 2008 with a 25% capital cost ceiling, leading to an 
uptake of only 1,000 new systems under the NSWHP 
in 2008. Therefore, in early 2010 Eskom doubled 
the available rebates to stimulate market demand and 
allow for a five-year payback period for SWH systems, 
which falls within the average 4-8 year payback period 
for the conventional electric alternative (Edkins et al., 
2009a). Depending on collector efficiency and the 
system’s local content share, the rebates ranged from 
ZAR 3,000-12,000 (USD 435-1742), compared with 
a unit cost range of ZAR 15,000-35,000 (USD 2 177-
5 060). The average rebate covered 35% of the capital 
cost and about 28% of the total installed cost of a 
SWH system (Hardie, 2011). With these increases in 
the capital cost incentive and improved administrative 
procedures for consumers, 60,000 new systems were 
installed under the Eskom rebate scheme in 2010. This 
marked increase in consumer demand and resulting 
budgetary pressure led in turn to Eskom’s decision 
to reduce the available rebates for newly installed 
systems by an average of 10-25% from 30 April 
2011 (Engineering News Online, 14 April 2011). In 
addition, rebate restrictions have now been imposed to 
avoid the promotion of oversized systems. 
In terms of multilateral support, in late 2009 the 
World Bank-managed Climate Technology Fund 
(CTF) approved USD 500 million to support South 
Africa’s renewable energy and energy efficiency 
objectives. Policy and regulatory support for SWH 
systems is an important component of the investment 
plan. For example, the CTF funds aim to help 
develop the administrative and financing capacity of 
municipal power distribution companies (MPDs), 
which, as bodies involved in the mass rollout of 
SWH systems in the NSWHP, will be vital players 
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in expanding household SWH use. Expected uses of 
CTF financing include low-interest loans to MPDs 
to support the bulk purchase of SWH systems, risk 
guarantees for customer payment defaults under 
ESCO leasing mechanisms, and low-interest loans 
to SWH suppliers to facilitate their initial market 
entry and expansion needs. Thus, these international 
cooperation funds are anticipated to help support the 
creation of a sustainable domestic industry capable 
of meeting the country’s large-scale deployment 
objectives (CIF, 2009). 
In its 2008 programme, the NSWHP targeted the 
amendment of the national building regulations, 
following on from existing municipal policy drives, 
to incorporate an energy efficiency obligation on 
new or refurbished buildings to cover at least 50% of 
hot water demand by energy-efficient technologies, 
including SWH systems. This regulatory pull would 
help generate a sustained demand for SWH systems, 
encouraging national suppliers to increase their 
production and installation capacities.  However, the 
introduction of the energy-efficient building code has 
encountered delays and will only come into effect in 
November 2011.
The outlook for the NSWHP to achieve at least its 
short-term 2014 targets is uncertain. While the rebate 
scheme has a high likelihood of meeting the objective 
of 210,000 installations in high-income households 
based on the latest market trends, this is not the case 
for the mass rollout of low-cost systems to low- and 
middle-income consumers. Without as yet a dedicated 
SWH entity charged with managing this substantial 
logistical challenge, it is unlikely that the majority 
of the targeted 790,000 systems will be installed 
by 2014. 
Barriers to SWH market penetration in  
South Africa
As the previous section indicated, continued challenges 
to sustained SWH market growth in South Africa 
comprise demand and supply barriers.
Figure 6. SWH market development in South Africa, 1998-2009
Source: Edkins et al., 2010a; Weiss and Mauthner, 2011
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Demand-side barriers include:
• High upfront capital costs that need to be met 
in advance of the rebate being reclaimed. The 
average rebate payment period is eight weeks.
• High financing costs for consumers in the 
absence of low interest rate loans.
• Low and subsidised electricity rates below cost-
recovery levels.
• Lack of awareness regarding the benefits of 
SWH system use and environmental aspects.
• Competition from incumbent electric boiler 
technology with high production volumes and 
low costs.
Supply-side barriers include:
• Quality issues: (i) lack of quality control and 
standards for systems not accredited under 
Eskom’s rebate scheme; (ii) onerous, lengthy 
and high costs of compliance in terms of 
equipment standards and installation guidelines 
for suppliers and consumers to qualify for the 
Eskom rebate scheme.
• Low research and development (R&D) 
investment: because of low investor confidence 
in the credibility of the government’s 
promotion strategy.
• Low economies of scale.
• Skills shortages, especially for SWH system 
installation, which is more labour-intensive 
than for electric water heaters and requires 
different skills.
• Unsupportive external environment (especially 
critical for small enterprises): e.g., restrictive 
employment legislation, high costs of regulatory 
compliance, high crime rates.
While it does not necessarily impede demand for SWH 
systems, sustained competition from low-cost imports 
(40% of the 2009 market) constitute a barrier to the 
establishment of a domestic industry, as the lack of 
investor confidence reduces the willingness to invest in 
the necessary capital structure (Hardie, 2011; Edkins 
et al. 2010a).
The outlook for the NSWHP to reach at least its short-
term goals by 2014 are uncertain. While the Eskom 
capital-cost incentive scheme is likely to help sustain 
market growth to meet the objective for the high-
income segment, the planned mass rollout of SWH 
systems is much less likely to scale up to the level 
needed to achieve the much higher number of system 
installations for low- and middle-income households. 
A fundamental obstacle is the continued absence of 
a dedicated organisation charged with initiating and 
managing this logistical challenge. Evidently, the 
achievement of the medium-term goals to 2020 is 
considerably more difficult to predict. 
Table 4 assesses South Africa’s experience with 
the NSWHP programme against the different 
evaluation criteria.
Conclusions and recommendations
When looking to introduce SWH technology options in 
their economies, developing countries can benefit from 
the international experience, policy lessons, technical 
advances and cost reductions resulting from large-scale 
market deployments of commercially mature SWH 
technologies in first-mover countries. Nevertheless, 
the introduction of new energy technologies is likely 
to be accompanied by deployment challenges that are 
specific to the national context. Thus, in order for the 
market penetration of a new technology to progress 
sustainably and in line with target objectives, policy 
support should be carefully adapted to national 
market circumstances and accompanied by concerted 
measures to develop and enhance the capacity of all the 
stakeholders involved, including suppliers, regulators, 
the public and the finance community. 
Effective policy options to scale up SWH in 
developing countries 
For a policy to be successful, it has to provide efficient 
and effective ways of increasing renewable energy 
capacity (cf. IEA 2008b). Solar thermal heat offers 
enormous potential in Africa for providing domestic 
hot water production and to some extent industrial 
process heat. 
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Table 4. Evaluation of South Africa’s SWH policy promotion
9 
 
 
 
Indicator Score Details 
Administrative ease for the 
applicant 
o • The administrative procedures for the SWH system 
end-user to apply for the rebate are relatively 
straightforward, though the numerous installation 
requirements impose additional costs. 
• However, the waiting period for the direct financial 
transfer/rebate receipt combined with the absence of 
concessional loans for residential buyers, i.e. a high 
upfront investment cost, may dissuade a sizable share 
of the potential market. 
Administrative ease for the 
implementation agency 
- The Eskom rebate scheme entails complex accreditation 
procedures to be managed by Eskom. 
Institutional capacity o • Eskom is deepening its experience in managing the 
SWH capital-cost rebate scheme 
• However, in sharp contrast, the planned SWH  
‘champion’ to manage the mass rollout of low-cost 
systems for the majority of the population has not 
even been created yet. 
Public awareness and 
acceptance 
o • Government information campaigns are gradually 
improving public understanding of SWH systems. 
• However, overall public acceptance of SWH is still 
relatively low due to mistrust of technical quality 
linked to a continued large proportion of low-quality 
systems in the market, though they are not approved 
for the Eskom subsidy scheme. 
Stringent quality assurance o • While the minimum accreditation standards set by the 
national standards bureau are suitably high, the delays 
due to insufficient testing facility resources are too 
burdensome for suppliers. 
• The lack of quality control for the large portion of 
systems not approved under the Eskom scheme is a 
severe problem, causing public mistrust and 
undermining the overall success of the NSWHP.  
Private sector 
participation/market 
orientation 
o • Private-sector system suppliers form an integral part 
of the NSWHP and were consulted on the design of 
the policy framework. 
• However, the market orientation of the SWH 
promotion system is not evident, e.g. there are no 
financing products for system purchase using existing 
credit markets. 
Credibility and predictability  - • At its current status, the NSWHP is not very credible: 
the delivery mechanism (national SWH entity) to 
achieve the bulk of the 2014 target market has not yet 
been implemented, slowing down the development of 
a full domestic supply-chain.  
• The NSWHP support scheme (rebate scheme) is not 
very predictable: the Eskom rebate provisions are 
subject to unexpected (and not clearly communicated) 
changes depending on public budget constraints. 
contd.
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Sources: author’s own analysis; Hack, 2006; Weiss and Mauthner, 2011; Theobald and Cawood, 2009
10 
Sustainable impact on market 
development 
o • The outlook for the achievement of the NSWHP 
market objectives of 1 million SWH installed by 2014 
and 5 million by 2020 is uncertain (see analysis in 
previous section). Nonetheless, there is a high 
likelihood of the high-income category target being 
achieved based on recent market growth trends. 
• The NSWHP has not (yet) implemented credible 
measures capable of gradually moving the SWH 
market towards self-sustainability 
Capacity additions since 
inception 
o • Additional capacity installed linked to NSWHP 
incentives (Eskom rebate scheme): not publicly 
available 
• Total additional capacity installed since NSWHP 
inception: 73,489 m2 (2008-2009) + 60,000 units 
(approx. 100,000 m2) in 2010 = approx. 173,000 m2 
(2008-2010)  
• Total cumulative capacity installed in South African 
market (end 2009): 309,682 m2; (end 2010): approx. 
410,000 m2 
Average annual market growth 
rate 
o • Since NSWHP inception (2008-2010):  
20% average annual growth rate 
• In 2010: 32% annual market growth rate  
Investment volume n/a30 Data not publicly available 
Carbon emission reductions n/a Data not publicly available 
Domestic industry growth o 2010: approx. 190 suppliers accredited by Eskom rebate 
scheme; total number of suppliers: approx. 400 
2009: Available annual production capacity (domestic 
manufacturers and importers): 200,000 m2 
Employment creation o 2009: 700 people employed mainly in small new 
businesses 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
South Africa’s mixed experience with investment 
cost subsidies, as in several industrialised economies 
(cf. Steinbach et al., 2011), highlights the risk of 
unpredictable changes to subsidy levels due to the 
instrument’s dependence on public budgets and the 
importance of streamlined administrative processes 
to attract end-users. When direct financial incentives 
are implemented, they should offer incentives by 
energy (kWh) or capacity (kW or M2) rather than as a 
percentage of installed cost. This reduces the likelihood 
of market price distortions and the prevalence of 
oversized installations. 
On the hand, regulatory incentives such as solar 
building obligations have proved to be very effective 
and should be considered in all African countries, 
given their vast solar resources. Nevertheless, a major 
drawback of renewable energy building obligations is 
the necessary monitoring to ensure that the building 
code is being observed. 
Innovative financial policies, such as the PROSOL 
scheme in Tunisia, which is aimed at shifting the solar 
thermal market from a cash-based to a credit-based 
market, could be effective in other countries where 
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private consumers lack the necessary capital to cover 
upfront system costs. The role of commercial financial 
institutions is key because it can place the financing 
of SWH systems on a competitive and sustainable 
footing (cf. Srinivasan, 2009). In addition, bank 
lending can give policy-makers the assurance that 
SWH systems are technically mature. The experiences 
of UNEP in designing and implementing the 
PROSOL project suggests that banks require a scale 
of a minimum of 10,000 loans to continue expanding 
their lending portfolio independently of the initial 
policy programme (Usher, 2010).
Besides the specific design of the main support 
instrument, a country’s framework conditions also 
need to be conducive to encourage large-scale SWH 
penetration (IEA, 2008b). A key challenge in opening 
up the market for renewable heat in many developing 
(as well as industrialised) countries consists of raising 
awareness that heat demand is responsible for an 
important part of final energy demand, and is thus an 
important issue in realizing CO2 emission reductions, 
energy security and fuel diversification. Tunisia has 
overcome this issue with targeted ongoing public 
information campaigns.
Concerted capacity-building is a fundamental element 
in establishing a sustainable market for SWH, which 
eventually becomes competitive without financial 
incentives. Educational and technical assistance 
(whether through national or international channels) 
should be offered to implementing agencies, system 
suppliers and installers. 
The experiences of Tunisia and South Africa also show 
how international development cooperation, such as 
UNEP’s backing of PROSOL in Tunisia and the World 
Bank’s CTF financing support for the NSWHP in 
South Africa, can effectively complement and leverage 
but not replace concerted and monitored national 
policy efforts. Taking ‘ownership’ of a promotion 
system should help ensure that national stakeholders, 
especially the responsible implementing agencies, 
equipped with sufficient training, move towards 
the large-scale market objectives in a transparent, 
consistent and efficient manner. 
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Annex 1
SWH technology overview
Solar energy is the most abundant energy resource on 
earth, with the total annual solar irradiance reaching 
the earth’s surface (approximately 3,400,000 EJ1 or 
944,444,444 TWh1) exceeding the world’s total 
annual primary energy demand in 2008 (514 EJ 
or 142,712 TWh) by a factor of more than 7,500 
(Thirugnanasambandam et al., 2010; IEA, 2010a). 
Besides its abundance, solar energy is versatile: 
it can be harnessed through different conversion 
processes – providing electricity or useful heat – for 
a variety of end-use applications, at different scales, 
temperature levels and degrees of grid connection, 
e.g., water pumping, domestic hot water, swimming-
pool heating, industrial processes (sterilisation, water 
desalination), and large-scale grid-connected power 
(IEA, 2008a; IEA, 2009). 
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Active solar heating technologies1 use solar energy to 
provide heat. The components within a solar thermal 
system vary depending on the application, but always 
include a collector to capture the sun’s radiation and 
a conversion system to transform the energy into a 
useful heat output. Advanced systems have storage 
and/or a back-up system that uses an alternate (often 
conventional) fuel, such as natural gas. Solar radiation 
is captured by the collector and then stored as thermal 
energy in a circulating fluid, e.g., refrigerant/water or 
antifreeze/air. The heated fluid cools an absorber and 
then transfers the thermal energy to the second part of 
the system (tank), where it is converted into a useful 
heat output and distributed with fans, pumps and 
pipes for a variety of end-uses (IEA, 2009).
SWH systems can be distinguished by two main 
characteristics:
• Active systems, which include circulation pumps 
and controls, or passive systems, which rely on 
natural convection to move the heat transfer 
fluid between the collector and the tank. Active 
systems are generally more expensive and more 
efficient than passive ones. However, the latter 
are often more robust and reliable, requiring less 
maintenance due to the absence of a pump and 
controller. Nevertheless, passive systems, e.g., 
thermosiphon1 systems, are prone to freezing 
and overheating and are therefore more suited 
to moderate though sunny climates.
• Direct (‘open loop’) or indirect (‘closed loop’) 
systems. Direct systems circulate household 
water directly through the collectors to the 
tank, while indirect systems circulate a heat-
transfer fluid (e.g., distilled water or diluted 
antifreeze) through the collectors and then use a 
heat exchanger to transfer the heat to household 
water. Because of their sophistication, indirect 
systems are more expensive but offer the 
advantage of freeze and overheating protection.
The temperature required for each end-use dictates the 
type of collector used to harness the thermal energy. 
Collectors can be designed to provide water- and space-
heating at a household scale with low temperature 
requirements (20°-80°C), but the technology is also 
being increasingly employed at larger scale to provide 
hot water for commercial and industrial operations 
with medium temperature requirements (80°-250°C), 
as in the food sector in Austria and other countries, 
or linked to district heating installations. The main 
collector technologies include unglazed and glazed 
flat plate, vacuum or evacuated tubes. For residential 
and commercial water and space heating, glazed flat 
plate and evacuated tube collectors (which dominate 
the Chinese market) are the most popular. Unglazed 
systems are used for swimming-pool heating. 
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Endnotes
1. Mtoe = million (106) tonnes of oil equivalent (toe).
2. The subscripts ‘el’ and ‘th’, e.g., GWel and GWth, refer respectively to 
electric power and thermal power produced. 
3. These estimates are thought to represent approximately 90% of 
the actual installed global capacity, as some data gaps exist (Weiss 
and Mauthner, 2011).
4. The presented data were originally collected in square metres. 
A methodology agreed between international experts uses a 
conversion factor of 0.7 kWth/M
2 to derive the nominal 
capacity from the installed solar collector area (Weiss and 
Mauthner, 2011).
5. It is important to note that in South Africa unglazed collectors 
make up the largest market share, e.g., 71% of total operational 
capacity (744 MWth) in 2009. However, due to its status as 
a luxury good, the market for swimming-pool heating was 
significantly affected by the economic contraction in 2008-9, 
with a 46.1% decline in 2009 annual installations (Weiss and 
Mauthner, 2011).
6. By year-end 2010, Germany held a 44% share both of worldwide 
cumulative installed solar PV capacity and new capacity additions 
(REN, 2011). 
7. Detailed cost ranges for current SWH systems are given in  
(IEA and IEA-RETD, 2007), while (IEA, 2011) provides 
projections for future evolution of SWH costs under different 
long-term scenarios.
8. The exchange rate used is USD 1 = CNY 6.45 (average exchange 
rate on 15 July 2011).
9. Solar obligations are a common regulatory instrument requiring 
solar energy to supply a minimum share of heat demand in new 
and renovated buildings.
10. For in-depth discussions of policy experiences and good practice 
for SWH market penetration in OECD countries, see (IEA and 
IEA-RETD, 2007) and (IEA-RETD, 2010). For a deeper analysis 
of European Union (EU) countries, refer to (Connor et al., 2009).
11. (Weiss and Mauthner, 2011).
12. For the purposes of this article, the term ‘glazed’ collector 
encompasses glazed flat-plate and evacuated tube collectors, which 
are used for hot water preparation and space heating, which is the 
focus of this study. In contrast, unglazed flat-plate collectors are 
used for swimming-pool heating.
13. The penetration of SWH systems in Tunisia is very low relative 
to other energy sources. This is evident from the fact that 
solar energy’s contribution to final energy consumption in the 
residential, commercial and public-service sectors – which is 
dominated by hot water production and space heating – is too 
small even to be captured in energy statistics. In 2009, fossil fuels 
(oil products, such as liquid petroleum gas or LPG and natural 
gas) represented 41% of final energy consumption in these sectors, 
followed by (mostly traditional use of ) biomass (in the residential 
sector only) (37%) and electricity (22%) (IEA, 2011a).
14. The penetration of SWH systems in South Africa is negligible 
relative to other energy sources. This is evident from the fact 
that solar energy’s contribution to final energy consumption in 
the residential, commercial and public-service sectors – which is 
dominated by hot water production and space heating – is too 
small even to be captured in energy statistics. In 2009, traditional 
unsustainable use of biomass in the residential sector represents 
the overwhelming share of final energy consumption across these 
end-use sectors (38%), followed by coal (31%), (predominantly 
coal-fired) electricity (25%) and natural gas (6%) (IEA, 2011a).
15. The estimate of installed collector area uses a conservative 
assumption that the average overall collector area of a SWH 
system for a four-person household is about 2.5 M2. This 
assumption reflects two opposite trends in South Africa: (i) that 
demand for evacuated tube systems (with larger collector sizes 
than flat-plate systems) is growing significantly (Theobald and 
Cawood, 2009), and (ii) that the national SWH support program 
targets a large share of basic SWH systems (with relatively small 
collector areas) for low-income households, especially to 2020 
(Hardie, 2011).
16. From (IEA-RETD, 2010): ‘Irradiation below 1200 kWh/M2 was 
considered a low solar resource (L). Between 1200 kWh/M2 and 
1400 kWh/M2 was considered a medium solar resource (M). 
Above 1400 kWh/M2 was considered a high solar resource (H).’
17. From (IEA-RETD, 2010): ‘A SWH system costing less than 10% 
of the GDP (PPP) per capita including installation was considered 
low cost (L). A SWH system costing between 10%‐15% of the 
GDP (PPP) per capita including installation was considered 
medium cost (M). A SWH system costing more than 15% of the 
GDP (PPP) per capita including installation was considered high 
cost (H).’ 
18. (IEA, 2010b).
19. PPP stands for ‘purchasing power parity’: PPP ‘measure[s] the 
amount of a given currency needed to buy the same basket 
of goods and services, traded and non-traded, as one unit of 
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the reference currency [in this article, USD]. By adjusting for 
differences in price levels, PPPs, in principle, can provide a more 
reliable indicator than market exchange rates of the true level of 
economic activity globally or regionally’ (IEA, 2010b).
20. (UNDP, 2011).
21. The Global Competitiveness Index of the World Economic 
Forum assesses countries on their performance in twelve so-called 
‘pillars’ that build competitiveness: institutions, infrastructure, 
macroeconomic stability, health and education, higher education 
and training, goods market efficiency, labour market efficiency, 
financial market sophistication, technological readiness, business 
sophistication, and innovation (World Economic Forum, 2011).
22. ‘Under PROSOL, the loan duration was five years instead of the 
usual three-year term. As for interest rates, the commercial lending 
rate for similar loan products in Tunisia is 14%. Within PROSOL, 
banks agreed to a 7% reduction. Through the MEDREP Fund, 
UNEP provided a 7% interest buy-down for loans disbursed in 
the first 12 months and 3% for subsequent loans. This means the 
rate initially charged to customers was 0% and, after 12 months, 
4%’ (Menichetti and Touhami, 2007).
23. The exchange rate used is USD 1 = TND 1.39 (average exchange 
rate on 15 July 2011).
24. The AfDB defines ‘middle class’ as those with a daily expenditure 
of USD 4-20 per day. Tunisia ranks highest among all African 
countries in terms of the population share of its middle class. The 
relative size of middle-class population segments across Africa 
averages 13.4% (AfDB, 2010).
25. ‘Split incentives’ are a specific example of the so-called ‘principal-
agent’ problem. ‘Principal-agent’ problems refer to the potential 
difficulties that arise when two parties engaged in a contract 
have different goals and different levels of information. A 
common example is referred to as the landlord-tenant problem, 
which problem occurs when the landlord provides energy-using 
appliances (such as a refrigerator or lighting systems), but the 
tenant pays the electricity bill. In this situation, there is little 
incentive for the landlord to choose the most energy-efficient 
appliances (IEA, 2007). 
26. In 2008, new SWH installations (10,000) were dwarfed by the 
size of the conventional electric heating market (720 000)  
(CIF, 2009).
27. The Global Competitiveness Index of the World Economic 
Forum assesses countries on their performance in relation to 
twelve so-called ‘pillars’ that build competitiveness: institutions, 
infrastructure, macroeconomic stability, health and education, 
higher education and training, goods market efficiency, labour 
market efficiency, financial market sophistication, technological 
readiness, business sophistication, and innovation (World 
Economic Forum, 2011).
28.  South Africa’s official unemployment rate in 2010 was 24.9%.
29.  The exchange rate used is USD 1 = ZAR 6.89 (average exchange 
rate on 15 July 2011).
30.  Not applicable.
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Enabling environment and policy 
principles for replicable technology 
transfer: Lessons from wind energy  
in India
Emi Mizuno
Climate Strategies
Cambridge, United Kingdom
Abstract
This article examines cross-border technology transfer 
between Indian and Danish/German firms in the wind 
energy industry between 1990 and 2005. The analysis 
shows the increasing technology gaps between the two 
sides during this time period, the fragmented and non-
performance-oriented market mechanism, the small 
market size, the policy inconsistency, the institutional 
inadequacy caused by the power sector restructuring 
process, the persistent infrastructure deficiency, and the 
lack of proper oversights, which all contributed to the 
slowdown of technology transfer after the initial strong 
transfer trends.  The weak demand-pull and supply-
push domestic forces in India prevented replicable 
technology transfer from happening, as technology 
providers and collaborators looked elsewhere for more 
reliable market investment opportunities and suppliers. 
The research shows the centrality of policy and 
capacity building to support continuous and replicable 
technology transfer. Such a policy and capacity-
building framework would consist of the following: the 
creation of sizable and performance-oriented domestic 
markets using policy incentives specifically designed for 
the particular technology; robust project/technology 
quality requirements to deter incentive abuse; support 
for physical infrastructure development to accelerate the 
flow of necessary products, components and services; 
and financial and technical support for supply-chain 
and technology-specific capacity building at firm and 
industry levels. The spectrum of the last, e.g., support 
for capacity building from manufacturing via project 
execution to operation, depends on each country’s 
and/or firm’s choices on ‘what to make’ at home and 
‘what to buy’ from outside. Policy decisions in this area 
require strong communications with industry players 
and other experts.
Financial and political policy sustainability and, overall 
long-term consistency of policy frameworks with sound 
adjustments are essential. Building strong monitoring 
and evaluation capacity, public-private partnerships, 
communication pathways, and technology- and 
industry-specific strategic thinking are requisite for 
both business and policy communities. Capacity 
building support from the international community 
also needs to focus on this area. 
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Introduction
This article examines private-sector wind energy 
technology transfers from Denmark and Germany to 
India between 1990 and 2005.  The topic was chosen 
because the sector has a record of international private-
sector partnerships between European and Indian 
companies. Special attention was paid to: 1) the roles 
and effects of government policy and institutional 
settings; and 2) enabling environment for technology 
transfer in order to learn lessons for how developing 
countries can build favourable environments for 
replicable technology transfer involving climate change 
mitigation technologies and catch-up industries. 
The article is structured as follows. After this 
introduction, section 2 describes Indian policy on 
wind energy development. Section 3 examines the 
technologies that have been transferred to India 
from the technology frontier of Denmark/Germany. 
Section 4 investigates the causal factors which created 
the technology transfer results. Lastly, Section 5 
summarises the lessons learned from these experiences 
and makes policy recommendations.       
Indian wind energy policy and programmes 
India began to be serious about wind energy 
development during the 1980s in order to establish 
an indigenous industry and exploit further its wind 
energy potential. Its efforts in the 1980s were mainly 
technology-push (development of indigenous turbine 
prototypes; demonstration programs from 1985) 
and wind data collection (wind resource assessment 
programme from 1983) at the federal level.   
The situation changed significantly in the early 1990s. 
By the beginning of that decade, India had amassed 
an unsustainable level of public debt and was facing 
an unprecedented level of economic crisis. This led 
the country to embark on a massive economic reform 
programme in 1991. This Economic Reform of 19911 
changed the wind energy policy picture greatly; as in 
other sectors, the federal Government of India (GOI) 
shifted the focus of wind energy policy to stronger 
private-sector involvement, extended public finance 
to private-sector wind-power projects and provided 
fiscal and financial incentives to encourage private 
investments. Investment assistance with soft loans and 
tax benefits for wind project investments started in 
1992 at the federal level, although these tax benefits 
(rates and types of various taxes, tax holidays, rates of 
depreciation, etc.; see Annex 1) and the interest rates 
on soft loans changed quite frequently over the years.2 
The direction of technology-push measures also 
changed from initial government-led demonstration 
projects and indigenous turbine development to 
the more market-driven approach adopted in 1992 
focusing on technology commercialisation. From 
1997, wind energy R&D efforts concentrated more on 
government–industry collaboration. The R&D Unit 
in the Centre for Wind Energy technology (C-WET) 
was established in 1999 to provide generic information 
and knowledge to innovate wind turbine components 
and subsystems suited for Indian-specific conditions. 
Meanwhile, the National Wind Resource Assessment 
Programme continued, constantly updating data and wind 
development potential by considering technical upgrades.
As for power generation project procedural regulations, 
the GOI abolished the clearance requirements of the 
Central Energy Authority (CEA) for any renewable 
energy projects from 1991 (Eased Industrial 
Clearance). In 1994 the MNES and Indian Renewable 
Energy Development Agency (IREDA) established 
joint-sector companies called ‘Wind Energy Estates,’ 
which set up wind farms in windy areas to provide 
fully developed plots for the installation of wind 
turbines by individual investors.3 The first technology 
quality standards and certificates and project procedure 
guidelines were introduced in 1995 only after a large 
number of abuses of these incentives had been reported 
between 1992 and 1995. 
Additionally, the GOI implemented many federal-
level wind industry-related policy measures and 
regulations. The door to foreign investments was 
substantially widened in 1991, when the GOI began 
permitting financial collaboration, joint ventures and 
technical collaboration with foreign entities in many 
sectors, including wind. Another important policy 
change after 1991 was a new trade policy, in particular 
a change in custom duties. Between 1991 and 1994, 
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the GOI trimmed tariff rates on imported power 
equipment, including wind turbine sets, from 400% to 
20%, and custom duties on capital equipment fell to 
25% (Bath 1998). Subsequently, however, the import 
duty rates for wind turbines and components changed 
quite frequently (see Annex 2). Import application 
procedures also remained complex until the 2000-
01 fiscal year,4 when Duty Exemption Certification 
(waiving the need to declare critical components) was 
extended to wind turbine erection and spare parts. 
Besides import duties, the 1993 tax rule made wind 
turbines exempt from excise duty and sales tax. The 
rule changed in 1998: while the first parts of wind 
turbines and rotor blades had no excise duty, both taxes 
were placed on spare parts in order to encourage high-
quality manufacturing and assembly of the parts in the 
first place and avoid replacements (IWTMA 2002). 
In addition to these federal policy incentives, various 
states began implementing wind policy incentives from 
1992. Due to the federal structure of the Indian power 
sector, each state dictated the rates of power production 
incentives (feed-in tariffs) and the conditions for third 
party sales, banking and wheeling benefits. Many 
states also implemented state-level capital investment 
incentives. However, these incentives greatly differed 
among states. In September 1993, the Ministry of 
Non-conventional Energy Sources (MNES) issued the 
first federal guidelines for state-level promotional and 
fiscal incentives for wind project development to all 
states. Representative states implementing wind policy 
measures were Tamil Nadu, Gujarat, Maharashtra, 
Andhra Pradesh, Karnataka and Rajasthan (see Annex 
3 for the diversity of states’ policy measures). 
Figure 1 summaries the policy instruments used to 
promote wind energy in India from 1990 to 2005.
Technology transfer results between 
Denmark/Germany and India
As a result of the above policy implementations, India 
experienced strong wind energy sector development 
and technological changes. This section examines the 
results in terms of private-sector technology transfers, 
which significantly contributed to the technological 
changes occurring in product introduction and 
manufacturing, project execution and innovation 
capabilities.    
Product: Turbine capacity, technological 
features and turbine efficiency
Table 1 shows the wind turbines introduced by 
Danish and German manufacturers to India between 
1993 and 2005 (data extrapolated from Consolidated 
Energy Consultants Ltd. 2005).  In terms of turbine 
capacity, turbines of between 400kW and 600kW 
capacity had been introduced to the Indian market 
by the mid-1990s without much of the delay of their 
European market launch. However, these medium-
capacity turbines never became mainstream in India. 
In addition, a number of turbines between 600kW and 
999kW launched on the technology frontier market 
of Denmark and Germany between 1995 and 2005 
were never introduced to India. By 2001, when the 
Indian manufacturer Suzlon introduced the first 1MW 
turbines to the Indian market, the major Danish and 
German manufacturers had already launched several 
MW-class turbines in the frontier market. By the end 
of 2005, when a 5MW capacity model had already 
been launched in the frontier market, India had 
introduced only four MW-class turbines (up to 2MW). 
Although not all the turbines launched in Denmark 
and Germany were necessarily suitable for the Indian 
market, the number of non-introduced turbines 
simply cannot be ignored. The Danish and German 
market also had much higher technology depreciation 
rates than the Indian market over the years: many 
wind turbine models which were no longer available in 
the frontier market were still installed in India in 2005. 
The average installed turbine capacity of Denmark and 
Germany compared with India’s clearly illustrates the 
increasing gaps between 1995 and 2005 (Figure 2).    
As for technological features, all wind turbines installed 
from 1993 to 1997 in India were stall-regulated, 
fixed-speed turbines, also the mainstream technology 
at the frontier at the time. Two fixed-speed turbines 
with dual winding technology were introduced to the 
Indian market by various manufacturers. However, the 
gaps in technological features began increasing during 
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the mid-1990s; many important innovations at the 
frontier either did not arrive in India at all or were 
introduced with significant time delays, as the number 
of new turbines introduced decreased. While the 
increasing number of turbines introduced and installed 
in India after 1999 up to 2005 had pitch regulation 
(7 out of 18 introduced turbine models were pitch), 
fixed-speed turbines were still the majority (11 out of 
18 were fixed-speed). Limited-range variable-speed 
turbines (shown as turbines with DFIG in Table 1), 
which occupied a large fraction of the market share 
at the frontier, had had a very limited number of 
installations in India by 2005.
The gaps in both turbine capacity and technological 
features created the large power generation efficiency 
gaps between the frontier and India due to the 
differences in aerodynamic efficiency and energy 
capture. Figure 2 illustrates the gaps by comparing 
turbine efficiency (turbine power generation 
efficiency), calculated by dividing yearly-generated 
wind electricity by the cumulative number of turbines.5 
It shows the staggering increase in the gaps in power 
generation efficiency between Denmark/Germany and 
India over the years, even taking weather and climate 
differences between the two areas and year-to-year 
weather variations into account. Between 1992 and 
2003, turbine efficiency in Denmark and Germany 
increased 3.9-fold and 6.4-fold respectively, while 
efficiency growth in India remained only 1.6-fold. 
The turbine efficiency and capacity trends in the three 
countries show the similar gaps. The influences of the 
gaps in turbine capacity and variable speed operations 
on turbine efficiency were evident, as the turbines 
installed in Germany show the highest efficiency 
increase over the years.  
Capability: Manufacturing, Project Execution 
and Innovation 
The Indian wind industry indigenised small-capacity 
foreign-designed turbine-manufacturing technology 
at high level early on. By the end of March 1995, 
MNES estimated the indigenisation of manufacturing 
technology for up to 250kW capacity wind turbines 
as nearly 70% in terms of the number of components, Fi
gu
re
 1
: W
in
d 
E
ne
rg
y 
Po
lic
y 
in
 I
nd
ia
 u
p 
to
 2
00
5
* 
R
&
D
 f
oc
us
es
 m
or
e 
on
 p
ro
vi
di
ng
 g
en
er
ic
 i
nf
or
m
at
io
n 
an
d 
kn
ow
le
dg
e 
to
 i
nn
ov
at
e 
co
m
po
ne
nt
s 
an
d 
su
b-
sy
st
em
s 
su
it
ab
le
 f
or
 I
nd
ia
n-
sp
ec
ifi
c 
co
nd
it
io
ns
, 
in
vo
lv
in
g 
th
e 
in
du
st
ry
, r
es
ea
rc
h 
in
st
it
ut
io
ns
 a
nd
 la
bo
ra
to
ri
es
, a
ca
de
m
ic
 in
st
it
ut
io
ns
 a
nd
 e
nd
-u
se
rs
.
**
  
Fi
ve
 g
en
er
ic
 a
re
as
 a
re
: 
in
di
ge
no
us
 d
es
ig
n 
an
d 
m
an
uf
ac
tu
re
 o
f 
al
l 
ty
pe
s 
of
 t
ur
bi
ne
s 
by
 2
01
2;
 t
ec
hn
ol
og
y 
su
pp
or
t 
to
 b
ec
om
e 
ne
t 
fo
re
ig
n 
ex
ch
an
ge
 e
ar
ne
r 
by
 
20
12
; 
pe
rf
or
m
an
ce
 i
m
pr
ov
em
en
t 
of
 e
xi
st
in
g 
tu
rb
in
es
 (
C
ap
ac
it
y 
U
ti
lis
at
io
n 
fa
ct
or
 (
C
U
F)
 f
ro
m
 1
7%
 t
o 
25
%
 b
y 
20
12
);
 h
um
an
 r
es
ou
rc
e 
de
ve
lo
pm
en
t;
 a
nd
, 
re
se
ar
ch
 s
up
po
rt
 f
or
 w
in
d 
re
so
ur
ce
 a
ss
es
sm
en
t 
an
d 
m
ic
ro
-s
it
in
g.
**
* 
T
he
 T
ec
hn
ol
og
y 
U
pg
ra
da
ti
on
 F
un
d 
(T
U
F)
 o
f 
th
e 
M
in
is
tr
y 
of
 T
ex
ti
le
s 
of
fe
re
d 
a 
5%
 r
ei
m
bu
rs
em
en
t 
on
 t
he
 i
nt
er
es
t 
ac
tu
al
ly
 c
ha
rg
ed
 b
y 
fin
an
ci
al
 i
ns
ti
tu
ti
on
s 
on
 s
an
ct
io
ne
d 
te
xt
ile
 p
ro
je
ct
s 
th
at
 in
cl
ud
e 
w
in
d 
en
er
gy
 e
qu
ip
m
en
t 
fo
r 
ca
pt
iv
e 
po
w
er
 g
en
er
at
io
n 
by
 t
ex
ti
le
 b
us
in
es
s 
en
ti
ti
es
. T
he
 s
ch
em
e 
w
as
 a
va
ila
bl
e 
fr
om
 
A
pr
il 
1,
 1
99
9 
to
 F
eb
ru
ar
y 
22
, 2
00
5.
So
u
rc
es
: 
(M
N
E
S 
1
9
95
a;
 M
N
E
S 
1
9
95
b
; 
M
N
E
S 
1
9
9
6
b
; 
M
N
E
S 
1
9
9
7a
; 
M
N
E
S 
1
9
9
7b
; 
M
N
E
S 
1
9
9
9
b
; 
1
9
9
9
; 
M
N
E
S 
2
0
0
0
b
 M
N
E
S 
2
0
0
1b
 ;
 M
N
E
S 
2
0
0
2
b
; 
M
N
E
S 
2
0
0
2
/2
0
0
4
/2
0
0
6
; 
M
N
E
S 
2
0
0
4
, 
2
0
0
5
) 
(G
u
p
ta
 1
9
95
; 
T
E
R
I 
2
0
0
1)
; 
:(
IR
E
D
A
 2
0
0
2
a;
 I
R
E
D
A
 2
0
0
2
b
 a
n
d
 2
0
0
6
; 
IR
E
D
A
 2
0
0
2
c;
 
Ja
ga
d
ee
sh
 2
0
0
0
; 
(C
o
n
so
li
d
at
ed
 E
n
er
gy
 C
o
n
su
lt
an
ts
 L
td
. 
2
0
0
5
; 
R
aj
se
k
h
ar
, 
V
an
 H
u
ll
e,
 a
n
d
 J
an
se
n
 1
9
9
9
);
 (
IW
T
M
A
 2
0
0
2
; 
K
h
an
n
a 
1
9
9
8
; 
W
in
d
 
P
o
w
er
 M
o
n
th
ly
 1
9
9
6
a;
 W
in
d
 P
o
w
er
 M
o
n
th
ly
 1
9
9
7b
; 
W
in
d
 P
o
w
er
 M
o
n
th
ly
 2
0
0
3
a;
 S
as
i 
an
d
 B
as
u
 2
0
0
2
; 
W
in
d
 P
o
w
er
 M
o
n
th
ly
 1
9
9
7a
; 
W
in
d
 
P
o
w
er
 M
o
n
th
ly
 1
9
9
7c
; 
W
in
d
 P
o
w
er
 M
o
n
th
ly
 2
0
0
0
; 
W
in
d
 P
o
w
er
 M
o
n
th
ly
 2
0
0
4
);
(J
ag
an
 1
9
95
).
 
38
Table 1: Wind Turbines introduced by Danish Manufacturers 1993-2005
Source: extrapolated from Consolidated Energy Consultants Ltd. 2005
Manufacturer Capacity 
RD 
(m) 
Power 
Control 
Rotor 
Speed 
Generator 
Installation in 
India 
European 
Launch 
AMTL - Wind 
World 
220kW* 
250kW 
500kW* 
N/A 
25 
37 
 
Stall 
N/A 
2-fixed 
1-fixed 
 
WRIG 
1993 
1994-1999 
1996 
N/A** 
1991 
1992 
BHEL- Nordex 
200kW 
250kW 
N/A 
29.7 
Stall 
N/A 
1-fixed 
WRIG 
1994-1996 
1995-1999 
N/A** 
1994 
C-WEL - DeWind 600kW* 46 Pitch Variable DFIG/CV 2001-2002 1997 
Enercon India 
230kW 
330kW 
600kW 
800kW 
30 
33.4 
44 
48 
Pitch Variable 
WRSG/ 
DD/CV 
1995- 
2005- 
2001- 
2005- 
1995 
2005 
2001 
2005 
Enron/GE Wind  
(USA-Germany, 
subsidiary) 
600kWa* 
750kWi* 
1.5MWs* 
46 
50 
70.5 
Active S 
Pitch 
Pitch 
2-fixed 
Variable 
Variable 
IG 
DFIG/CV 
DFIG/CV 
2002 
2002 
2004- 
1998 
2001 
1999 
Flovel Tacke 
250-80kW*  
600kW*  
26 
43 
Stall 
Stall 
2-fixed 
Fixed 
IG 
N/A 
1996 
1995 
1990 
1994 
Grematch - 
Pegasus 
250kW* N/A N/A N/A N/A 1995 N/A 
NEG Micon 
(Subsidiary) 
750kW 
950-200kW 
1.65MW 
48.2 
54.5 
82 
Stall 
 Active S 
Active S 
2-fixed 
2-fixed 
1-fixed 
WRIG 
1999- 
2002- 
2004- 
1998 
2001 
2003 
NEPC Micon 
225-40kW 
250kW 
400-100kW 
600kW* 
29.8 
29 
31 
42 
Stall 
2-fixed 
1-fixed 
2-fixed 
2-fixed 
WRIG 
1993-1998 
(1989), 1993-1998 
1994-1998 
1995 
N/A** 
N/A** 
1992 
1994 
NEPC - Norwin 750-180kW* 47 Active S 2-fixed WRIG 2005-present 1998 
Pioneer- Wincon 
250kW 
750kW* 
29 
48 
Stall  
Semi- Pitch 
1-fixed 
2-fixed 
WRIG 
1995- 
2002 
1995 
1998 
REPL - Bonus 320kW 33 Stall 1-fixed WRIG 1995 -1997 N/A** 
Suzlon - 
Südwind 
270kW* 
350-100kW 
N/A 
33.4 
Stall 
N/A 
2-fixed 
WRIG 
1996 
1996 - 1997 
1993 
1996 
Textool -
Nordtank 
300kW  
550kW* 
31 
37 
Stall 1-fixed WRIG 
(1991) 1996 
1996 
1985 
1992 
Vestas RRB 
225-50kW 
500kW  
27 
42/47 
Pitch 
2-fixed 
1-fixed 
WRIG 
1993 – 
1995 -  
1988 
1993 
TTG - HSW 250-80kW 28.5 Stall 2-fixed PEIG 1994- 1990 
* The total installation number of these turbines was less than ten.  
** No European record available for these makes.  The numbers in parentheses indicate the year introduced 
by demonstration projects before 1993 in India.  
Keys: DFIG = Doubly Fed Induction Generator, WRIG = Wound Rotor Induction Generator, DD = Direct Drive, 
WRSG = Wound Rotor Synchronous Generator, PEIG = Permanently Excited Induction Generator, CV = 
Converter, IGBT= Insulated Gate Bipolar Transistor   
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while blades, special bearings, etc. were still being 
imported (MNES 1995a). By 1997 the industry-wide 
rate grew nearly 80% (MNES 1997a).  However, 
the indigenisation level of high-value and high-tech 
component manufacturing and their quality remained 
low. The dependence of high-tech power electronics and 
controllers on imports was never reduced, and med-tech 
mechanical engineering components made in India 
were still prone to failures. Many components of large-
capacity turbines commercialised at the frontier since 
the mid-1990s were not introduced in India, with the 
exception of direct-drive WRSG with IGBT converter 
by Enercon, slip-ring generator application by Suzlon, 
and Glass Fiber Reinforced Epoxy (GFRE) blades and 
individual pitch mechanism by both firms. As for blade 
manufacturing capability, resin vacuum infusion and 
automation technologies related to vacuum infusion 
were indigenised in India through the manufacturing 
activities of LM Glasfiber India, Enercon India, and 
Suzlon. Manufacturing of 34m-length blades for 
1.5MW turbines and 40m-length blades for 1.65MW 
turbines started in India in 2004 (MNES 2005), but 
manufacturing of other large blades for many multi-
MW class turbines commercialised at the frontier 
were not introduced. In addition, the quality issues 
of components manufactured in India still persisted. 
Despite the approximately fifteen years of experience, 
still 20% of gearbox failures and breaking of blade tips 
were being recorded in 2003 (Wind Power Monthly 
2003b). Overall, many of the gaps in mid-tech 
manufacturing capability between Denmark/German 
and India were not reduced, and the gaps in high-tech 
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Figure 2: Average Turbine Capacity and Efficiency by Country 
Note: Due to the differences in statistical years between Denmark/Germany and India, the Danish/
German calendar year (January to December) is compared to the Indian fiscal year (April of the same 
calendar year to March of the next calendar year). For example, data for the Danish/German 1992 year 
is compared to the Indian 1992-1993 fiscal year. The comparison, however, is considered approximate 
enough. 
Sources: Danish Wind Industry Association 2006; DEWI and ISET in BWE 2005; Consolidated 
Energy Consultants Ltd. 2005: DWIA, DEWI, BTM Consult ApS 2005b.
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and complex component manufacturing capability for 
large-capacity turbines greatly increased. 
In terms of wind power project execution, skills and 
know-how of project planning, site assessment, site 
development and micro-siting in India were low at 
the beginning and caused many project failures in 
the early and mid-1990s. However, these project 
execution capabilities advanced greatly since the mid-
1990s through joint venture and license agreement 
collaborations. Progress in and the transfer of remote 
monitoring SCADA (Supervisory Control and Data 
Acquisition) products, as well as project development 
software tools such as WAsP and WindPRO for local 
wind-resource mapping, optimisation, and micro-
siting, also helped the Indian industry to enhance 
these capabilities. 
As for innovation capacity building, in general this had 
been slow. Government–industry R&D collaboration 
schemes developed by MNES in 1997 were seen as 
passive and limited by industry insiders, as they were 
not utilised widely (Shekhar, Kumar, and Shar 2001). 
In terms of in-house innovation capacity building by 
manufacturers, Enercon India and Suzlon built the 
R&D facilities in India, but their main R&D activities 
still remained in Europe. While innovation capability 
greatly advanced at the frontier with various high-
technology developments since 1990, none of the 
significant innovations were carried out in India. The 
innovation capability gaps grew greatly between 1990 
and 2005.
Overall, the increasing gaps between the frontier 
and India were seen in all of product technology, 
the manufacturing capability of med-tech/high-tech 
components, and innovation capability.      
Causal factors of the increased  
technology gap 
This section examines the causal factors of the 
increasing technology gaps illustrated in the previous 
section from the perspectives of the market, industry 
and infrastructure, and their relationships with policy. 
 
Market-related factors
At the end of March 1989, India had only 10MW 
of total installed wind capacity, all in the form 
of government demonstration projects. With the 
introduction of market development policy measures 
in 1992, however, India began experiencing strong 
wind market growth. By the end of the 1995-96 fiscal 
year, installation grew very rapidly. The market slowed 
down dramatically from 1996-97 and the recovery was 
slow; annually installed capacity exceeded the 1994-95 
level only in 2001-02. 2003-04 and 2004-05 saw the 
strongest installation, in record numbers (Figure 3). 
The market fluctuation was seen not only at the national 
level but also at the state level. There was a strong 
disparity in wind energy development among the states 
too. Only a handful of states implemented state policy 
measures contributed to wind energy development. 
The first wave of development was concentrated mainly 
in Tamil Nadu and Gujarat between 1992-93 and 
1995-96. Maharashtra was the main market between 
1998-99 and 2001-02 when other state markets 
stagnated. The picture changed again from 2002-03, 
when Tamil Nadu, Rajasthan and Karnataka became 
the main wind development locations. The differences 
and fluctuations in growth patterns by state illustrate 
the strong market segmentation within India. Overall, 
Indian market demand in terms of size, location, and 
stability was highly uncertain. 
As for investor profiles, more than 98% of total 
installed capacity from 1992 to March 2005 was 
developed by industrial firms. According to MNES, 
80% of wind power fed into the grid was used as 
captive consumption, being consumed by these 
investor-developers (industrial firms) themselves at a 
distance via wheeling, and 78% of wind-power buyers 
were energy-intensive manufacturing firms (Winrock 
International India 2003). 
The fluctuations in the Indian market were mostly 
caused by the unstable policy and institutional 
environments. The first boom years occurred from 1992 
to 1996 due to the combination of the generous 1993 
tax rule incentives (the first-year 100% depreciation 
of capital equipment and zero-tax planning) and the 
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IREDA soft loans for wind projects. Foreign Direct 
Investment (FDI) stimulation from 1991 and the 
import duty reduction from 1993 supported the 
boom by bringing the required technologies from 
abroad. However, a peculiar aspect of the Indian 
wind market was the total irrelevance of wind power 
production incentives (feed-in-tariffs). This situation 
was created because the power-usage charges imposed 
on industrial customers by the State Electricity Boards 
(SEBs) was higher than the feed-in tariff payments. 
Traditionally the Indian SEBs used cross-subsidies 
which imposed far more expensive power-usage 
charges on industrial customers than on residential 
and agricultural customers, and this mechanism made 
industrial investors simply use wind power plants 
as their captive power consumption plants to avoid 
expensive power-usage charges, in addition to getting 
one-time tax benefits. Thus, the wind-power feed-in 
tariff incentives were totally irrelevant regarding the 
control of market development; Indian investment in 
wind energy simply gave industrial firms some short-
term tax-planning and management tools. 
The tax-saving practices without any project quality-
assurance measures by the government also stimulated 
the questionable practice of gold-plating6 by many 
investors. The first boom years were ended by the sudden 
policy changes of late 1995; the large reduction in tax 
benefits, the increased interest rates for IREDA loans, 
the higher import duties for wind turbine components 
from 1997, the extremely low performance level of 
wind energy plants during the first boom years and the 
great uncertainty involving the financial conditions of 
the SEBs, which started implementing unfavourable 
state wind-energy policies, all deterred investments, 
although the new federal project quality policy measures 
successfully eliminated the fraudulent investors. The 
market began experiencing strong growth again after 
the enactment of the 2003 Electricity Act, which 
streamlined and resolved many power sector issues.7 
Figure 3: Annually Installed Capacity in MW by State in India 
Source: MNES cited in (Consolidated Energy Consultants Ltd. 2005)
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The success of the gradual transfer of the decision-
making power from the SEBs to the State Electricity 
Regulatory Commissions (SERCs) as the result of the 
1998 Reform Act,8 the steady reduction of IREDA 
loan interest rates, Technology Upgradation Funds 
(TUF) and the gradual increase in turbine capacity 
and improvement to project execution technology also 
contributed to market recovery after 2000.      
    
These market conditions, created by the complicated 
policy and institutional landscapes, greatly influenced 
technology transfer and development activities in 
India. Overall, the effects of market demands on project 
economic efficiency improvement, cost reductions and 
the introduction of low-wind-specific technology were 
fairly weak in India as a result of the greatly fluctuating 
market conditions. Despite the similarity of these 
demand characteristics with Denmark and Germany, 
they did not induce technological change through 
technology transfer after the mid-1990s.    
The main cause for this was the small market size. In 
Europe, the regional market, especially the huge German 
market, strongly pulled technology development 
by the Danish and German manufacturers into the 
directions the market demanded. Conversely, with 
the recession from 1996-97 the Indian market simply 
lost such pulling-power to attract the introduction of 
newer and larger turbine models, which required larger 
investments as they cost more to manufacture and 
install. The prospect for economies of scale was also 
very limited in the small Indian market. Thus, a large 
market size and market certainty and continuity were 
lacking in India: even though many market demand 
characteristics were similar to those in the frontier 
market, without a sizable market and its own pulling 
power, technology upgrading through replicable 
technology transfer did not happen. The small market 
made all demands for technological improvement 
insignificant. 
In addition, as described previously, Indian investment 
in wind was supported only by the industry’s investor-
developers, whose primary drive was not to make 
viable wind projects but to manage taxes and escape 
from the unreasonably high power-usage charges 
imposed on them. This contributed to the consistently 
low Internal Rate of Returns (IRRs) and the weak 
demands for IRR improvements. Thus, the market 
was not oriented towards economic performance. 
Although the IREDA revolving fund and soft loans, 
the encouragement of FDI and the reduction in 
import duties greatly helped the creation of market, 
without any proper mechanisms to prevent the abuse 
of government incentives, the market’s and investors’ 
lack of interest in the performance of wind turbines 
which could greatly improve the IRR created extremely 
weak demand for technological improvement. 
The abrupt policy changes during the mid-1990s 
added great political uncertainty to the already 
problematic market mechanism. The low economic 
performance of the wind projects built during the first 
boom years, the rising interest rates and the soured 
relationship between investors and SEBs caused by 
the SEBs’ problematic finance and pricing strategies 
all contributed to deterring many further investments. 
The confusing process of India’s power sector reform 
and restructuring, which allowed some privatisation 
to take place in private-sector power generation while 
leaving cross-subsidies in power-usage charges intact 
among various sectors because of the incomplete 
commercialisation and not targeting the recovery of 
capital, operational and maintenance costs, created 
the self-contradictory mechanisms of the SEB policy, 
and affecting wind energy market growth negatively 
in the process. Market adjustment was therefore 
slow, and market continuity and certainty were well 
beyond reach.      
The three-year market setback since 1996 was 
devastating for India’s wind energy technology 
upgrading through technology transfer, because there 
was simply no attractive market to pull the extensive 
technological progress made at the frontier during 
this period. Regional Asian market demands were also 
weak, doing nothing to help utilise or augment Indian 
manufacturing capacity by producing export orders. 
Even after 2000, when the market began improving, 
India was not considered a primary investment spot 
for technology upgrading, as the market was far 
smaller compared to the combined regional European 
markets. The enactment of the Electricity Act in June 
2003, the continuous restructuring of the SEBs and 
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the establishment of the SERCs had positive effects on 
the market recovery. However, insufficient demand-
pull after 1996 created persistent and damaging effects 
on India’s technology development and diffusion, as 
could still be seen in 2005. 
Industry-related factors
The economic reforms since 1991 and the new wind 
energy policy triggered the strong expansion of the 
wind industry too. The Indian wind turbine industry 
was largely formed through business diversification of 
local firms through technical collaboration agreements 
(joint venture or license agreement) with the 
manufacturers on the technology frontier. The main 
trigger for these collaborations was the encouragement 
of FDI in 1991. 
Table 2 shows the entry and exit of turbine manufacturer 
businesses in India, which clearly demonstrates that 
most of them had foreign technology collaborators. 
However, it also shows that the majority of these firms 
exited from the Indian market between 1996 and 1999, 
which corresponds to the severe three-year market 
slowdown.  Only four technology collaborations 
established before 1996 9 still survived in 2005. The 
new entries after 1997 include two subsidiaries, which 
were 100%-owned by foreign manufacturers (NEG 
Micon and GE Wind), and three independent firms, 
two of which (Suzlon and NEPC India) became 
independent after the dissolution of their original 
partnerships with the European technology providers 
and collaborators. NEG Micon India (subsidiary of 
NEG Micon) and Vestas RRB were both still in business 
separately in India as of the end of 2005, though their 
Danish partners merged into one firm (Vestas) at the end 
of 2004.  
These industry transformations influenced the 
technology transfer results greatly. Technology 
transfer was active in the early to mid-1990s through 
technology collaborations. By 1998, however, many 
technology providers and collaborators had pulled 
out of the Indian market. The reasons varied from the 
market slowdown and financial, technical or ethical 
problems with Indian partners, to their own business 
exits at the frontier. The number of technology 
introductions consequently declined because of the 
reduction of technology providers and collaborators. 
The slowdown in the introduction of updated 
technology was also seen in the surviving technology 
collaborations, and it was more problematic. The 
resistance to passing manufacturing and production 
licenses to Indian partners became obvious from the 
turbines above 500kW capacity after the mid 1990s. 
This tendency was stronger in divided ownership 
firms (joint ventures and license agreements) than in 
undivided ownership firms (100% foreign subsidiaries 
and an independent Indian ownership firm) (see 
Table 3). The increasingly tighter technology and 
cost management and controls due to the growing 
competition at the frontier and the Indian market 
slowdown reduced the strategic advantages of joint 
ventures and license agreements with Indian partners. 
In addition, persistent low-quality production in 
India offset the cost advantages derived from low cost 
labour for export; the Indian firms could not meet 
the demands for higher-quality high-tech export 
products. This further limited the opportunities to 
improve the quality of manufacturing in India and 
affected the chances of being part of global value 
chain and sourcing networks, thus creating a negative 
feedback loop. 
Technology components innovated at the frontier 
also increasingly became difficult to introduce on an 
individual basis, as their system integration needs 
became higher and higher. Acquiring high-level 
technology requires high-level capability as well as 
cumulative experiences, but the technological capacity 
to attract more updated technology was weak in India. 
Thus, supply-push technology transfer was weak, as the 
Indian side did not build sufficient capacity to support 
the progressively more competitive global technology 
and cost management needs. 
In terms of the role and effects of policy on supply-push 
technology transfer, various industry-related policy 
measures without proper supervision of firm operations 
and technology or project quality control contributed 
to the limited formation of manufacturing capacity, 
allowing many low-quality projects and technologies 
to prevail, and only a handful collaborations actually 
44
built manufacturing facilities with serious in-house 
quality control. 
There was also a lack of more direct and specific 
technology-push policy to support manufacturers in 
building the higher capacity needed to become the 
export base, due to the limitations of government 
interventions to individual joint venture and license 
agreements. Most technological decisions were 
left to the mercy of foreign technology providers 
and collaborators, which strictly controlled which 
technologies should be introduced to and how they 
should be handled in India through restricted business 
practices and technology transfer agreements. Because 
such practices usually prohibited any Indian R&D 
and adjustments to technologies from the frontier, the 
government–industry R&D collaboration schemes 
drawn up by MNES for developing technologies to 
meet Indian-specific needs were simply unrealistic.  
As for technological capacity building, the 
contradictory use of import duties aimed at 
simultaneous cost reductions and indigenous 
technology development ended up deterring both 
market investments and technology introduction by 
confusing both investors and manufacturers.10 The 
conflicting use of manufacturing incentives was also 
evident in the use of excise duty: imposing a high 
excise duty on high-valued activities had negative 
impacts on the improvement of technological capacity 
building, though the duty differentiation between 
the first and second components did contribute to 
the improvement of manufacturing and assembly 
activities.11 The lack of consistency in these import 
and manufacturing incentives confused the industry 
and ended up hindering both product introduction 
and the manufacturing capability building of higher-
valued components. 
 
Infrastructure-related factors 
Some general infrastructure issues also influenced wind 
energy technology development and diffusion in India. 
One problem was its weak grid, which was especially 
connected with reactive power consumption.12 The 
other issue was the general road and port infrastructure 
problems in the country, which hindered the transport 
and construction efforts required for wind turbine 
manufacturing and power project construction. These 
two issues were closely intertwined.  
In general, wind energy technologies and technical 
solutions developed at the frontier show sufficient 
adequacy to control the negative effects of the low 
wind and weak grids in India. This was particularly 
true of pitch-controlled, variable speed turbines. 
However, the technology transfer results show that 
these technologies were of minor importance in India 
up to 2005. One of the important reasons hindering 
the introduction of these technologies was deficiencies 
in road and port infrastructure, which greatly limited 
the size of the turbines that can be transported and 
installed in India. As the insufficient infrastructure 
hindered the introduction of large-capacity high-tech 
turbines, the technologies that can address the problems 
related to the weak grids and low wind conditions were 
not brought to or diffused in India because they were 
parts of large-capacity turbine technologies. Regardless 
of the privatisation of the transport and logistical 
sectors since 1991, improvements were slow. Although 
the wind manufacturer-developers assumed the 
responsibility for developing the road infrastructure 
to reach the project sites and fortify power evacuation 
facilities wherever necessary,13 the efforts of individual 
manufacturers had their limitations.  MNES could 
not offer any significant support for logistical 
improvements (Twele 2005). The lack of support 
from MNES for improvements to the deficiencies in 
the transport infrastructure was not a surprise, given 
that the issues cannot be solved by one ministry and/
or one industry alone. As for the Transmission and 
Distribution (T&D) deficiency, despite the principle 
that the SEBs should be responsible for upgrading 
facilities and fortifying weak grids, this was not done 
because of their severe financial difficulties. This issue 
also involves many other energy-related ministries 
and industries. 
Policy supports necessary to systematically solve 
infrastructure deficiency problems require better 
coordination among various ministries and larger and 
continuous investments. These did not exist in India, 
affecting technology transfer greatly. 
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Entry 
Year 
Indian Firm Foreign Collaborator Exit Year 
1985 BHEL ----  
1986 Vestas RRB Vestas (Denmark)  
1987 NEPC Micon  Micon (Denmark) 1999* 
1993 AMTL Wind World (Denmark) * 
1994 
BHEL Nordex (Denmark) 1999** 
Elecon HMZ (Belgium) 1998 
TTG Industries Husumer Schiffswerft (Germany) * 
1995 
ABAN Loyd Kenetech (USA) 1997 
Das Lagerwey Lagerwey (The Netherlands) 2000 
Enercon India Enercon (Germany)  
Flovel Tacke (Germany) 1997* 
Grematch CNC Pegasus (Germany) 1995 
Himalaya ---- 1996 
Windia Nedwind (The Netherlands) 1998 
Pioneer Wincon Wincon West Wind (Denmark)  
REPL Bonus (Denmark) 1997 
Sangeeth  Carter (USA) 1997 
1996 
JMP Ecotecnia (Spain) 1996 
Rayalseema Mitsubishi (Japan) 1996 
RES AWT (USA) * 
Suzlon Südwind (Germany) 1996 
Textool Nordtank (Denmark) 1996 
1997 
Kirloskar  WEG (UK) 1998 
Suzlon -----  
1998 NEPC India -----  
1999 NEG Micon (subsidiary) NEG Micon (Denmark)  
2000 C-WEL -----  
2001 C-WEL DeWind (Germany) 2002 
2002 
Elecon Turbowind (Belgium)  
GE Wind Energy (subsidiary) GE Wind Energy (USA)  
2005 Pioneer Asia  Gamesa (Spain)  
Bold letters show firms active as of March 2005.  
Entry year is defined as the year that the firm installed its first turbine, exit year as when the firm installed 
its last turbine in this table. Although the original source shows some other manufacturers on the list, this 
table only included those that installed turbines, locations and dates of which were verified by the data in 
the source. 
* These collaborations already ended in the late 1990s or before the specified exit years. However, the 
turbines originally provided by the providers were continuously manufactured and offered in India 
independently by the Indian firms after their partnerships ended. Flovel ceased the installation of 
turbines altogether in 2001.  
** Nordex and BHEL ended its first licensing agreement in 2002, but a new agreement was in place by 
2003. However, no installation was made between 1999 and March 2005.   
Table 2: Turbine Manufacturer Entry and Exit in India
Source: extrapolated from Consolidated Energy Consultants Ltd. 2005
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Table 3: Firm and Technology Ownership and Introduced Turbine Capacity by Surviving and New 
Manufacturers in India 
Source: extrapolated from (Consolidated Energy Consultants Ltd. 2005)
 
 
Divided Firm/Technology Ownership 
(Joint venture/license agreement) 
100% Firm/Technology Ownership 
(100% subsidiary/independent Indian firm) 
Turbine Make and Capacity 
Introduction  
Turbine Make and Capacity 
Introduction 
India Europe India Europe 
Small-Capacity (less than 500kW) 
Vestas RRB 225-50kW (JV) 1993 1988 C-WEL 250kW (I) 2000  
Pioneer Wincon 250kW (JV) 1995 1995    
Enercon India 230kW (JV) 1995 1996    
Enercon India 300kW (JV) 2005 2005    
BHEL-Nordex 200kW (LA) 1994 N/A    
BHEL-Nordex 250kW (LA) 1995 1994    
Medium-Capacity (between 500kW and 1MW) 
Vestas RRB 500kW (JV) 1995 1993 NEG Micon 750kW (S) 1999 1998 
Pioneer Wincon 755kW (JV) 2002 1998 GE Wind 600kWa (S) 2002 1998 
Enercon India 600kW (JV) 2001 2001 GE Wind 750kW (S) 2002 2001 
Enercon India 800kW (JV) 2005 2005    
Pioneer Asia 850kW (JV) 2005 2004    
NEPC-Norwin 750-180kW (LA) 2005 1998    
C-WEL-DeWind 600kW (N/A) 2001 1997    
Elecon-Turbowind 600kW (N/A) 2002 N/A    
Large-Capacity (larger than 1MW) 
   NEG Micon 950-200kW (S) 2002 2001 
    NEG Micon 1.65MW (S) 2004 2003 
   GE Wind 1.5MW (S) 2004 1999 
   Suzlon 1MW-250kW (I) 2001 2003 
   Suzlon 1.25MW-250kW (I) 2002 2003 
   Suzlon 2MW-250kW (I) 2005 2004 
JV = Joint Venture, LA = License Agreement, S = Subsidiary, I = Independent 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Policy recommendations to create an 
enabling environment for replicable 
technology transfer
India’s experiences with wind technology have some 
important lessons for how to encourage private-sector 
replicable technology transfers from developed to 
developing countries. The small market size, the non-
performance-oriented market mechanism, the policy 
inconsistency, the institutional problems of the power 
sector, the lack of technological capabilities to meet 
the increasingly higher quality requirements of wind 
energy technology and the persistent infrastructure 
deficiencies in India, along with tighter technology 
controls by technology providers and collaborators, 
all contributed to the increasing technology gaps in 
both product and capabilities with the frontier after 
the mid-1990s.  
 
Enabling environment for replicable 
technology transfer
In addition to the domestic factors mentioned above, 
external factors such as the rapidly increasing high-tech 
characteristics of wind energy technology systems and 
the fast structural transformations of the industry at 
the frontier made it difficult for India to cope with the 
various changes. Nonetheless, domestic factors were 
the more serious causes of the increasing technology 
gaps and the lack of replicable technology transfer, 
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preventing economic efficiency and technological 
improvements. The lack of positive feedback from 
India to the frontier during the constant industry and 
technology transformation deterred replicable transfer 
when the Indian market slowed down, demonstrating 
that the process or history greatly influence whether 
technology transfer is replicated or not. FDI and 
the formation of technology partnerships alone do 
not automatically guarantee continuous technology 
upgrading and replicable technology transfer. 
Replicable technology transfer is process-oriented, 
demanding simultaneous and continuous demand-pull 
created by sizeable and performance-oriented markets 
and technology-push connected to technology-specific 
learning mechanisms and market trials. Policy is 
central to materializing these two forces. 
Financial and policy sustainability, as well as overall and 
long-term consistency of policy frameworks with sound 
adjustments and sequencing, are essential to support 
such process-oriented technology transfers. In addition 
to the creation of general enabling environments such 
as macroeconomic policy frameworks, technology- or 
industry-specific policies and enabling environments 
are equally important because economics and industry 
characteristics and their transformations are strongly 
technology-specific. Strong monitoring and evaluation 
capacities by policy makers and good public-private 
partnerships and communications are critical in 
creating such an enabling environment.  
The article recommends the following rather simple 
frameworks for creating a virtuous cycle of replicable 
technology transfers involving distributed energy 
technologies and devices such as wind.   
Policy for sizable market and performance-
oriented demands
In order to stimulate more efficient and updated 
technologies repeatedly through private-sector 
technology transfer activities, the sizeable and 
performance-oriented market demands which 
continuously pull such technologies are fundamental; 
the market demand characteristics are a necessary but 
not sufficient condition for inducing technological 
change, which also requires a strong market pull. The 
performance-oriented market cares about economic 
efficiencies, resulting in constant demands for higher 
quality technologies. Consistent but flexible policy 
measures tailored to each technology status and 
characteristics are central to the creation of such a 
market.  
• Capital investment, fiscal and financial, and 
power production incentives can be all used 
wisely to create performance-oriented demands. 
Market growth should be controlled by these 
sector-specific policy measures, in order not to 
repeat the Indian wind economics situation, 
which was affected by a factor external to the 
wind industry, namely the high power-usage 
charges imposed on industrial consumers. 
Engaging in sunset clauses of capital investment 
and short-term fiscal measures is also important 
to make the market more performance-oriented. 
• Market segmentation is strongly opposed to 
the creation of strong market pull. National, 
regional and international policy collaborations 
can be helpful in creating a sizable market, 
and this can be done without the geographical 
proximity of each market.
• Implementation of incentive abuse prevention 
measures from the beginning of market and 
industry creation is critical for the orderly, 
certain and continuous growth of both. 
Quality assurance measures such as technology 
certifications and standards and project 
guidelines contribute to technological capacity 
building and the industry’s structural adjustment 
by eliminating low-quality firms too.
• A revolving fund such as the one used for the 
IREDA soft loans can be a cost-effective way of 
utilising international public lending to support 
private-sector development.  
• Hasty and disorderly procedure and methods in 
respect of power sector reform and restructuring 
can pose larger costs later by creating self-
contradictory mechanisms and political 
uncertainty, this negatively affecting private-
sector investments.   
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Supply-push policy: Choice of ‘what to 
make’ and ‘what to buy’
Technological capacity building and its relationship 
to technological characteristics are very important in 
managing supply-push technology transfers. However, 
national-level policy formulation in this area is delicate, 
as it requires flexible adjustment and the coordination 
of policy measures with the business strategies of 
domestic firms in light of the rapid transformations to 
the global industry and technology, while not distorting 
competition and free business activities, including 
technology agreements between technology providers/
collaborators and receivers. Although supply-push 
policy measures are often considered limited to generic 
RD&D supports, FDI policy, trade policy, corporate 
tax policy and manufacturing tax incentives can be 
used to support national technology and industry 
building.  As seen in the Indian wind case, however, 
they do not guarantee replicable technology transfers 
and can even create contradictory effects. 
One important key for such policy formation 
are decisions regarding ‘what to make (provide 
domestically or internally)’ and ‘what to buy (procure 
from outside).’ Such strategic decisions are made 
by business firms on daily basis in respect of the 
management of innovation, manufacturing, project 
execution, and service provision, etc. What national-
level strategies on ‘what-to-make’ and ‘what-to-buy’ can 
do is help firm-level decision-making and encourage 
replicable technology transfers without intruding on 
firm-level business activities by providing generic and 
technology-specific training and policy and financial 
supports and incentives for chosen supply-chain 
activities and technological capacity building, thus 
creating technical and cost advantages which stimulate 
firm-level technology transfer and export activities. 
Although this is not an easy task, the potential benefits 
in many aspects of national capacity building are 
large. The policy-making procedures of such national 
strategies can help both firms and policy-makers 
develop the capability to pursue more tactical strategies 
and build comparative and competitive advantages 
through practical and mutual learning.  They can 
also help distinct the role of the public and private 
sectors in each technology sector in a given timeframe 
clear. Coordination and frequent communications 
between industry players and policy-makers become 
essential. Early creations of industry associations can 
support such a process too. Technology- and industry-
specific strategic decision-making is critical today 
for any public- and private-sector activities from the 
perspectives of resource allocations and the creation 
of comparative and competitive advantage. Capacity 
building supports from the international community 
need to focus on this area too. 
Physical infrastructure deficiency
This article has also highlighted the importance 
of ‘physical infrastructure’ in accelerating the 
flow of the necessary products, components and 
services to encourage technology development and 
diffusion. Although the soft dimensions of enabling 
environments are more often discussed (IPCC 
2000), the hard dimensions should be recognised 
too, as they can greatly influence the outcomes of 
technology transfers and business activities. While the 
development in physical infrastructure are considered 
generic, the certain requirements are often quite 
technology-specific (e.g., grid stability, transport/
logistical and construction requirements). Therefore, 
the political coordination and prioritisation which 
balances these generic and technology-specific needs 
are very important.
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Endnotes
1. As a result of industrial policy with heavy regulations and 
restrictions controlled by bureaucrats since Independence in 
1947, Indian business had suffered from the lack of transparency 
in the business environment, stagnant private and foreign 
investments, heavy government spending on inefficient public 
enterprises and the lack of technological progress. The country 
suffered from inflation, high budgetary deficits and foreign debt, 
increasing government duties and taxes, and low GDP per capita. 
The limited attempts at liberalisation made in the 1980s were 
insufficient to overcome these economic problems. The fiscal 
imbalance diverted household savings to public consumption 
and reduced the resources available for private investment. Due 
to the restrictions on foreign investment and trade, India faced 
a balance of payments crisis in early 1991, its foreign exchange 
reserves reaching an all-time low. The GOI attempted a series of 
short-term policies to finance imports and meet its immediate 
debt service obligations, which included using its gold reserves to 
obtain foreign exchange, use the IMF’s special drawing facilities 
and obtaining emergency assistance from Germany and Japan. 
Eventually, however, the GOI had no choice but to embark on a 
programme of more fundamental economic reforms and reduce 
the role of the government in economic development (Bajpai 
2002; Bath 1998).
2. For example, the IRENA soft loans for wind power projects 
changed every year between 9.5% and 21% (Gupta 1995; IREDA 
2002b and 2006; Jagadeesh 2000; Sasi and Basu 2002; Wind 
Power Monthly 1997a; Wind Power Monthly 1997c; Wind Power 
Monthly 2000; Wind Power Monthly 2004).
3. The joint sector companies acquire and lease the land, develop 
infrastructure and grid facilities, obtain the necessary clearances, 
and install, operate and maintain the wind turbines on behalf of 
the investors.
4. An Indian fiscal year starts in April of the same calendar year and 
ends in March of the next calendar year.
5. Turbine efficiency is usually calculated by yearly generated 
electricity divided by total rotor-swept area. However, this 
method of calculation has not been adopted here because the data 
regarding total rotor-swept areas of Germany and India over the 
years was not available. Yearly differences in wind and weather 
conditions have also not been normalised due to a lack of data.   
6. Gold-plating practices put far more expensive price tags on the 
turbines used in wind power projects than fair market prices, 
in order to inflate the project capital costs and receive more tax 
benefits and loans from governments. 
7. This Act changed some fundamental aspects of the electricity 
sector of India, including the following: 1) completely de-
licensing power generation, except for interstate hydro projects, 
and allowing free entry to power generation for businesses; 2) 
freely permitting captive generation by removing all licensing 
and permissions; 3) providing all power generation plants with 
open access to the transmission grid, as well as rights to build 
transmission lines for a fee in order to wheel power for self-
usage or for third-party sales; 4) obliging all state governments 
to separate transmission activity from SEBs and to establish 
state-owned State Transmission Utilities as well as SERCs, while 
providing state governments with the freedom to decide the 
sequences and phases of restructuring; 5) ordering SERCs to 
determine tariffs based on commercial principles and gradually 
eliminating cross-subsides; 6) permitting consumers to enter 
direct commercial relationships freely with generating companies 
or traders after open access is allowed; 7) introducing power 
trading; and 8) obliging GOI to formulate a National Electricity 
Plan and CEA to prepare the National Electricity Plan (Prayas 
2003). As for renewable energy, the 2003 Act limits the role of 
state governments to formulating policies related to: 1) providing 
government lands at nominal cost for renewable energy projects; 
2) providing subsidy for the cost of infrastructural development; 
and 3) providing the cost of electricity purchase by licensees from 
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renewable energy plants. Tariffs and charges are now decided not 
by state governments or SEBs but by SERCs. The predominant 
roles of SERCs are: 1) to determine tariffs for the generation, 
supply, transmission and wheeling of electricity within the state, 
as well as surcharges for open access to consuming power from a 
source other than a licensee; 2) to regulate electricity purchase and 
procurement distribution processes; 3) to facilitate the wheeling 
of electricity within the state; and 4) to promote electricity 
generation from renewable energy sources by providing suitable 
measures for grid connection and power sales to any person, as 
well as measures that specify a percentage of total consumption of 
electricity in the area of distribution licensees for the purchase of 
electricity from such sources (Consolidated Energy Consultants 
Ltd. 2005).
8. This 1998 Act was replaced by the 2003 Electricity Act.
9. This excludes TTG Industries, whose existence was unknown as 
of 2005.
10. Low duties targeted the easy import of components and cost 
reductions to encourage the market investment. Meanwhile, 
high duties were aimed at import restrictions on components 
which were desired to manufacture in India to increase domestic 
technological capability. Indian policy was very confusing because 
these opposed measures often targeted the same components. The 
duties were frequently changed, as the GOI itself was confused. 
11. Putting more duties on replacement components encouraged 
manufacturers and developers to avoid costly replacements and to 
manufacture and assemble the first components correctly.
12. Reactive power is the consumption of power from the grid to 
create a magnetic field inside a Wound Rotor Induction Generator 
(WRIG) in order to start it. The problem is specific to wind power 
generation using WRIG at a low loading stage. Reactive power 
reduces transmission efficiency.
13. Actually the difference in marketing and development 
approach created discrepancies in installed turbine sizes among 
manufacturers. For example, one of the reasons that Suzlon led the 
pack in terms of turbine size was that the firm began the so-called 
‘Wind Park’ approach (the firm develops a large tract of lands and 
infrastructure altogether and then sells a patch of the development 
and services to investors), thus solving many infrastructure-related 
problems and creating economies of scale.
 
     Annex 1: Fiscal policy and incentives for wind energy in India
Sources: Consolidated Energy Consultants Ltd. 2005; MNES 1995a; Rajsekhar, Van Hulle, and 
Jansen 1999
Schemes Contents 
1989 Tax Scheme on 
Wind Power Project 
Tax breaks to deduct the entire cost of equipment in the first year from pre-tax 
profits 
1993 Income Tax Rules 
Five-year 100% tax holiday on income from sales of wind electricity  
100% depreciation on investment in capital equipment related to wind power 
plants in the first year  
Zero-Tax planning (possible to avoid paying corporate tax on incomes of their 
registered companies and corporations) by combining various tax rebates and 
exemption and 100% accelerated depreciation 
1997 Tax Rules  
Introduction of Minimum Alternate Tax (MAT) on wind projects 
 12.9% MAT on book-value profits (return on equity) imposed on the 
companies that chose the ‘zero-tax’ planning, while 100% first-year 
depreciation continued.  
Lowering tax rate for the companies with higher book-value profits than 
investments on wind power projects 
 Reduced marginal corporate tax rate (from 46% to 35% in April 1997, further 
to 30% in 1998) 
April 1999 Tax Rules 11.4% MAT Rate  
April 2000 Tax Rules 8.4% MAT Rate 
April 2001 Tax Rules  Ten-year tax holiday on income from sales of wind electricity  
2003 Tax Revision 80% of first year depreciation on and after 4/1/2003 
 
Items 
Import Duty Rates 
1993- 
3/1997 
4/1997-
3/1998**
* 
4/1998-
3/2002 
4/2002-
3/2003 
4/2003-
6/2004 
7/2004-
Present 
Generators up to 30kW 25% 37.86% 29% 
5% 
5% 
5% 
Wind Turbine Parts/ 
Components*  
Special bearing 
Gearbox 
Yaw components 
Turbine controllers 
Sensors 
Brake hydraulics 
Flexible coupling 
Brake calipers 
0%** 
22% 9% 
25% 
Rotor blades* 12% 9% 
5% 
Rotor blade parts* 0% 9% 
Raw materials for rotor 
blades 
80% 0% N/A 
Duties are total effective duties that combine basic duty and special duty.  
*  For both manufacturing and maintenance purposes 
** Import duty exemption was up to ten components 
*** A prerequisite for clearing imports will be a requirement for the importer to furnish a certificate 
to the customs authorities from an officer of the rank of deputy secretary and above at MNES. 
Since MNES clearance is required for each and every shipment, the whole procedure could be 
time-consuming and arduous.  
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     Annex 2: Import duties on wind turbine sets and components in India
Sources: IWTMA 2002; Khanna 1998; MNES 2002/2004/2006; Wind Power Monthly 1996a; Wind 
Power Monthly 1997b; Wind Power Monthly 2003a 
Annex 3: State policy
Tamil Nadu
Tamil Nadu was the first state to draw up a support policy for wind energy, long before the MNES 1993 guidelines 
was issued. Tamil Nadu strongly promoted demonstration projects from the 1980s, and the accumulated 
experiences were reflected in their early state policy (Annex 2-a). 
Gujarat 
Gujarat was another state that started the demonstration projects in the 1980s that helped to formulate its 
state support policy. Gujarat completely withdrew the state policy in March 1998, following a slight policy 
modification in 1997. In June 2002, the state announced a new policy (Annex 2-b).  
Maharashtra
Maharashtra first drew up its support policy in 1995. The state began implementing a new policy with the strong 
fiscal and financial incentives in December 1999, which ended in March 2002.   The newest policy began in 
November 2003 (Annex 2-c).  
Schemes Contents 
1989 Tax Scheme on 
Wind Power Project 
Tax breaks to deduct the entire cost of equipment in the first year from pre-tax 
profits 
1993 Income Tax Rules 
Five-year 100% tax holiday on income from sales of wind electricity  
100% depreciation on investment in capital equipment related to wind power 
plants in the first year  
Zero-Tax planning (possible to avoid paying corporate tax on incomes of their 
registered companies and corporations) by combining various tax rebates and 
exemption and 100% accelerated depreciation 
1997 Tax Rules  
Introduction of Minimum Alternate Tax (MAT) on wind projects 
 12.9% MAT on book-value profits (return on equity) imposed on the 
companies that chose the ‘zero-tax’ planning, while 100% first-year 
depreciation continued.  
Lowering tax rate for the companies with higher book-value profits than 
investments on wind power projects 
 Reduced marginal corporate tax rate (from 46% to 35% in April 1997, further 
to 30% in 1998) 
April 1999 Tax Rules 11.4% MAT Rate  
April 2000 Tax Rules 8.4% MAT Rate 
April 2001 Tax Rules  Ten-year tax holiday on income from sales of wind electricity  
2003 Tax Revision 80% of first year depreciation on and after 4/1/2003 
 
Items 
Import Duty Rates 
1993- 
3/1997 
4/1997-
3/1998**
* 
4/1998-
3/2002 
4/2002-
3/2003 
4/2003-
6/2004 
7/2004-
Present 
Generators up to 30kW 25% 37.86% 29% 
5% 
5% 
5% 
Wind Turbine Parts/ 
Components*  
Special bearing 
Gearbox 
Yaw components 
Turbine controllers 
Sensors 
Brake hydraulics 
Flexible coupling 
Brake calipers 
0%** 
22% 9% 
25% 
Rotor blades* 12% 9% 
5% 
Rotor blade parts* 0% 9% 
Raw materials for rotor 
blades 
80% 0% N/A 
Duties are total effective duties that combine basic duty and special duty.  
*  For both manufacturing and maintenance purposes 
** Import duty exemption was up to ten components 
*** A prerequisite for clearing imports will be a requirement for the importer to furnish a certificate 
to the customs authorities from an officer of the rank of deputy secretary and above at MNES. 
Since MNES clearance is required for each and every shipment, the whole procedure could be 
time-consuming and arduous.  
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Andhra Pradesh, Karnataka and Rajasthan
The states of Andhra Pradesh, Karnataka and Rajasthan have offered the following policy (Annex 2-d). 
Annex 3-a: Support policy in Tamil Nadu
Sources: Consolidated Energy Consultants Ltd. 2005; MNES 1995a; MNES 1996a; MNES 1997a; 
MNES 1998; MNES 1999a; MNES 2000a; MNES 2001a; MNES 2002a; MNES 2003; MNES 2004; 
MNES 2005; Winrock International India 2003 
 
Annex 3-b: Support policy in Gujarat
Sources: Consolidated Energy Consultants Ltd. 2005; MNES 1995a; MNES 1996a; MNES 1997a; 
MNES 1998; MNES 1999a; MNES 2000a; MNES 2001a; MNES 2002a; MNES 2003; MNES 2004; 
MNES 2005
Time 
Period 
Wheeling 
Charge 
Banking Feed-in Tariffs  Third-Party Sales 
Pre 1993 – 
3/1996* 
2% of power 
generated 
One year 
2% charge 
INR 2.00/kWh in 1994-95  
INR 2.75/kWh in 1995-96 
Allowed with 15% 
wheeling charge  
(1994-95) 
4/1996 – 
3/2001* 
One Month 
2% charge 
INR 2.25/kWh in 1996-97  
5% annual escalation based 
on 1996-96 tariff *** Not allowed 
4/2001 – 
Present ** 
5% of power 
generated 
One financial year 
5% charge 
INR 2.70/kWh*** 
No escalation for five year 
* In addition, a capital subsidy of 10% of project cost with a ceiling of INR 15 lakhs was available until the 
1996-97 fiscal year. Exemption of generation tax was available until the 2000-01 fiscal year. Penalties for 
reactive power charge of INR 0.1/KVARH (quantum of reactive power) started from June 1995. The charge 
was increased to INR 0.30/KVARH in June 1999, and again to INR 1/KVARH in April 2000.    
** Infrastructure charges of INR 28.75/MW and application/processing fee of INR 11,000/application apply. 
In addition, from May 2002, reactive power charge of INR 0.30/KVARH if the ratio of reactive power 
drawn to kWh exported is 10% or less and INR 1/KVARH for more than 10%.  
*** TNEB has been too financially strapped to keep the 5% annual increase between 1996 and March 2001 
and the tariff of INR. 2.70/kWh after April 2001. Only INR 2.25/kWh has been paid in reality. TNEB claims 
the balance will be paid as and when the utility's financial health improves.     
 
 
 
Time 
Period 
Wheeling 
Charge 
Banking Feed-in Tariffs 
Third-Party 
Sales 
1994 – 
1997* 2% of power 
generated 
6 months 
INR1.75/kWh  
No escalation 
Not allowed  
1997 – 
3/1998** 
6/2002 – 
Present*** 
4% of power 
generated 
INR 2.60/kWh  
INR 0.05 annual escalation based 
on 2002-03 tariff  
for ten years 
*   Land was leased on a 15-year term, and sales tax and electricity duty were waived. 
**  Sales tax exemption and deferral were available up to 50% of investment.  
*** Reactive power charge INR 0.1 per consumed power and application/processing fee of INR 
50,000/MW are applied. Electricity duty exemption and exemption from power cut are available up to 
30%.    
 
 
 
 
 
Time 
Period 
Wheeling 
Charge 
Banking Feed-in Tariffs  Third-Party Sales 
Pre 1993 – 
3/1996* 
2% of power 
generated 
One year 
2% charge 
INR 2.00/kWh in 1994-95  
INR 2.75/kWh in 1995-96 
Allowed with 15% 
wheeling charge  
(1994-95) 
4/1996 – 
3/2001* 
One Month 
2% charge 
INR 2.25/kWh in 1996-97  
5% annual escalation based 
on 1996-96 tariff *** Not allowed 
4/2001 – 
Present ** 
5% of power 
generated 
One financial year 
5% charge 
INR 2.70/kWh*** 
No escalation for five year 
* In addition, a capital subsidy of 10% of project cost with a ceiling of INR 15 lakhs was available until the 
1996-97 fiscal year. Exemption of generation tax was available until the 2000-01 fiscal year. Penalties for 
reactive power charge of INR 0.1/KVARH (quantum of reactive power) started from June 1995. The charge 
was increased to INR 0.30/KVARH in June 1999, and again to INR 1/KVARH in April 2000.    
** Infrastructure charges of INR 28.75/MW and application/processing fee of INR 11,000/application apply. 
In addition, from May 2002, reactive power charge of INR 0.30/KVARH if the ratio of reactive power 
drawn to kWh exported is 10% or less and INR 1/KVARH for more than 10%.  
*** TNEB has been too financially strapped to keep the 5% annual increase between 1996 and March 2001 
and the tariff of INR. 2.70/kWh after April 2001. Only INR 2.25/kWh has been paid in reality. TNEB claims 
the balance will be paid as and when the utility's financial health improves.     
 
 
 
Time 
Period 
Wheeling 
Charge 
Banking Feed-in Tariffs 
Third-Party 
Sales 
1994 – 
1997* 2% of power 
generated 
6 months 
INR1.75/kWh  
No escalation 
Not allowed  
1997 – 
3/1998** 
6/2002 – 
Present*** 
4% of power 
generated 
INR 2.60/kWh  
INR 0.05 annual escalation based 
on 2002-03 tariff  
for ten years 
*   Land was leased on a 15-year term, and sales tax and electricity duty were waived. 
**  Sales tax exemption and deferral were available up to 50% of investment.  
*** Reactive power charge INR 0.1 per consumed power and application/processing fee of INR 
50,000/MW are applied. Electricity duty exemption and exemption from power cut are available up to 
30%.    
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Annex 3-c: Support policy in Maharashtra
Sources: Consolidated Energy Consultants Ltd. 2005; MEDA 2001a; MEDA 2001b; MEDA 2002; 
MNES 1995a; MNES 1996a; MNES 1997a; MNES 1998; MNES 1999a; MNES 2000a; MNES 
2001a; MNES 2002a; MNES 2003; MNES 2004; MNES 2005
 
Time 
Period 
Wheeling 
Charge 
Banking Feed-in Tariffs 
Third-Party 
Sales 
1995 – 
12/1999 
Allowed 
Allowed* up to 
20% of energy 
generated 
INR 2.25/Kwh  
5% annual escalation based on 1994-95 
tariff 
Allowed 
12/1999** 
- 3/2002 
2% of power 
generated 
One Year 
INR 2.25.KWh  
5% annual escalation based on  
1997-98 tariff  
11/2003- 
Present 
*** 
2% of power 
generated for 
wheeling plus 
5% for T&D 
loss 
One Year 
INR 2.25.KWh  
5% annual escalation based on 1994-95 
tariff for Group1 and 2**** 
INR 3.50/kWh with INR 0.15/kWh 
annual increase for Group 3***** 
*  Banking was for three months in 1996-97 fiscal year and became one year after 1997. 
** Although this policy itself was created in 1998, the state did not implement it until December 1999 when 
the new administration took office in the state. In addition to the above, a capital subsidy of 30% of 
project cost subject to maximum INR 20 lakh, and sale tax exemption up to 100% of investment were 
available. 
*** Reactive power charge INR 0.25 per consumed power and application/processing fee of INR 
50,000/MW. No electricity duty for five years for captive use and a green energy fund are available for 
100% of cost of approach road and for 50% of power evacuation arrangement cost as subsidy. No 
interest loan is available for 50% of power evacuation arrangement cost.  
**** 5% tariff escalation is set differently for the following three groups:  
Group 1 (projects commissioned before 12/27/1999): annual increase of compound basis for the first 
ten years, no increase for the next three years, and then 5% increase for the next seven years.  
Group 2 (project commissioned between 12/27/1999 and 3/31/2003): annual increase of for eight 
years. Then the producer needs to sell power in the open market. Increase to be simple rate. 
*****Group 3 (project commissioned between 4/1/2003 and 3/31/2007): INR 3.50/kWh for the first year 
with INR 0.15/kWh annual increase for a period of 13 years.    
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Annex 3-d: Support policy in Andhra Pradesh, Karnataka and Rajasthan
Sources: Consolidated Energy Consultants Ltd. 2005; MNES 1995a; MNES 1996a; MNES 1997a; 
MNES 1998; MNES 1999a; MNES 2000a; MNES 2001a; MNES 2002a; MNES 2003; MNES 2004; 
MNES 2005
State 
Time 
Period 
Wheeling 
Charge 
Banking Feed-in Tariffs 
Third-Party 
Sales 
Andhra 
Pradesh 
1994 – 
3/1997* 
2% of power 
generated 
One Year 2% 
charge* 
INR 2.25/Kwh 
Allowed 
4/1997 – 
3/2000** 
One Year 
INR 2.25/Kwh  
5% annual escalation based 
on 1997-98 tariffs (until 
3/2000) and 1994-95 tariffs 
(from 4/2000) 
INR 3.48/kWh in 2003-04 
4/2000 - 
3/2004*** 
Not 
allowed  
4/2004 – 
Present 
**** 
Vary between  
INR 46/kWh 
and 60/kWh  
N/A 
INR 3.37/kWh 
No escalation 
* 8 months banking was allowed from August to March. Capital subsidy of 20% of project cost subject to 
max. INR 25 lakh and 20-year long land lease with free rent for the first five years. 
** Capital subsidy of 20% of project cost subject to maximum INR 25 lakh. 
*** Reactive power charge of INR 0.1 per consumed power. 
****Reactive power charge of INR 0.1 per consumed power, infrastructure development charge of INR 10 
lakh/MW, and application/processing fee of INR 5,000/MW are applied.    
 Karnataka 
1994 – 
3/1997* 2% of power 
generated 
One year 
(July – June)*  
INR 1.75/kWh in 1994-95 
Allowed 
INR 2.25/kWh  
5% annual escalation base on 
1994-95 tariffs 
4/1997 – 
3/2000** 
One year 
4/2000 – 
12/2004*** 
20% of power 
generated 
2% per month  
for one year 
1/2005 – 
Present**** 
5% of power 
generated 
2% charge 
INR 3.40/kWh  
No escalation for ten years 
*  Banking had one month grace period. Land-lease for a period of 50 years, capital subsidy same as for 
other industries, and exemption of electricity duty for five years were available.  
**  Exemption of electricity duty for five years was available. 
*** Capital subsidy of max INR 25 lakh, electricity duty exemption for five years, and reactive power charge 
of INR. 0.4 per consumed power were applicable. Feed-in-tariffs were INR 3.25/kWh and INR 3.10/kWh 
for projects commissioned before 8/31/2003 and from 9/1/2003 to 12/31/2004, respectively.    
**** Application/processing fee of INR. 30,000/MW and electricity duty exemption for five years.   
Rajasthan 
4/1999 – 
10/2004* 
2% of power 
generated 
One year 
INR 2.75/kWh in 1999-01 
INR 2.89/kWh in 2001-04 
5% annual escalation base on 
1999-00 tariffs  
Allowed 
10/2004 – 
Present** 
10% of 
power 
generated 
One calendar 
year 
INR 2.91/kWh for the first 
year, then INR 0.05/kWh 
annual escalation until 10th 
year, then INR. 3.36/ kWh 
until 20th year  
* Exemption of electricity duty for five years was available. 
** 50% exemption of electricity duty for seven years is available. Reactive power charge of INR 0.25 per 
consumed power and application/processing fee of INR. 50,000/MW are applied.  
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Developing enabling frameworks for 
the dissemination of clean-burning, 
fuel-efficient cookstoves
Robert Bailis and Jasmine Hyman
Yale School of Forestry and Environmental Studies, USA
Introduction
Distributing clean-burning, fuel-efficient cookstoves, 
whether through aid or low-cost distribution 
programmes, has recently risen up the global public 
agenda since the establishment of the ‘Global Clean 
Cookstove Alliance’ (GACC) in September 2010. 
The GACC is a private-public partnership including 
the United Nations Foundation, the United 
States’ Environmental Protection Agency and the 
Shell Foundation, among others (United Nations 
Foundation 2011; Smith 2010). UNEP is an official 
implementer of the Alliance and is actively working 
with over 250 other organisations towards a ‘100 by 
20’ target in which 100 million homes adopt clean and 
efficient stoves and fuels by 2020.
The potential benefits of shifting from current cooking 
technologies to clean-burning, fuel-efficient cookstoves 
include reduced exposure to harmful indoor air 
pollution, decreased pressure on wood resources for 
Abstract
Clean-burning, fuel-efficient cookstoves have been 
promoted as a means of reducing negative health and 
environmental impacts resulting from the burning 
of solid biomass fuels. International initiatives such 
as the Global Alliance for Clean Cookstoves reflect 
general consensus in the policy making community 
that investments in fuel-efficient cookstoves provide 
large returns to society in terms of health benefits, time 
savings and reduced pressure on forests and climate. 
However, with a few exceptions the adoption and long-
term use of alternative stoves remains low. This article 
surveys the history of stove adoption and reflects on 
current models of stove dissemination to identify best 
practices in clean cookstove programme design and 
dissemination. The article summarises best practices 
from the history of cookstove intervention attempts 
and uses illustrative case studies to present best practice 
techniques to transform the cookstove challenge into 
an opportunity for a more effective scaling-up strategy.
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firewood and charcoal, reduced workloads for women 
and children (the traditional collectors of firewood in 
many cultures), lower monthly expenditure on fuel, 
and reduced burns and injuries in the home. There are 
also benefits for the global environment in the form 
of reduced emissions of greenhouse gases (GHG) and 
black carbon (soot).1  
However, in order to meet the 100 by 20 goal, we 
must examine the past. Interest in stove interventions 
dates back to the 1970s, when concerns were 
centered mainly on forest conservation. The 
justification for interventions in household energy 
broadened over the years to incorporate concerns 
about public health and climate change, with forest 
conservation taking a lesser role. Through these shifts, 
it became apparent that, despite potentially large 
social and environmental benefits, successful stove 
dissemination was not easy to achieve. This article 
reviews the benefits of clean-burning cookstoves, 
examines the links between local cooking habits 
and global climate change, and then examines ways 
in which the international community can support 
the widespread dissemination of efficient cookstoves 
in line with developmental and environmental 
goals. The discussion outlines key experiences from 
the past, current financing opportunities for the 
development practitioner, and issues related to stove 
adoption and gender dynamics that are also the key 
to a cookstove project’s success on the ground. The 
purpose of this article is to familiarise the reader with 
current knowledge on cooking-stove promotion and 
diffusion, and to point out best practices for fuel-
efficient cookstove programme design, dissemination 
and local level adoption. 
Why clean-burning, fuel-efficient 
cookstoves? 
Today, between a third and a half of the world’s 
population rely on solid fuels for the majority of their 
energy needs. Solid fuels include a range of unprocessed 
biomass like firewood, crop residues and dung, as well 
as processed fuels like briquettes and charcoal. In some 
places, fossil coal is also used for household cooking 
and heating. Coal use is most prevalent in China, but 
also occurs in some parts of India, southern Africa and 
Latin America (ICF Macro 2011). 
Numerous negative consequences arise as a result of 
reliance on solid fuels. Cooking represents the largest 
use of energy in the household, and most cooking 
appliances tend to be relatively inefficient both in the 
way they combust fuel and in how they transfer the 
heat from the stove to the food. Many families cook 
indoors, either seasonally or year-round. Inefficient 
combustion releases harmful pollutants, which 
concentrate in the kitchen, leading to pollution levels 
far in excess of international standards (Smith, Edwards 
et al. 2007). As a result, the WHO estimates that 
smoke from solid fuels contributes to nearly 3% of the 
global burden of disease (Smith, Mehta et al. 2004), 
rivaling malaria and tuberculosis as a source of illness 
and death in developing regions. Many pollutants 
also act as heat-trapping greenhouse gases (GHGs) 
(Bailis 2005; Smith, Uma et al. 2000). Finally, in some 
locations wood is harvested unsustainably, leading to a 
net loss in tree cover, which further exacerbates climate 
change and contributes to environmental degradation.
Additional negative impacts on household members 
are associated with the collection and preparation of 
solid fuels. In some places, fuel is collected by women 
and children who often trek long distances, harvest 
wood using simple hand tools and carry heavy loads 
of fuel, which all create a considerable physical burden 
(Bryceson and Howe 1993). Fuel collection has also 
been associated with an elevated risk of sexual assault 
in some regions (Gaye 2007). The potential impacts 
from cookstove interventions therefore range from 
reduced pressures on global environmental resources to 
enhanced livelihoods, health and working conditions 
in developing country households.
Climate change and cooking stoves: How 
are they related? 
Clean-burning, fuel-efficient cookstoves can 
contribute to climate change mitigation through two 
pathways. First, by reducing the demand for wood, 
stove adoption can relieve pressure on forest resources. 
On average, stoves currently used to generate carbon 
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emission reductions in the Clean Development 
Mechanism (CDM) reduce wood fuel consumption 
by more than 50 percent relative to the stoves they 
replace (see below for more information about stoves 
in the CDM). Annually, deforestation constitutes 15-
20% of global greenhouse emissions (IPCC 2007). 
Thus, in places around the developing world where 
wood fuel demand drives deforestation, clean-burning, 
fuel-efficient cookstoves can slow or reverse the loss of 
forest cover and reduce CO2 emissions by avoiding 
unsustainable tree harvesting. 
However, the exact contribution of wood fuel demand 
to deforestation is not known. Linkages between wood 
fuel utilisation and deforestation are complex. While 
it is possible to measure and document wood savings 
in households that adopt clean-burning, fuel-efficient 
cookstoves (PCIA 2011), measuring impacts on forest 
cover is more difficult, and well-documented cases 
leading to reduced rates of deforestation are elusive 
(Ghilardi, Guerrero et al. 2007). This remains an area 
of active research. 
The second way that clean-burning, fuel-efficient stoves 
contribute to climate change mitigation is by improving 
combustion. Perfect combustion of hydrocarbon 
fuels releases only CO2 and water vapor. However, 
traditional cookstoves typically have poor combustion 
and emit methane (CH4), carbon monoxide (CO), 
non-methane hydrocarbons (NMHCs) and aerosols 
(Smith, Uma et al. 2000). These additional pollutants 
have a significantly higher global warming potential 
than CO2 (IPCC 2007; MacCarty, Ogle et al. 2008). 
Well-designed stoves can improve airflow and/or raise 
temperatures in the combustion area, thereby burning 
more cleanly and reducing emissions of non-CO2 
pollutants.
In order to compare the climate impacts of cookstoves 
accurately, fuel processing also needs to be considered. 
This is most relevant for charcoal because the emissions 
that occur when wood is turned into charcoal via 
traditional technologies like earthen kilns can exceed 
the emissions that occur when charcoal is burned to 
cook food (Pennise, Smith et al. 2001). Thus, when 
efficient charcoal stoves are introduced and lead to 
reduced fuel consumption, emissions decrease at the 
point of production as well as the point of use.
Thus, clean-burning, fuel-efficient stoves can 
contribute to climate change mitigation by lowering 
emissions of non-CO2 pollutants and reducing wood 
consumption in cases where wood fuel harvesting leads 
to deforestation. Importantly, the pollutants that are 
reduced or avoided by improving combustion also 
present health risks (particularly aerosols and CO). 
Promoting stoves as a climate change mitigation 
strategy therefore leads to improved indoor air quality 
and associated health benefits.
Approaches to cookstove dissemination 
over the years
Stove dissemination programmes of various types 
are currently being implemented in dozens of 
countries (Legros, Havet et al. 2009). The GACC is 
perhaps the highest profile stove programme to have 
been implemented to date. To understand how the 
Alliance’s ambitious goal of 100 million stoves may be 
achieved, it is instructive to look at the lessons learned 
throughout the recent history of stove dissemination. 
Cookstoves for forest conservation
Although there was some activity in earlier decades, 
most would place the origin of cookstove interventions 
in the 1970s. The history of stove dissemination 
mirrors the history of development priorities over the 
decades. The first stove projects focused on stopping 
deforestation. In the 1970s, woodfuel demand was 
directly blamed for deforestation in developing 
countries (de Montalembert and Clement 1983; 
Eckholm 1975; FAO 1978), but over time more 
nuanced analyses emerged demonstrating that changes 
in forest cover are often driven by other pressures like 
timber extraction and demand for pasture or cropland 
(Leach and Mearns 1988; Leach and Mearns 1996). 
Further, stoves of that era relied on questionable 
design principles, and projects had little user input in 
the design process and suffered from poor monitoring 
and evaluation (Barnes, Openshaw et al. 1994). 
Finally, enthusiasm for stove adoption among target 
populations was often quite low. As a result of these 
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difficulties and the questionable link between wood 
fuel users and deforestation, early donor interest in 
cookstoves waned. However, important lessons had 
been learned: while wood scarcity is a real problem, in 
many cases wood fuel users cannot be directly ‘blamed’ 
for deforestation. Further, successful cookstove 
interventions require a collaborative approach with 
the target community in order to ensure that the 
new technology is both technically and culturally 
appropriate. 
Cookstoves to reduce indoor air pollution
As these realisations sunk in, research was emerging 
about the health impacts caused by exposure to smoke 
from the indoor use of solid fuels (Smith 1993). By 
the late 1990s donors began to prioritise public health, 
thus opening new funding channels for cookstove 
programmes. However, this was also a period when 
donors began to disfavour subsidies and other non-
commercial approaches to development assistance and 
instead began to promote commercial models (Bailis, 
Cowan et al. 2009). This created particular challenges 
for alternative stoves. On one hand stoves are durable 
household goods, and such goods have always been 
sold in unsubsidised markets around the world. On the 
other hand cookstoves are upheld as tools for public 
health interventions, environmental conservation and, 
more recently, carbon emissions reductions. Each of 
these problems is linked in some way to a ‘public good’: 
public health, ecosystem services and climate change 
mitigation. Public goods are typically not provided 
through commercial approaches and may require 
financial assistance from the government, NGOs or 
international donors. However, in the case of stoves, 
by the 1990s such assistance lost popularity.2 
Cookstoves for climate change mitigation
In the lead-up to the ratification of the Kyoto Protocol 
to the United Nations Framework Convention on 
Climate Change in 2005, stoves gained traction for 
their potential to mitigate climate change (Ezzati, 
Bailis et al. 2004; Smith and Haigler 2008). This 
attention has spilled over into mainstream media 
outlets (Martha Stewart Living 2010; Rosenthal 2009) 
and has opened up new channels of funding. 
In addition, two other aspects in recent climate change 
mitigation discussions have added to the interest in 
cookstoves. First, the reduction of emissions from 
deforestation and degradation (REDD) has brought 
attention back to the complex links between wood fuel 
dependence and deforestation (Angelsen, Brockhaus et 
al. 2009, especially Chapter 19). Secondly, cookstoves 
have been identified as major sources of ‘black 
carbon’ (BC) aerosols, which are potent warming 
agents (Hansen and Nazarenko 2004). Research 
on the atmospheric impact of BC aerosols revealed 
an additional channel through which stoves could 
mitigate climate change (Ramanathan and Carmichael 
2008). 
The largest international experiment in new energy 
finance is the CDM, created under the Kyoto Protocol. 
The CDM enables developed countries to fund 
reductions in greenhouse gas emissions in developing 
countries. Stoves are now being deployed in dozens 
of carbon offset schemes across the developing world. 
Emissions reductions for each adopted stove range 
from 1 to 3 tons of CO2 equivalent per year (tCO2e/
yr). Offsets generate revenue for project developers 
that can potentially reduce the costs of the stove for 
the end user and enable the stove producers to achieve 
financial sustainability, even without development 
assistance. 
In addition to bringing much-needed finance to stove 
projects, carbon markets have also introduced closer 
scrutiny to monitoring and evaluation. In the past, 
most projects were evaluated based on the number of 
stoves sold or installed without attention being paid to 
whether and how the stoves were actually used (Ruiz-
Mercado, Masera et al.). Now, in order to receive 
payments for carbon credits, stove projects must follow 
specific monitoring methodologies and undergo third-
party verification. While this proves burdensome for 
implementation, it is critical to ensure environmental 
efficacy and provides essential insight into the fate of 
the stoves after they arrive in the kitchen. 
One cookstove project in Mali provides an example of 
the difference a small amount of carbon finance can 
make. The project, which sells fuel-efficient charcoal 
‘SEWA’ stoves, uses carbon finance to reduce the 
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stove’s cost by 30 percent (from a retail price of USD 
7.50 to roughly USD 5.30). Though USD 2.20 seems 
negligible, average monthly income in is Mali less than 
USD 100 per household, and this financial assistance 
has been helpful for stove dissemination (The Gold 
Standard 2008). Text Box 1 describes a similar project 
in Peru. 
Thus the 1990s brought about another lesson for the 
cookstove community: while fully subsidised diffusion 
programmes are unattractive to donors, partial subsidies 
and assistance can help bridge the abyss between 
traditional and alternative cooking technologies. 
Complexities of stove adoption
Outside China, uptake of fuel-efficient stoves has been 
slow. Despite decades of interventions, adoption rates 
remain low. This leads to a natural question: under 
what circumstances do people adopt new stoves? In 
order to change cooking technologies, stove users must 
perceive that the stove carries benefits that outweigh 
the costs and risks associated with adoption. For stove 
users, the benefits of adoption can take many forms. 
These include primary policy objectives like cleaner 
indoor air and reduced wood consumption. However, 
research has shown that smoke reduction is not always 
a top priority for users (Mobarak, Dwivedi et al. 2011; 
Troncoso, Castillo et al. 2007). Other dimensions, 
which do not factor into social or environmental 
policy objectives, are also crucial: for example, ease 
of use, reduced cooking times and flexibility in being 
able to burn multiple types or sizes of fuel may also 
be important. Reduced smoke in the kitchen may also 
be desirable for reasons other than health. Troncoso 
and colleagues (2007) report that aesthetic issues like 
soot-free pots, pans and kitchen walls were very highly 
valued by stove adopters in central Mexico.3  
The costs of adoption include any monetary or in-kind 
expenditure that the stove user pays or contributes to 
the stove provider.4 However, other costs may also be 
relevant. Some cookstoves can only burn small sticks 
and twigs, which may require users to spend additional 
time preparing fuel. Moreover, users may perceive 
some risk in adopting a new stove technology. For 
example, the stove may alter the taste of certain foods, 
it may break or be incompatible with cooking utensils, 
maintenance may be too burdensome, and spare parts 
may not be readily available, or the stove may fail to 
perform as advertised. 
Regional variations in stove programmes
Roughly 160 stove programmes are currently active 
(REN21 2010). The IPCC’s ‘Special Report on 
Renewable Energy Sources’ (Chum, Faaij et al. 2011) 
uses data from the UNDP and WHO to estimate 
that 820 million people, or ‘around 30% of the 2.7 
billion that rely on traditional biomass’ use ‘some 
kind of improved stove for cooking’ (Ch. 2, p. 55). 
Since typical households have four to five individuals, 
between 160 and 200 million ‘improved’ stoves are 
probably in use worldwide. The authors’ own analysis 
of UNDP/WHO data finds ~200 million stoves 
in use. 
Of course, wide regional disparities exist. Currently, 
75% of non-traditional stoves in use globally are in 
China, where over 70 percent of the solid fuel-using 
population has adopted some type of new stove (Legros, 
Havet et al. 2009). India, with a similar number of 
people reliant on solid fuels, follows a distant second, 
with 13.5 million non-traditional stoves, just eight 
percent of solid fuel users (Legros, Havet et al. 2009). 
Other regions, like Sub-Saharan Africa and South 
Asian countries, where biomass reliance exceeds 80% 
of the population, stoves have reached just 4-5 million 
households, which is fewer than 10% percent of solid 
fuel users in each region (Legros, Havet et al. 2009). It 
is difficult to explain the wide disparity between non-
traditional stove adoption in China and the slower 
uptake elsewhere; however, Text Box 2 discusses some 
of the dimensions of China’s stove programme that led 
to its success. 
Summing up, over the past three decades, experiences 
indicate that many factors complicate efforts to 
achieve the widespread adoption of clean-burning, 
fuel-efficient cookstoves. Design difficulties, a lack 
of prioritisation and cash restraints among target 
populations, and difficulties with the monitoring 
and verification of long-term adoption rank among 
the most problematic issues. Yet the challenge is well 
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worth the attention of the international community 
given the magnitude of stove-related problems and 
the cost-effectiveness of successful stove interventions. 
The next section of the article examines more closely 
how widely cookstove dissemination can be achieved 
worldwide.
Current models of stove dissemination: The 
challenge of scaling up
Stove dissemination, whether one prioritises forests, 
public health, climate or all three of the potential 
benefits, requires careful programme design to overcome 
a series of challenges. The successful diffusion of efficient 
cookstoves cannot follow a single recipe. Instead stove 
programs must find the right combination of elements 
from a multi-course menu. This section examines the 
factors that programme designers must consider.
Sensitivity to factors related to gender and 
social norms
Importantly, there is a gender dimension to the 
costs and benefits of stove adoption that may be 
underappreciated (Clancy 2002; Skutsch 2005). For 
example, in many households around the world, 
expenditure decisions are made primarily by male 
household heads (Hart 1997), while responsibility 
for cooking and the impacts associated with exposure 
to indoor air pollution fall primarily on women. 
Although clean-burning cookstoves may reduce 
harmful emissions, the men who control budgets do 
not directly experience these benefits. Fuel-efficient 
stoves also reduce fuel consumption, but in many cases 
women and children collect fuel wood at no monetary 
cost, so that men may undervalue the time saved. 
In contrast, when fuel is purchased, the benefits of 
adopting fuel-saving technology may be more obvious.
Numerous context-specific factors come into play 
when a family is presented with a choice to purchase 
a fuel-efficient stove (or even accept a stove offered to 
them for free). Some stove users may consider reduced 
fuel consumption an attractive attribute while others 
may not be concerned with fuel consumption but value 
cleaner kitchen environments, and yet others may 
demand fuel-flexibility because of seasonal variation 
in the types of fuel available to them. Moreover, there 
may be no agreement within the household about the 
relative importance of each dimension described above. 
In addition, the opinions of family members may not 
be static. Instead, opinions may evolve as individuals 
observe friends, neighbours and ‘local thought leaders’ 
who adopt (or do not adopt) cookstoves, or they may 
be influenced by marketing messages conveyed by 
stove promoters. Achieving the widespread adoption 
of clean cookstoves among the hundreds of millions 
of households worldwide requires an understanding 
of these complex social factors. Partnering with local 
organisations, women’s groups and local leaders can 
help the practitioner transform this challenge into an 
opportunity for a more locally tailored and effective 
scale-up strategy.
Business models to meet local conditions
In order to achieve widespread stove adoption, stove 
dissemination needs to occur on an unprecedented 
scale. As discussed above, over 700 million households 
worldwide use solid fuels without clean-burning, 
fuel-efficient stove. Reaching these households poses 
a challenge. In order to achieve the scale necessary, 
thousands of new businesses will need to be established 
in stove construction and supply, as well as in retail sales. 
Business start-ups are difficult under any circumstances, 
particularly when the majority of consumers are poor 
rural families. Many of the countries in which solid 
fuel users reside are not business-friendly. A recent 
World Bank study ranks Sub-Saharan Africa and 
South Asia, where the majority of people in need of 
stoves reside, as the most difficult regions in which to 
conduct business (World Bank 2010).5  
Several stove programmes have reduced these challenges 
by developing lightweight stove designs that are 
fabricated in a centralised factory and shipped around 
the world (Aitken, Watson et al. 2010; Adkins, Tyler 
et al. 2010). This strategy reduces the need to establish 
multiple businesses in areas of the world with difficult 
business environments. It also facilitates quality 
control and allows stove producers to take advantage 
of economies of scale. However, for regions where large 
in-built stoves are the norm, like Central America, 
mass production of light-weight portable stoves is 
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unlikely to succeed. Still, in these cases some degree of 
centralised production is possible. For example, several 
stove promoters in Central America have established 
centralised facilities, which make mass-produced 
components like grills, grates, chimneys and fireboxes 
(Proyecto Mirador 2011; Álvarez, Palma et al. 2004). 
While this approach requires facilities to be established 
in places with difficult business environments, they 
also have the advantage that they create employment 
and build local capacity. Similarly, small-scale, highly 
decentralised production can also be successful, as in 
the case of the well-known Kenyan ceramic jiko (KCJ), 
a simple low-cost charcoal stove that is mass-produced 
by informal artisans (metal and ceramics workers) across 
Kenya. The design was popularised with donor support 
in the 1980s and 1990s and has now been replicated 
across Sub-Saharan Africa (Bailis, Cowan et al. 2009).
Finance
The costs of cookstove projects range from the design 
of the new technology to the investments required to 
transport the stoves, educate consumers, deliver the 
stoves, monitor long-term use and, if necessary, repair 
or replace poorly functioning stoves. Financial models 
range from NGO-led efforts that provide users with 
100% subsidised stoves to purely commercial sales in 
which the users pay the full costs and the suppliers 
earn a profit. Many stove programmes exist somewhere 
between these two extremes, offering stoves at partially 
subsidised prices. An increasing number use carbon 
finance as a means to lower purchase costs for the 
target population while also recouping the initial 
capital investment (Burridge, Goetz et al. 2011).
A commonality present in most cookstove initiatives 
is that the majority of solid fuel users are poor rural 
families who tend to be cash-constrained and lack 
access to credit. Fuel-efficient stoves may cost as little 
as USD 5 for a simple metal charcoal stove (Kinyanjui 
2010) to over USD 100 for some of the robustly built 
‘plancha’ stoves being promoted in Central America 
(Álvarez, Palma et al. 2004). However, even at the 
lower end of this range, the cost may be a barrier to 
adoption among the poorest families, while the upper 
end of this range would be a stretch for most rural 
families. Thus, whether the objective is to make fuel-
efficient stoves more affordable to all potential users, 
or simply to allow the poorest families to access what 
better-off families can already afford, mechanisms 
to reduce the initial price of stoves are essential for 
widespread adoption. This can be accomplished 
through several mechanisms, including corporate 
finance, direct subsidies, microfinance and finance 
through the generation and sale of carbon offsets. 
Corporate Finance
A small number of large corporations have led stove 
dissemination efforts. For example, Bosch-Siemens, BP 
and Philips have invested in developing and marketing 
alternative stoves. In these cases, corporations with 
large amounts of capital and substantial in-house 
capacity for research, product design and marketing 
have been able to bring a stove from concept through 
to commercialisation (Roth 2011; B/S/H 2011).6  
Subsidies
There are active debates about the degree to which 
clean-burning, fuel-efficient stoves should be subsidised 
(Bailis, Cowan et al. 2009; Barnes, Openshaw et al. 
1994). Many think that subsidies of some form are 
justifiable on health grounds. Research has shown that 
clean-burning, fuel-efficient stoves are an extremely 
cost-effective public-health investment. The WHO 
estimates that efforts to reduce illness and death 
from exposure to wood smoke in Sub-Saharan Africa 
through clean cookstove dissemination would cost 
between USD 500 and 700 per healthy year gained. 
In contrast, interventions that attempt to improve 
health in the region by promoting clean-burning 
fossil fuels like kerosene or LPG would cost between 
USD 1,000 and USD 11,000 per healthy year gained 
(Mehta and Shahpar 2004). In fact, stoves are likely to 
be as cost-effective as other low-cost interventions that 
reduce the burden of disease from common diseases in 
developing regions like malaria and tuberculosis, which 
are typically subsidised in order to reach the poorest 
and most vulnerable populations (Bailis, Cowan et 
al. 2009). Moreover, other analysts have estimated 
additional non-market benefits of interventions such 
as timesaving for stove adopters resulting from reduced 
illness and less time spent collecting fuel, as well as 
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reduced environmental damage. Taking these benefits 
together with health improvements yields very large 
cost-benefit ratios for cookstove projects, ranging from 
three to six in Malawi (Habermehl 2008) and China 
(Smith and Haigler 2008), nine to eleven in Mexico 
(García-Frapolli, Schilmann et al. 2010), thirteen in 
Zimbabwe (Mutamba and Gwata 2003), and 25 to 
29 in Uganda (Habermehl 2007). However, most 
of the benefits are not monetised and are unlikely 
to materialise without outside intervention, which 
suggests that long-term subsidies may be justified 
(Adler 2010). 
Stove subsidies come in many forms. In addition 
to directly reducing the final price of the stove to 
consumers, subsidies may also target stove developers 
themselves in the form of start-up grants or 
concessionary loans (Gaul 2009). This is particularly 
useful at the early stages of stove development. Stoves, 
like any type of new consumer good, must undergo 
research, field-testing and multiple design stages. 
The concept of health benefits through the reduction 
of smoke from solid fuels must also be marketed to 
consumers, as well as any other benefits of clean 
cookstove adoption (faster cooking times, lower fuel 
consumption, etc.). Many stove developers began as 
non-governmental organisations, which may have 
trouble financing these activities in the early stages of 
product development.7  
Microfinance schemes
Another method to overcome the high costs of 
cookstoves for consumers is to couple micro-finance 
with stove dissemination (Adler 2010). Since its 
inception, microfinance has become a popular means 
of providing small quantities of credit to poor rural 
families with little access to formal credit markets.8  
In the past, some stove promoters have attempted to 
offer their own forms of micro-finance, but this has 
proved difficult, as they seldom have the ability to 
assess risk or the capacity to take action in the case of a 
default (Bailis, Cowan et al. 2009). More recently the 
situation has changed, as many MFIs have loosened 
their lending policies and now lend for purchases of 
consumer goods (McIntosh, Villaran et al. 2011), 
including loans for energy services (Rao, Miller et 
al. 2009). To finance stoves, the Shell Foundation, a 
major donor, has courted MFIs in order to encourage 
their participation in the sector (Microfinance Focus 
2009). In addition, individual stove promoters are 
forming partnerships with MFIs (Microfinance Africa 
2011). Grameen Shakti, an offshoot of the Grameen 
Bank, the pioneering Bangladeshi MFI, began lending 
for purchases of non-traditional stoves in 2006, when 
they financed the purchase of 400 stoves. By 2010, 
the organisation had financed nearly 150,000 stoves 
(Grameen Shakti 2011).
Another option is pairing microfinance with carbon 
finance, as was done by the Nepal National Biodigester 
Program in Chitwan province (Sundar and Shakya). 
Since micro-lenders generally favour loans for income-
generating activities over loans for consumer goods, 
pairing microfinance schemes with carbon finance 
options can also help project designers overcome 
financial barriers.
Carbon Finance
As briefly mentioned above, carbon finance represents 
another means of reducing upfront stove costs. 
Carbon credits place value on the emissions reductions 
achieved by shifting from traditional to clean-burning 
cookstoves. Funds generated by selling credits can 
be used to reduce the cost of the stove. Rather than 
relying on government subsidies or donor aid, stove 
promoters can sell emissions reductions as a source 
of finance. One of the benefits of finance generated 
through carbon credits is that the cookstove project 
can achieve long-term financial sustainability without 
relying on donor or government support. 
Carbon offsets from cookstoves exist in both regulated 
and voluntary markets. The regulated markets are 
dominated by the Clean Development Mechanism 
(CDM), which has a lengthy verification process 
that can pose barriers for project developers. The 
voluntary market presents an alternative to the CDM. 
Regulations vary in voluntary markets: some market 
segments allow less burdensome verification processes 
than the CDM, while others, like the Gold Standard, 
are arguably more strict (The Gold Standard 2011).  
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At the time of writing, there were nineteen cookstove 
projects in the CDM pipeline (Fenhann 2011). 
Voluntary markets are not as well documented as 
the CDM, so the total number of cookstove projects 
participating in voluntary carbon markets is not clear. 
Nevertheless, over thirty projects seeking voluntary 
Gold Standard certification have also been identified 
(The Gold Standard 2011). A recent analysis from 
REN21 (2010) noted that 160 projects are currently 
active worldwide. If correct, this implies that roughly 
30% of stove projects are engaged with carbon markets 
through the CDM and/or Gold Standard. 
On average, the cookstoves being promoted by 
projects in the CDM pipeline are estimated to reduce 
fuel consumption by about 60% relative to the 
traditional stoves they will replace, resulting in annual 
GHG emissions reductions of 2.4 tCO2e per stove.9 
Historically, offsets in the CDM have sold for USD 
11-14 (Kossoy and Ambrosi 2010). If stove projects 
sold offsets at that price, then each stove would earn 
USD 30-38 per year. Assuming half of this is required 
to cover the significant transaction costs of establishing 
a CDM project (Michaelowa and Jotzo 2005), then 
USD 15-19 per year remain to cover the costs of the 
stoves. Most stoves last two to three years, and some are 
built to last seven years or more (Burridge, Goetz et al. 
2011). Thus the sale of carbon offsets can substantially 
reduce the cost of most stoves. 
Conclusions
The ‘100 by 20’ challenge is timely, reflecting 
widespread understanding within the international 
development community that investments in clean-
burning cookstoves provide large returns to society, 
largely in the form of non-monetary benefits like health, 
time savings and reduced environmental impacts. 
While the scale of the problem presents numerous 
challenges, policy-makers can draw on decades of prior 
experience to prepare the field for higher levels of stove 
adoption and stove-programme durability, even in the 
face of changing economic conditions and complex 
cultural settings.
This article has summarised current knowledge on 
cookstoves in terms of the science, historical victories 
and failures, and current options for financing 
diffusion projects. While each fuel-efficient cookstove 
intervention must be designed for the development 
needs of the particular target community, general best 
practices can be used to help guide the policy-maker in 
programme design:
1. Achieving the widespread adoption of clean 
cookstoves is challenging, requiring an 
understanding of complex social factors. 
Cookstove programmes that are partnered with 
local organisations, women’s groups and local 
leaders can transform this challenge into an 
opportunity for a more effective scaling-up strategy.
2. The environmental and health benefits associated 
with reduced emissions are ‘goods’ that may not 
be fully valued by the target community. It is 
therefore sensible for policy-makers to identify 
the characteristics of alternative stoves that 
would be valued, such as faster cooking times or 
cleaner kitchens, and to incorporate them into 
stove design and marketing. 
3. In a similar vein, cultural factors may be the 
key to the success of the cookstove programme. 
Fuel-efficient technologies must not only cook 
more cleanly and reduce carbon emissions, but 
cultural norms – such as flavour, the ability 
to accommodate traditional pot sizes and 
portability – can be key indicators as to whether 
or not a particular cookstove programme will 
succeed in a given context.
4. Gender and power dynamics within the 
community and the household may influence 
stove dissemination. Early investment in 
stakeholder consultations and village-level 
surveys can help project developers identify 
household decision-making process regarding 
the choice whether or not to adopt a new stove. 
5. It should be recognised that subsidies in some 
form, either direct to the end user or at some 
intermediate stage(s) of the project, may be 
essential until the dissemination programme 
‘takes root’ in the community and financial self-
sustainability can be achieved. 
6. Carbon finance, microfinance and private-
public partnerships may complement subsidies 
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Text Box 1: Notes from the field: The Q’ori Qoncha Cookstove Program in Peru 
Currently in rural Peru, the terra cotta fogón is used for domestic cooking. A fogón is a lidded pot placed 
on the ground and heated by a wood fire. According to the Catholic University of Peru, approximately 
two million Peruvian homes use a fogón to cook with wood fuel. The fogón has no chimney and thus fills 
the home with smoke. Women and children are principally impacted as they spend the most time in the 
kitchen, and they often suffer from serious health problems. Furthermore, the fogón does not cook the food 
evenly or completely, nor does it sterilise water, causing digestive health risks for the entire household. 
The Q’ori Qoncha Cookstove Program in Peru was initiated by the French social initiative ‘Microsol’ and 
carbon consultants from the myclimate organisation, together with local Peruvian NGO ‘ADRA Perú – 
Agencia Adventista para el Desarollo y Recursos Asistenciales’, ProPERU Service Corps and the ‘Instituto 
Trabajo y Familia’ in 2008. The Gold Standard Foundation, a certification scheme for carbon emission 
reduction projects endorsed by over sixty environmental groups worldwide, registered the program in 2010. 
According to an independent verification report by Tuv Nord in May 2011, the Q’ori Qoncha program 
has installed 26,070 fuel-efficient cookstoves in the Peruvian regions of Cusco and La Libertad, resulting in 
improved living conditions and livelihoods for the households involved, as well as the reduction of 44,409 
tons of carbon dioxide from the global atmosphere. 
The stoves are locally produced from clay, fine mud and adobe. In addition to the environmental and health 
benefits, the program also creates new skilled jobs, as locals produce and maintain the stoves. According to 
one recipient of a cookstove in Lima, ‘Our lives changed. The advantages go far beyond the wood savings’ 
(The Gold Standard 2008; Tuv Nord 2011).
Left: A traditional fogon on an open fire; note that there is no channel for smoke evacuation.   
Right: A fuel-efficient cookstove with chimney. The black walls remain from the  
days of the old fogon, but smoke is part of the past [2008, The Gold Standard]
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or replace them entirely. In places where MFIs 
are already well established, it may be relatively 
straightforward to expand their lending 
instruments to include clean-burning stoves, 
particularly as improved stoves become more 
‘mainstream’. Similarly, MFIs may be helpful 
in establishing stove enterprises: design labs, 
manufacturing facilities and retail outlets. 
While there is no ‘one size fits all’ solution for bringing 
clean-burning, fuel-efficient cookstoves to the rural 
and urban poor, the clear political commitment 
and international focus has created an enabling 
environment, setting the stage for meaningful progress.
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Text Box 2: Past successes: China’s National Improved Stove Program (NISP) 
China’s massive National Improved Stove Program (NISP) ran from the early 1980s until the late 1990s in 
three distinct phases. The program began with strong government backing, but was run as a decentralised 
program, with decisions being made largely at the county level. Moreover, each phase involved a shift 
toward increasing commercialisation, as described below (Sinton, Smith et al. 2004; Smith 1993): 
• Phase 1 (1983–1990): Counties received funding to promote fuel-efficient stoves. The central 
government supplied a small fraction and county governments provided additional funds, but 
consumers paid the largest proportion of the stoves’ costs. NISP was not designed to target the poor, 
but some counties subsidised stoves to poor households. 
• Phase 2 (1990–1995): Consumer subsidies were rapidly scaled back as part of a commercialisation 
strategy. However, businesses assistance was still available in the form of tax breaks and favourable loans. 
• Phase 3 (1995–2002): Government support largely shifted to providing technical advice. However, 
the government also played an important role in setting standards and offering certification to ensure 
consumer confidence in the new designs. 
Over twenty years of activity, NISP created a strong infrastructure consisting of private enterprises, R&D 
facilities and state agencies that are equipped to develop and market efficient solid fuel stoves throughout 
many of China’s rural areas.
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End Notes
1. This list includes the full range of possible benefits arising as a 
result of a shift from burning solid fuels in open fires or stoves 
characterised by poor combustion vented directly into the indoor 
environment with clean-burning, fuel-efficient stoves. We must 
note, however, that not all stoves promoted as cleaner and more 
efficient alternatives deliver all of these benefits. Moreover, a 
wide range of stoves are characterised as ‘improved’, with the 
implication that they deliver this full suite of benefits, but in 
reality they do not (Smith and Dutta 2011). For this reason, we 
avoid the term ‘improved’ and use ‘clean-burning, fuel-efficient’ 
in its place. 
2. Subsidies are not straightforward. Previous analyses of stove 
adoption have acknowledged their importance while also stressing 
the need to phase them out after a short time (see Barnes, 
Openshaw et al. 1994, for example). We explore this tension in 
Section    
3. Though it is beyond the scope of this article, stove design 
is essential to achieving these qualities: ease of use, reduced 
cooking times and flexibility, as well as reduced emissions and 
fuel consumption (see Bryden, Still et al. 2006, for a detailed 
discussion).  
4. In Central America, improved stoves are typically large appliances 
built directly into the kitchen. There, stove promoters may require 
in-kind contributions of sand, cement or bricks as a partial 
payment for the stove (Proyecto Mirador 2011).
5. However, the report also notes that many countries in Sub-
Saharan Africa are undertaking numerous reforms to become 
more open to business. In contrast, countries in South Asia are 
lagging behind relative to other regions.
6. The Protos cooker by Bosch-Siemens uses plant oil rather than 
solid biomass. Nevertheless, it is a good example of a stove 
developed by a large corporation with considerable in-house 
capacity for research, product design and marketing (B/S/H 
2011).
7. Others, like the large corporations that have developed improved 
stoves, face fewer challenges in this regard.
8. There is a vast literature on microfinance, which is beyond the 
scope of this chapter. For examples relevant to public health, see 
(Leatherman and Dunford 2010; Pronyk, Hargreaves et al. 2007) 
and access to energy services, see (Ezzati, Bailis et al. 2004;  
Zerriffi 2011).
9. This is the unweighted average annual GHG reduction claimed 
per stove based on data in Project Design Documents (PDDs) for 
nine CDM projects and eleven Programs of Activity (PoAs) listed 
as being in the CDM pipeline as of August 2011 (Fenhann 2011). 
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An enabling framework for wind 
power in Colombia: What are the 
lessons from Latin America?
Isaac Dyner, Yris Olaya and Carlos J. Franco
CeiBA Complejidad, National University of Colombia
Introduction
This article examines the existing environment for 
power generation in Colombia and identifies policy 
requirements for increasing the share of Renewable 
Energy Technologies (RETs), specifically wind power. 
As high capital costs are one of the main barriers to 
investing in wind power, we focus on the regulatory 
incentives for investment in power generation.
Colombia’s hydroelectricity potential is among the 
highest in the world (WEC, 2004). Energy policy in 
Colombia has aimed at developing these resources: by 
2010, hydro power’s share of total generation capacity 
was 63%, and it supplied between 70% and 80% of 
the demand connected to the transmission grid (XM, 
2010). Although this policy has had positive results in 
terms of costs and efficiency of supply (Larsen et al., 
2004), the high dependence on hydro power makes 
the system vulnerable to climatic variations (UPME, 
2009; Larsen et al., 2004). Thermal generation, 
with a 33% share of total installed capacity, balances 
Abstract
This article discusses the existing framework for 
enabling wind power in Colombia. Although the 
Colombian framework does not specifically target wind 
power, it provides tax reductions for renewables. So far, 
such policy has favoured conventional technologies 
(including hydro), at the expense of renewable 
energy technologies. Other Latin American countries 
including Brazil, Mexico, Chile and Costa Rica have 
achieved fast deployment of wind energy technologies 
by combining feed in tariffs with other incentives such 
as portfolio standards and tax reduction. The Brazilian 
case is an example of how adequate incentives can 
add wind energy technologies to a power system that 
relies mostly on hydro sources. Based on this evidence, 
we propose a policy for promoting renewables in 
Colombia by using schemes that combine feed-in 
tariffs and portfolio standards to make initial progress 
by 2020.
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the fluctuations of hydropower generation. In a 
dry year, when hydropower cannot operate at full 
capacity, thermal power plants generate up to 50% 
of total demand, whereas in average rainy conditions, 
thermoelectricity dispatch might be as low as 15-20% 
of the total (UPME, 2009; XM, 2010).
During the last fifteen years, gas-powered plants have 
been the preferred option to back up power generation 
during periods of peak demand and during the dry 
season in Colombia. More than 1400 MW of gas-fired 
generation capacity has been built since 1994, making 
up 28% of installed generation capacity in 2010, and 
accounting for 84% of thermal capacity (UPME, 
2009). Combined-cycle gas turbines (CCGT) have 
shorter lead times and lower capital costs than large 
hydro plants; this, along with the incentives given to 
thermal plants between 1997 and 2005, made CCGT 
a commercially attractive option for increasing the 
reliability of power supply in Colombia.
Regulatory incentives for remunerating capacity 
expansions that increase security of supply and the 
reliability of the interconnected system date from 1994. 
These incentives have been modified and adjusted to 
the changing conditions of the Colombian market 
(Larsen et al., 2004; Dyner et al., 2007). By definition, 
this mechanism is technology-neutral, meaning that 
any technology that ensures ‘firm’ (i.e., stable) energy 
supplies can receive monetary payments. As Figure 
1 shows, between 1997 and 2007, the incentives 
initially favoured thermal technologies for increasing 
generation capacity, but ever since 2000 these have 
favoured hydro technologies. Note that the only wind 
farm in place did not receive capacity payments and 
was built using different incentives.
 
To summarise, hydroelectricity forms the basis of power 
generation in Colombia, and because water inflows are 
variable, CCGTs provide security of supply. However, 
as Figure 1 shows, incentives for firm capacity have 
favoured hydro-based power, a seasonally-dependent 
technology. The dominance of hydro power has a 
direct impact on the profitability of thermal plants, 
whose high operating costs make thermal generation 
economically infeasible during periods with high 
availability of water. With this structure, the electricity 
sector in Colombia has a relatively low carbon 
footprint, and the main reason for seeking a larger 
share of RETs is technology diversification and, as 
discussed above, security of supply. 
Figure 1.  New generation capacity between 
1997 and 2010 and expected additions to 
2018 (results from auctions). 
The potential for RETs deployment in Colombia is 
high but has not been fully estimated. Water sources 
suitable for small hydro plants (less than 20 MW) are 
abundant, as is solar radiation. More research is needed 
to assess the wind potential of the whole country, but 
the coastal region of La Guajira, where Jepírachi, the 
only wind farm, is located, has proven potential for 
generating commercial wind power as high as 18 GW, 
according to Vergara et al. (2010). Because the capital 
costs of wind power are relatively high compared to 
other options, policy-makers in Colombia tend to 
consider it a viable option to generate energy in off-
grid zones, rather than a technology that can contribute 
to power supply in the interconnected power sector 
(UPME, 2009). Nevertheless, evidence from the only 
wind power project in Colombia suggests that wind 
power technology can increase the reliability of power 
supply in the dry seasons. In particular, wind flow 
variations in La Guajira, Colombia, balance seasonal 
and hourly variations of water flows, and effectively 
increase the availability of energy (ESMAP, 2009).
Experiences from around the world indicate that wind 
power can be successfully added to the primary energy 
mix, provided that there is an enabling framework 
that lowers entry barriers, especially the high capital 
costs (IEA, 2009). In 2002 Colombia created a 
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general framework for promoting Renewable Energy 
Technologies (RETs). This framework includes 
incentives for research on RETs and tax exemptions for 
suppliers that use RETs and obtain carbon certificates. 
Between 2004 and 2010, the Colombian enabling 
framework promoted only one wind farm with a 
capacity of 19.5 MW (0.015% of total 13440 MW 
capacity). This is a poor result compared to other 
countries in Latin America.
The existing framework for promoting renewable 
and wind power generation consists of the following 
initiatives:
• Law 697 of 2001 and Decree 3683 of 2003, 
which:
1. Incorporate renewables and energy 
efficiency as part of the goals to be met 
by energy policy and create institutions to 
support their development, 
2. Propose research funding for energy 
efficiency, and 
3. Include renewable options for non-
interconnected regions.
• Law 788 of 2002, which establishes: 
 A fifteen-year tax-exemption period for power 
generated from wind or biomass energy. To 
benefit from this tax-exemption scheme, 
generators must obtain carbon emission 
certificates, which are an additional source 
of income, and 50% of this income must be 
invested locally in social benefit programs.
This policy for RETs has been insufficient to trigger a 
large-scale development of wind power in Colombia. 
By 2010, the only wind farm in place was Jepírachi. 
Despite the significant potential for developing 
renewable energy sources, only 1.2% (105 MW) 
of proposed new generation projects are non-hydro 
renewable. Although other wind projects are under 
consideration, the indicative plan for power generation 
and transmission expansion registers only the 20 MW 
Jouktai wind farm, which is to be located in La Guajira 
(ESMAP, 2009; UPME, 2009). 
The Colombian framework fails to promote wind 
power mainly because the incentives it provides (tax 
cuts) are not targeted at lowering entry barriers for 
renewables. The high capital costs of wind power, a 
market structure based on hydro technologies and 
high industry concentration (four utilities account 
for 82.39% of hydro capacity; UPME, 2009) create 
a negative environment for investing in wind farms. 
As discussed earlier, regulatory incentives (capacity and 
reliability charges) have favoured expansion based on 
medium to large-scale hydro plants at the expense of 
other technologies, particularly renewables (Larsen et 
al., 2004). Reliability charges can be allocated regardless 
of technology and could in principle remunerate the 
capital costs of wind energy. In their current form, 
however, reliability charges do not provide a method 
of forecasting the power generated by intermittent 
sources other than that available for hydro sources. 
The contribution of hydroelectricity to power supply 
can be forecast from long historic time series which 
are not available for wind, solar or other renewable 
energy technologies. Thus, it is not possible to make 
a reliable estimate of the contribution of wind power 
technologies to total energy supply during years of 
extreme weather conditions. A lack of wind generation 
data is common to many wind farms, but average 
assessments of capacity can be used for remunerating 
immature wind farms, as the New York Independent 
System Operator (NYISO), the Pennsylvania-Jersey-
Maryland market (PJM) and Spain do. (Botero 
et al., 2010). 
As there are limited incentives for technological 
innovation, utilities are reluctant to diversify their 
technology portfolios. Barriers to renewable energy 
technologies are likely to persist in the short to medium 
term. Wind power costs, however, are expected to 
decrease, which will provide an opportunity to develop 
Colombia’s wind resources. From the 1980s to the 
2000s worldwide, wind power capacity grew at annual 
rates above 20% (IEA, 2004); turbine sizes increased 
and capacity costs generally decreased (Wiser and 
Bolinger, 2009). Capital and equipment shortages in 
the 2000s put pressure on wind capacity costs, but in 
the long term it is expected that the industry will move 
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along a learning curve, thus reducing its capital costs 
(Wiser and Bolinger, 2009). 
The case of the Jepírachi wind farm, which this 
article discusses in detail, illustrates the challenges of 
Colombia’s renewables, and also shows the potential for 
the deployment of wind power technologies on a larger 
scale. Having examined the Colombian framework for 
promoting RETs, we then look at policies in Latin 
American countries, focusing on those whose power 
sector structure is similar to that of Colombia’s. Based 
on this analysis, we examine the potential for the 
Ministry of Mines to set wind generation goals of 3% 
for 2015 and 6% by 2019. Finally, this proposal is 
contrasted with the current proposal by Vergara et al., 
(2010) to make reliability payments to intermittent 
sources by calculating their contribution to the ability 
of the interconnected system to meet demand during 
extremely dry seasons (firmness). 
Assessment and development of wind 
resources in Colombia
As of 2010, the only wind farm operating in 
Colombia is located in La Guajira province, a region 
in the north-east of the country. This onshore wind 
farm has fifteen units of 1.3 MW each for a total 
nominal power of 19.5 MW. This farm, the first 
one built in Colombia, was commissioned in 2004 
and it is connected to the national grid by a 110 
kV transmission line. Minimum wind speed for the 
windmills is 4 m/s and the average wind speed is 
9.25 m/s (EPM, 2008; Pinilla and Trujillo, 2009). 
This wind regime is rated among the best in South 
America, comparable only to the Patagonia region 
(ESMAP, 2010). The farm was built by Empresas 
Públicas de Medellín (EPM), a public utility, the 
second largest power generator of the country and 
the only vertically integrated utility. Jepírachi is part 
of EPM’s R&D programme on wind energy, whose 
purpose is to learn about the operation of wind farms 
in Colombia, and which includes:
1. Evaluation of wind regimes  
2. Study of tax incentives and the enabling 
framework for RETs, and
3. A pilot plant to transfer and innovate wind 
energy technology 
EPM started this R&D programme after examining 
medium to long-term trends for power generation 
in Colombia. The Guajira is a semi-tropical desert, 
and the operating challenges of the pilot plant have 
shown the need to adapt wind power technology 
to the Caribbean conditions (Pinilla and 
Trujillo, 2009). 
GTZ, the World Bank and the Universidad Nacional 
de Colombia advised EPM during the formulation of 
the project, whose capital investment was $21 million 
dollars (EPM, 2004). The plant is located in the Uribia 
municipality, in the territory of the indigenous Wayúu 
community. This is an arid area, with long summers, 
frequent droughts and no surface water. Water comes 
from wells and desalination plants. As a part of its social 
and environmental plant, EPM built a desalination 
plant that provides the Wayúu community with 
clean water. Carbon credits are 10% of the Jepírachi’s 
revenues, the rest coming from energy sales. 
The output and performance data for the Jepírachi 
plant confirm that year-round winds in the Guajira 
region confirm the high potential for energy generation 
(see Figure 2). However, as winds speeds do vary, the 
performance of wind power is evaluated in terms of 
its capacity factor and availability. Capacity, or plant 
factors, are a measure of the productivity of a power 
plant, calculated as the amount of energy that the 
plant produces over a given time period divided by the 
amount of energy that would have been produced if 
the plant had been running at full capacity during the 
same time period (DOE, 2008). Availability is defined 
as the number of hours of energy production divided 
by the number of hours that wind speed is between 
the operating limits of the turbine (Pinilla and Trujillo 
2009). Pinilla and Trujillo (2009) report that capacity 
factors for turbines in Jepírachi are similar to those for 
other turbines, averaging 38% with 96% availability, 
whereas production is higher than typical values in the 
literature (1750 kWh/M2-year per turbine).  
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Figure 2. Complementarities between water regimes in the northwest of Colombia and wind 
regimes in La Guajira, Colombia.
Source: COLCIENCIAS-EPM-Universidad Nacional de Colombia, 2003.
As Figure 2 shows, wind peaks in La Guajira coincide 
with low water flows in the northwest of Colombia. 
To a large extent, wind resources complement water 
resources and the complementarities between water 
flow and wind speed are higher during the first months 
of the year, when water is scarce. Figure 2 shows how 
energy produced in Jepírachi is higher during the 
first six months of the year, and it is lower during the 
second semester.  
In addition to the complementarities between water 
and wind regimes, daily variability of wind can also 
improve the performance of the interconnected 
system because wind power could displace some water 
resources in the low-demand hours (Vergara et al., 
2010).
Being the first operational wind farm in Colombia, 
Jepírachi has provided valuable data and knowledge 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
0
1000
2000
3000
4000
5000
6000
7000
Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec
M
W
h
Average power generation at Jepírachi
0 
10 
20 
30 
40 
50 
60 
0 
2 
4 
6 
8 
10 
12 
Water flow (m3/s) Wind speed (m/s) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
0
1000
2000
3000
4000
5000
6000
7000
Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec
M
W
h
Average power generation at Jepírachi
0 
10 
20 
30 
40 
50 
60 
0 
2 
4 
6 
8 
10 
12 
Water flow (m3/s) Wind speed (m/s) 
Figure 3. Average power generation at Jepírachi. Adapted from Vergara et al., 2010
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that may support efforts to expand wind power 
generation in Colombia. In particular, and unlike 
other projects, this has been well accepted by the 
Wayúu community and is a reference for the future 
of wind power in La Guajira (Valencia, 2009). There 
are technical challenges in adapting wind generation 
technology to the conditions of the Caribbean (Pinilla 
and Trujillo), but the plant’s performance is likely to 
improve as EPM learns to operate the technology in 
the harsh climate of La Guajira. Current performance 
data prove that the high-speed, low-turbulence 
winds of Guajira province could generate more than 
100 GWh per year (Pérez and Osorio, 2002), and a 
couple of projects have been proposed to develop such 
potential, as shown in Table 1. 
Against this background, the main challenges in 
expanding wind power in Colombia have less to do 
with technology or with resources than with policy and 
the regulatory framework. In this sense, in a market 
dominated by hydropower technologies, investors 
are unlikely to pursue individual RET projects unless 
there is a comprehensive enabling framework, set at 
the national level, which provides clear incentives 
targeted at specific technologies. As hydropower has 
a low carbon footprint and low operating costs, the 
main reason for creating such a comprehensive RET 
policy is to enable a variety of technologies to enter the 
market, thus diversifying primary energy supply.
From this policy perspective, during the early stages 
of technology adoption, innovation and learning 
are the main benefits of adopting RETs. In the long 
run, these technologies increase the robustness of 
Colombia’s power system by complementing its hydro 
energy sources. As the previous discussion shows, 
the Colombian power market needs clear, direct and 
effective regulation of renewables to promote wind 
power. This becomes even more evident if one examines 
the policies for renewables in similar countries. The 
next section analyses the enabling frameworks for wind 
energy in Latin America and relates these frameworks 
to the Colombian case in order to propose changes to 
the existing policy. 
Wind power policy in Latin America
The initially slow penetration of renewable power in 
Latin America (LA) has changed since the mid-2000s, 
and for many countries, including Brazil, Mexico, 
Chile and Costa Rica, wind power capacity is growing 
at average rates higher than 25%. Policies to promote 
RETs in LA are diverse. Mexico and Brazil have devised 
comprehensive programs to increase their share of 
renewables, including wind power, on both small 
and large scales. These programs rely on incentives 
such as tax breaks and feed-in tariffs for wind power 
plants operating in a competitive power market. Feed-
Table 1. Wind power capacity expansions built and under construction in Colombia as of 2010
   * Source: ISAGEN (2010)
   ** Source: ESMAP (2009)
   *** Source EPM (2008)
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Environmental license issued in 2010*  
Ipapure** 200 
Ipapure 
(Uribia, 
Guajira) N.A. 
In 2008 EPM asked for bids for a pre-
feasibility study for a 200MW plant in 
Ipapure (Uribia) and Bahía Hondita 
(Maicao)***. 
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in tariffs guarantee a minimum price for renewable 
energy which is usually higher than the retail electricity 
price, and which is sustained over a long time frame. 
With small markets and a centralised market structure 
with vertical integration, Costa Rica and Nicaragua 
have reached the highest shares of wind power in the 
region (5 and 4.5% respectively; see Table 2). Chile 
is now implementing a different strategy through a 
RET portfolio standard. A renewable energy portfolio 
standard mandates electricity retailers to source a 
portion of their supply from renewable facilities 
(IEA, 2010). Because all suppliers must comply with 
the mandate, this policy internalises environmental 
costs, without targeting a specific renewable energy 
technology (Kydes, 2007). 
As shown in Table 2, for some countries surveyed in 
LA wind power capacity is already higher than 1%, 
and many countries are committed to ambitious 
expansion plans. We now discuss some of these cases 
in detail. Note that, in most of these countries, carbon 
emissions from power generation are low. 
Mexico
Mexico’s installed electricity generation capacity is 
nearly 75% thermal and 19% hydro (SENER, 2009). 
In 2007, Mexico approved a plan for developing the 
use of large-scale renewable energy (PERGE plan). 
The World Bank supports the PERGE plan, which 
includes an assessment of wind power potential and 
the building of the La Venta III wind power farm 
(101.4 MW). This initiative was complemented by 
the enactment of the Law for Renewable Energy Use 
and Financing of Energy Transition (LAERFTE) in 
2008. LAERFTE defines the programs and strategies 
for promoting RETs. The current goal for wind 
power is to reach 4.34% of installed capacity by 2012 
and to generate between 1.74 and 2.91% of power 
from wind (SENER, 2009). The construction of 
transmission lines connecting the wind-rich Isthmus 
of Tehuantepec to the national grid is also one of 
the programs created by LAERFTE. To address the 
intermittence of wind energy and to integrate wind 
power technologies with the grid, the regulatory 
Table 2. Wind power capacity in Latin America, 2009 or 2010
 Sources: Programa de Energía Eólica en Uruguay http://www.energiaeolica.gub.uy/index.  
 php and LAWEA http://www.lawea.org/YearBook/2009-2010/EspanolFinal/index.html
 * data for 2010
  
Installed 
capacity, 
MW 
Approved 
and 
planned 
expansion, 
MW 
Potential 
wind 
power 
capacity, 
GW 
Percentage 
of total 
generating 
capacity 
Argentina* 60 794 200 0.23% 
Brazil* 931 3140 143 0.89% 
Chile* 172 2000 40 1.29% 
Colombia* 19,5 27,5 18 0,15% 
Costa Rica* 120,1 100,5 0.6 5,34% 
Cuba 7,2  N.A. 0,14% 
Curazao 9 24 N.A. 5,17% 
Ecuador 2,4 15 N.A. 0,06% 
Mexico* 519 2300 71 1.03% 
Nicaragua 40 215 2 4,53% 
Uruguay* 20,5 150 2 0,93% 
 
 
Policy 
Instrument 
Information 
needs 
Costs Effectiveness Ease of 
monitoring and 
enforcing 
Flexibility 
Feed-in 
tariffs 
Low Shared with 
customers 
High.  Decrease 
levelized energy 
costs from 2% to 
30%* 
High, established 
by regulatory 
commission 
High, tariffs can 
be periodically 
reviewed and 
modified 
Portfolio 
Standard 
Low Shared with 
customers 
High. Used by 9 of 
20 IEA – wind 
members* 
Established by 
regulator.  Needs 
a market for 
green certificates 
Low, targets are 
set for a given 
period of time 
Subsidies Low Fiscal impact, 
need to be 
included in 
government 
budget 
Decrease 
levelized cost of 
energy from 2% 
to 20%* 
Allocation and 
targeting of 
subsidies is 
difficult, often 
causing 
inefficiencies 
Low, subsidies 
set for a fixed 
period of time 
Reliability / 
capacity 
charges 
High High costs of 
auctions. 
Costs shared 
with 
customers 
N/A Low, need 
additional 
investment for 
metering  
Periodically 
reviewed and 
modified, 
according to 
performance.  
Revisions are 
expensive. 
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commission has drawn up interconnection and 
transmission contracts for renewables (Reglamento 
ley energías renovables, 2009; Contrato de 
interconexión, 2010), aimed at stabilising wind 
producers’ income. 
In addition, other laws provide incentives like 
deducting 100% of capital investment in equipment 
and machinery for renewable generation from 
taxes (Ley del Impuesto sobre la Renta Art. 
40 Fracción XII, 2008). Finally, small-scale wind 
power generation is one of the technologies included 
in the programme for rural electrification (Proyecto 
de Servicios Integrales de Energía), which is funded 
by the World Bank and which aims to reach 2500 
rural communities by 2012.  
Brazil
Brazil’s installed capacity is 79% hydro and 18.5% 
thermal. In 2002 Brazil created the PROINFA 
programme, aiming to reach a 20% share of renewable 
energy sources in power generation by 2020 (Lei 
10.438, 2002; Lei 10.762, 2003). This comprehensive 
policy has provisions for technology transfer and for 
developing domestic technology, as well as incentives 
for small producers. In the case of Brazil, electricity 
generated by wind, small hydro, and biomass plants is 
sold to Eletrobrás, the state-owned electricity utility, 
in twenty-year contracts at a regulated price. In the 
first stage of the programme (until 2013), a renewable 
energy price is set to reflect technology costs, and 
for wind power, the price is guaranteed to be at least 
90% of the average end-use tariff. For the second 
stage of the programme, renewable energy is to be 
paid at the average cost of new hydro plants, which 
is lower than the average cost of new wind plants (Lei 
10.438, 2002). To increase the competitiveness of 
wind energy, in 2009 regulators held separate capacity 
auctions for wind power, approving more than seventy 
wind projects with a combined capacity of 1.8 GW 
(ANEEL, 2010).
Uruguay
Uruguay’s wind energy programme is financed by 
the Global Environmental Facility (GEF) through 
UNDP and it is executed by the energy and nuclear 
technology division of the Ministry of Mines and 
Energy. The objective of this programme is to develop 
a policy framework for wind power, to acquire 
relevant information for wind projects and to remove 
technological barriers through technology transfer and 
development (MIEM, 2008). 
Hydroelectricity accounts for 70% of total power 
generation capacity in Uruguay, the remaining 
capacity being thermal. However, renewables are 
making progress in this country: a) by 2009, two 10 
MW wind farms were already in place; and b) Decrees 
77/2006, and 397/2007 mandate the state-owned 
utility UTE to award contracts for building 60 MW 
of non-conventional renewable sources, while 28.45 
MW of wind power were awarded to three different 
projects currently under development (DNTN, 2009).
Decree 77 of 2006 and Decree 397 of 2007 allow UTE 
to buy at least 50% of generated power if the installed 
capacity is greater than 10 MW, and 100% if there are 
long-term contracts for renewable energy. Wind power 
is always dispatched, as it has low marginal costs and 
is exempt from transmission charges. Wind power 
generators have long-term power sales agreements 
with UTE, which do not allow generators to sell to 
third parties, though they can sell excess generation in 
the spot market. To increase the share of wind energy 
and to diversify the primary energy matrix, UTE is 
authorised to contract up to 150 MW of wind power 
capacity. New generators enjoy corporate tax breaks, 
and domestic equipment makers are exempt from 
other taxes. 
Chile
Chile’s installed capacity is 62% thermal and 37% 
hydro. Three companies, Endesa, Colbun and AES, 
have a 53% share of generation capacity. Chile’s 
renewable energy law (20.257), enacted in 2008, 
mandates generators with a capacity larger than 200 
MW to include sales of at least 5% of their total from 
renewable sources. This fraction is to increase by 0.5% 
annually between 2015 and 2024 until 10% of energy 
demand is supplied from renewables. Generators 
that do not meet the renewables’ requirement pay a 
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monetary penalty. To date, this policy has promoted 
170 MW of wind power (LAWEA, 2009). 
Costa Rica
The Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad (ICE) is 
a public monopoly that controls power generation, 
transmission and distribution in Costa Rica. Laws 
7200 of 1990 and 7508 of 1995 allow private 
investment in the generation of up to 15% of installed 
capacity and set incentives for renewables. Building, 
Operation and Transfer (BOT) contracts and power 
sales agreements to ICE are the main incentives used 
to promote investment in renewable, mostly wind 
and geothermal energy. These mechanisms have 
successfully increased wind power capacity in Costa 
Rica from 16.5 MW in 1996 to about 120 MW in 
2010. Approximately 80% of this capacity belongs to 
private concessionaires and 20% to ICE (ICE, 2010). 
The existing wind projects have support from the 
Clean Development Mechanism (CDM), and two of 
them (Chorotega and Vera Blanca) are part of World 
Bank’s Prototype Carbon Funds. About 100 MW of 
wind power is due to be auctioned in the near future 
under BOT contracts.  
Nicaragua
Law 532 of 2005 aimed to increase the share of 
renewables in the predominantly thermal energy 
system. This law sets tax incentives for renewable 
energy, and it also mandates distribution companies 
to contract a portion of their energy from new 
RETs. These contracts are for a minimum of ten 
years and subject to a regulated price. Generators 
that do not have contracts with distributors may sell 
their energy in the market place at prices initially 
set between 5.5 and 6.5 USD ¢/kWh. In addition 
to these incentives (portfolio standard and feed-in 
tariff), wind power generators in Nicaragua receive 
CDM support.  
In general, RET policies in Latin America emulate the 
success of those developed in the EU and the US, and 
there are no noticeable innovations. As in most of the 
world, Latin American wind power policies combine 
tax incentives with feed-in tariffs and in some cases 
portfolio standards. Although wind power policies in 
Latin America are relatively new, they have produced 
good results, particularly in Brazil, Mexico, Chile and 
Costa Rica. Relevant lessons for Colombia and may be 
summarised as follows:
• RET policies need clear goals, targets and dates 
to achieve them.
• If hydroelectricity dominates power generation, 
enabling frameworks for RETs should provide 
incentives targeted at specific technologies, such 
as the separate wind auctions held in Brazil, as 
well as feed-in tariffs.
• Carbon funds and other international financial 
mechanisms are useful for increasing the 
Internal Rate of Return of wind power projects. 
However, to reach a higher share of wind 
power generation, countries need to integrate 
these technologies with the grid. The Mexican 
interconnection contracts for wind energy 
are a good example of how to achieve such 
integration.
The next section examines and compares different 
policy alternatives to increase wind power share in 
Colombia. We propose and discuss a goal of reaching a 
wind share of 3% of generation capacity by 2015 and 
6% by 2019.
An enabling framework for wind power in 
Colombia 
In the absence of a feed-in tariff, CDM and energy 
sales are the main sources of revenue for wind power 
in Colombia. Unlike thermo- and hydro-electricity, 
wind power technologies have no access to the 
capacity and reliability charges paid in Colombia. 
Between 1997 and 2006 these charges contributed 
49% to the average generator’s income, and although 
they are decreasing, they still represent 28% of its 
revenues (Figure 4). 
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Successful wind energy policies set generation targets 
and dates, along with the mechanisms to meet them. 
Targets in developing countries range from 3% to 
10% of renewable energy share in generation. From 
experiences in comparable countries, a 3% share of 
wind generation capacity by 2015 and 6% by 2019 are 
attainable goals, and would have an almost negligible 
effect on the system’s finances. Many countries combine 
financial and production incentives to reduce market 
and capital risks for new wind power capacity (Zuluaga 
and Dyner, 2007). This article next compares feed-
in tariffs, portfolio standards, reliability charges and 
subsidies mechanisms in terms of their information 
needs, costs and fiscal impact, effectiveness in lifting 
market barriers, ease of monitoring and enforcing, 
and flexibility within changing economic and market 
conditions (Table 3).  
A recent analysis of market barriers for wind power 
in Colombia identifies three main instruments to 
lowering entry barriers for renewable energy (Vergara 
et al., 2010): 1) strengthening access to and increasing 
participation in the CDM; 2) targeting subsidies such 
as exemptions to income tax as well as to systems’ 
charges; and 3) introducing reliability charges (Table 
3) and taxes on polluting technologies. As we discuss 
next, although these three instruments enable the 
development of wind power, a more comprehensive 
policy is required to increase its market share in 
Colombia.
Two of the three instruments proposed by Vergara et al. 
(2010), CDM and tax exemptions, are already in place 
in Colombia. CDM forms part of Colombia’s national 
environmental policy and is a source of revenue for 
the Jepírachi wind farm, which also enjoyed tax 
exemptions on capital. However, these are completely 
insufficient revenues compare with the capacity charge 
mechanism that is available to hydro and thermo 
electricity, making clean technologies uncompetitive. 
Two of the main utilities in Colombia, EPM and 
ISAGEN, have shown an interest in investing in 
wind power, but only as part of their R&D initiatives 
aimed at making progress along their learning curves 
regarding diversification, with a specific focus on its 
adaptation to local and Colombian market conditions 
(ISAGEN, 2010). 
Taxing polluting technologies and modifying current 
market rules to include wind power have not been 
tried yet, but their usefulness within the Colombian 
context is unclear. Carbon taxing, for instance, would 
have little effect on energy prices because the base load 
power is hydro, which is enough to satisfy demand in 
Figure 4. Evolution of income sources for power generators in Colombia between 1997 and 2011. In 
2010 1 USD = 1887 COP.
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Table 3.  Comparison of policy instruments for promoting renewable energy
* www.iea-retd.org
most periods. This suggests that, with a large hydro 
baseline, a more direct mechanism is needed to 
stimulate investment in renewable energy technologies. 
According to Vergara et al. (2010), the reliability charge 
previously discussed can be modified to include wind 
projects in the corresponding auctions. Vergara et al. 
(2010) argue that a capacity charge designed for wind 
power might be as effective as direct incentives such as 
the renewable portfolio standard. In the short term, 
however, this mechanism is difficult to implement 
because there is no information for calculating the firm 
energy contribution from wind power.
Furthermore, regardless of how these capacity and 
reliability charges are implemented, the Colombian 
experience suggests that market mechanisms alone are 
insufficient to promote alternative power because of the 
existing entry barriers. More importantly, incentives 
and instruments are means to reach the goals of policy, 
and should be designed and implemented after these 
goals have clearly been set. Note that, even though 
reliability and capacity charges might be periodically 
reviewed and modified, this may be relatively costly to 
achieve. However, previous arguments, particularly the 
one relating to the unavailability of long time series on 
wind flows, clearly reject this alternative. 
It is clear that electricity regulators and policy-makers 
need relevant data when considering increasing 
investment in clean energy. Not every policy has 
the same information requirements. Information 
availability influences the ease of monitoring and 
enforcing policy. These leave room for considering 
all the options in Table 3, except for the changes to 
the Colombian reliability charges, which have already 
been rejected.
Unlike other instruments in Table 3, feed-in tariffs can 
directly target specific technologies and are effective 
  
Installed 
capacity, 
MW 
Approved 
and 
planned 
expansion, 
MW 
Potential 
wind 
power 
capacity, 
GW 
Percentage 
of total 
generating 
capacity 
Argentina* 60 794 200 0.23% 
Brazil* 931 3140 143 0.89% 
Chile* 172 2000 40 1.29% 
Colombia* 19,5 27,5 18 0,15% 
Costa Rica* 120,1 100,5 0.6 5,34% 
Cuba 7,2  N.A. 0,14% 
Curazao 9 24 N.A. 5,17% 
Ecuador 2,4 15 N.A. 0,06% 
Mexico* 519 2300 71 1.03% 
Nicaragua 40 215 2 4,53% 
Uruguay* 20,5 150 2 0,93% 
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performance.  
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mechanisms for recovering the high capital costs of 
wind power technology. In addition, feed-in tariffs are 
flexible. A flexible instrument can easily be adapted to 
changing market and economic conditions. Feed-in 
tariffs, for instance, might be in line with wholesale 
market prices and may only need to be adjusted by a 
producer price index.
By definition, portfolio standards are less flexible 
than feed-in tariffs and must be sustained over longer 
periods of time. Changes in portfolio standards need 
to be discussed and announced in advance, to avoid 
regulatory uncertainty. Portfolio standards, however, 
are highly effective, and because utilities are overseen 
and regulated, they can be monitored and enforced 
with ease.  
The previous section indicates that the most successful 
Latin American policies for increasing the share of 
RETs in power generation make use of feed-in tariffs. 
By far, feed-in tariffs have been the most widely used 
and successful regulatory option to promote renewables 
and wind energy worldwide, as nearly 45% of global 
wind generation capacity (53 GW in 2008) has been 
installed using this mechanism (REN21, 2010; IEA, 
2010).
Renewable portfolio standards have also been 
successfully applied in LA to increase the market 
share of renewable energy. This mechanism 
promotes renewable generation and internalises the 
environmental costs, while allowing the market to 
develop and utilise the most economic technologies 
(Kydes, 2007). Portfolio standards are a part of the 
renewables policy in Australia, Canada, Italy, Japan, 
Korea, Portugal, Sweden, the UK and the US (IEA, 
2009), and they are usually combined with other 
environmental policies.
Based on lessons learned from Latin America and 
elsewhere, we propose an effective framework for 
promoting RETs in Colombia by combining feed-in 
tariffs with renewable portfolio standards. The first 
step in this direction is to define a policy with both 
measurable goals and the mechanisms to reach them. 
A target of 3% of renewables would add about 400 
MW of wind power capacity by 2015, and to reach 
a 6% by 2020, an extra 450 MW would be needed. 
An effective mechanism to achieve this goal is to 
mandate generators with capacities larger than 500 
MW to source 3% of their dispatch from renewable 
energy in exchange of a feed-in tariff, while other 
generators can participate voluntarily. For other 
independent producers, new renewable power capacity 
can be allocated by auctioning 20 MW modules to 
be remunerated through a feed-in tariff. This scheme 
would complement existing instruments, namely 
supply subsidies and CDM support, while providing 
stronger incentives for investment. 
Conclusions
To a large extent, Colombia’s limited success in 
promoting wind power reflects the absence of a 
policy programme specifically targeted to increasing 
the share of renewable energy within the portfolio of 
power generation. The World Bank (Vergara et al., 
2010) proposes to adjust the current reliability charge 
to increase investment in wind power generation. 
Although appealing, this approach is not adequate, 
as: a) it places high requirements on wind power for 
information, which is currently not available; and b) it 
is not as effective as other proven mechanisms around 
the world. The experience in other countries is that, 
independently of the market structure and size, the 
early adoption of wind power benefits from two basic 
mechanisms: feed-in tariffs and portfolio standards 
(Zuluaga and Dyner, 2007). Moreover, policies that 
seek to accelerate learning by doing and technology 
adoption, like the Brazilian PROINFA programme, 
are adequate to lower entry barriers in countries with 
a large hydroelectricity component, such as Colombia.
Latin America, and particularly Colombia, has a good 
opportunity to deploy wind power technologies that 
now offer relatively cheap and modular generation 
units. From the perspective of regional integration, 
this is a strategic opportunity for Colombia, which 
needs a much higher electricity supply to contribute to 
the requirements of Central American countries and to 
complement Ecuador’s and Peru’s supply.
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Section II: Enabling frameworks 
addressing multiple technologies
Solar PV used to power village communications
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Abstract
This article aims to provide a summary to governments 
and stakeholders in developing countries on the 
function, strengths and potential drawbacks of 
‘feed-in tariffs’ (FITs) as one possible market incentive 
to increase the share of grid - and mini-grid - connected 
renewable electricity generation. It is important 
that FITs are not seen as a ‘silver bullet’, but rather 
as one policy option to complement others aimed at 
overcoming the barriers to significant and sustained 
investment in low-carbon energy. Despite the 
long-term rise in fossil fuel prices, the fact remains that 
most grid-connected renewable energy technologies 
(RETs) require financial support in order to compete 
with electricity generated from conventional primary 
energy sources, principally coal, natural gas and 
large-scale hydro-energy. In many countries, a lack of 
clear and stable revenue support for renewable energy 
(RE) has simply deterred investors from backing 
RE projects. 
For developing countries, many of which have 
significant renewable energy resources, harnessing this 
‘freely available’ energy is one way to offset domestic 
energy shortages, reduce import bills for hydrocarbons 
and expand energy access, especially in rural areas. In 
this article, an explanation is given of how FITs work 
followed by a discussion of their relative success in 
promoting RETs in OECD economies, taking into 
account broader aspects of the country and policy 
contexts. The rest of the article focuses on how FITs 
can be adapted for developing countries, considering 
their main benefits, potential costs and drawbacks.
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Introduction
‘Feed-in Tariffs’ (FITs) provide a minimum guaranteed 
price paid by utilities to all generators of electricity 
from renewable energy, supplying, or ‘feeding into’ 
the grid. The exact value of tariff support is set by the 
government, usually for a fixed time period, and tends 
to vary according to the type of generation technology.1 
The cost of feed-in tariffs is normally assumed by 
electricity utilities and then passed on to, i.e., divided 
among, all consumers. As such, FITs are a form of 
cross-subsidy designed to encourage investment 
in clean and low-carbon electricity generation, 
without placing a cap or quota on the amount of 
RE generation (Couture and Gagnon, 2010; Haas 
et al., 2011). However, they are unlike conventional 
subsidies in that they are intended to spur market and 
technological development, driving cost reductions in 
the process. Opinion is divided over the long-term fate 
of FITs, as it is hoped that renewable technologies will 
be able to operate in the market without price support 
in the future. Importantly, FITs provide financial 
support only to electricity generated and delivered 
to the grid, as opposed to subsidies for the initial 
capital investment.
Basic FITs are conceptually very simple and easy to 
administer, which partly explains their popularity 
and success in accelerating the deployment of RETs. 
Approximately 75% of global installed solar PV 
capacity and 45% of wind power receive some degree 
of supply-side tariff support (Rickerson et al., 2010). 
While FITs are best known for their role in supporting 
investment in RETs in Europe, there is in fact a diverse 
and growing range of experiences across the world, 
from which it is possible to draw some lessons. 
In many OECD countries with mature electricity 
markets, the use of FITs has led to widespread RET 
deployment, as in Germany, Denmark and Spain, 
which have Europe’s largest shares of renewable energy 
generation – particularly grid-connected wind energy 
(Reiche and Bechberger, 2004). In Germany the first 
FIT was introduced in 1991, and by 2008 feed-in 
support totalled €2.5 billion. While 17% of German 
electricity generation is met by renewable sources 
(BMU, 2011), average financial support in 2009 was 
€0.13 per kWh, which equated to €3.83 per household 
per month, or 6% of the average electricity bill.2 
Crucially, and in order to incentivise constant efficiency 
improvements and innovations, per-unit FITs are 
normally lowered every year (at a predetermined 
and fixed rate), which brings them closer to average 
conventional generation costs. This is known as tariff 
‘degression’. As such, FITs have helped push down 
the per-unit cost of electricity generated by RETs by 
encouraging technical innovation and economies of 
scale. In the case of Germany, annual degression in the 
FIT paid for new RE generation were originally set at 
1% for biomass, 1.5% for wind power and 5% for solar 
PV, which has the highest per-unit tariff. However 
the degression rate has been increased in recent years, 
most notably for solar PV, which, as of 2011, has a 
13% degression rate (IEA, 2011). Nevertheless, FITs 
typically provide investors with a guaranteed revenue 
stream for 10-20 years, as long as the installation 
remains operational. FITs have therefore proved 
successful in reducing the financial risk of investing 
in RETs, as compared to other policies such as 
tradable permits.3  
However, once RETs take up a larger share of the 
generation market place, FITs can become expensive 
and harder to justify, especially where governments 
claim to be strictly endorsing the principles of 
electricity market liberalisation and/or placing a higher 
value on cheap energy in the short term. Therefore, 
it is important to bear in mind that FITs are only an 
interim policy, designed to accelerate the development 
and diffusion of RETs. Experience shows that diffusion 
will push technologies along the innovation cost curve 
towards market competitiveness with conventional 
energy sources, the environmental impacts of which 
should be internalised or priced in. On the other hand, 
in many developing countries, such as Uganda, which 
has a high dependency on diesel generation, the per-
unit cost of mature RETs such as hydro and wind 
power is already lower than electricity generated from 
the fossil fuel base-load, which is itself on an upward 
price trend due to the increasing scarcity of easily 
accessible oil, gas and coal, as well as their climate and 
pollution externalities.
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The most common features of FIT laws are 
the following:  
• Utilities are obliged to purchase electricity 
supplied to the grid from RE sources generated 
specifically for that purpose (as distinguished 
from net-metering).
• The value of the electricity purchased (the FIT) 
is set by the government at a fixed rate each year, 
which normally declines in value over time so 
as to reward first movers and reflect technology 
cost reductions.
• The value of the FIT differs depending on 
the type, size and location of RE technology 
used, with higher rates paid to the least 
competitive technologies.
• Generators are usually responsible for paying 
for grid connection to the nearest connection 
point (shallow connection charges), whereas the 
grid operator bears the cost of grid extensions. 
Otherwise, in a deep connection charge system, 
the RE generator is normally responsible for 
the grid connection and all associated 
transmission upgrades. 
• FIT contracts are signed between generators 
and utilities, typically for 10-20 years.
History and design of FITs in OECD countries
FITs have been successful in promoting investment in 
RE generation in many developed countries, mainly 
because they minimise the long-term financial risks 
surrounding individual projects. The world’s first FIT 
was legislated in California in 1978 under the federal 
Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act (PURPA), 
which, in a context of high and rising oil prices, set the 
value of tariff support to reflect the avoided long run 
marginal cost of electricity, i.e., the anticipated cost 
of generating an extra kWh of electricity (Butler and 
Neuhoff, 2004). This, combined with an Investment 
Tax Credit implemented in 1979, underpinned the 
Californian ‘wind rush’ when approximately 15,000 
wind turbines with a combined capacity of 1,200MW 
were installed during the early 1980s. However, the 
policy was withdrawn in 1985 (by which time oil prices 
had fallen to near pre-1973 levels) amid accusations 
that the financial support was too expensive and 
provided unrealistic rates of return for renewable 
energy investors. This experience in itself provided 
lessons for policy-makers seeking to legislate ambitious 
support for renewable energy. 
Arguably the most successful FIT has been in Germany, 
where the policy was first introduced in 1991, initially 
with variable support linked to consumer energy 
prices. However, following a drop in energy prices 
during the late 1990s, the German FIT was fixed 
in 2000 (at different levels depending on the energy 
technology), which had the effect of greatly increasing 
investment in renewable energy capacity, particularly 
in wind and solar PV. While Germany’s decision to fix 
FIT support was a significant boost to the RE industry, 
many studies conclude that other policies, as well as 
the wider market structure, were equally important, 
including the country’s decision to phase out nuclear 
power (Jacobsson and Lauber, 2006).
In Germany, installed wind-power capacity increased 
from a total of 56MW in 1990 to 14,600MW 
in 2003, by which time wind power was already 
supplying 6% of Germany’s total electricity demand 
(UNEP, 2007). In 2010, Germany’s total installed 
wind capacity stood at more than 27,000 MW. In 
Denmark, a FIT underpinned rapid investment in 
wind power between 1980 and 2002, which, by 2007, 
accounted for 19.8% of domestic electricity supply 
and approximately 25% of installed capacity (Danish 
Energy Agency, 2009). 
In the UK, plans to introduce a FIT were added to 
the government’s Energy Bill in October 2008 after 
years of having resisted the introduction of direct tariff 
support, with the policy coming into effect in April 
2010. This was a major departure from reliance on a 
micro-generation grant scheme and the ‘Renewables 
Obligation’ (RO), a quota-based mechanism that the 
UK has used to expand renewable energy supplies 
gradually since 2002. Although the RO has enabled 
a doubling of renewable electricity generation in 
the UK since 2002, this is unimpressive given the 
country’s low starting point of around 2%. Indeed, it 
was partly the success of FITs in other countries that 
led the UK government to conduct a policy U-turn. 
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However, this was not done without a major policy 
campaign spearheaded by a coalition of NGOs and 
industry groups.
The specific value of FIT support is usually based on 
the type of RE technology, with the aim of ‘levelling 
the playing field’. As such, FIT support, measured 
as € per kWh, is usually set higher for technologies 
like solar PV, which remain furthest from market 
competitiveness, i.e., are more expensive per kWh of 
electricity generation. Conversely wind power, which 
is often the most cost competitive, tends to receive a 
lower level of FIT support. In order to accelerate cost 
reductions through market expansion, it is important 
to match the relatively high tariff support for expensive 
RET such as solar PV, with a relatively steep rate of 
tariff degression, thus creating strong incentives to 
invest sooner rather than later (Auer et al., 2009).
In addition to technology-based criteria for establishing 
FIT values, the policy can also be calculated on a 
resource basis in an attempt to level the playing 
field further by preventing the developers of wind 
projects from capturing large rents in areas of high 
wind resources. This was done in Germany, where 
the value of tariff support provided for wind farms in 
windy locations was set at the same level as low-wind 
resource locations, but declined at a faster annual rate 
thereafter. However, a resource-based differentiation 
in tariff support can be difficult and time-consuming 
to calculate and administer, and the argument is 
often made that ‘first movers’ deserve to be rewarded 
(assuming they locate their wind farms in the windiest 
locations) for taking a risk with a lesser-established 
technology, and where costs tends to fall along with 
market expansion. 
While support in the form of a high FIT has doubtless 
boosted the market for solar PV in Germany,4  it was 
not the only policy. The provision of direct installation 
subsidies, such as the 100,000 Roofs Photovoltaic 
Programme, which provided a total subsidy of 35%, 
was equally if not more important in Germany (Stryi-
Hipp, 2009). The relative success of FITs also depends 
upon various non-market factors such as the ease of 
processing RE development applications, i.e., the 
degree of bureaucracy in each country, as well as wider 
social obstacles such as a strong ‘NIMBY’5  effect.  
Some countries, such as the Czech Republic, Denmark, 
the Netherlands, Slovenia and Spain operate a 
‘premium’ FIT, whereby developers can choose between 
selling their renewably generated electricity at price set 
at marginal X% above the market price, which tends 
to fluctuate, or opt for a (higher) fixed tariff support. 
In these cases, both the fixed and premium tariffs are 
reviewed by the government each year to reflect changes 
in energy prices and technology costs, while RE project 
developers are free to change between regimes. This 
flexible system is designed to protect both project 
developers and consumers by ensuring that losses and 
excess profits are avoided (Mallon, 2006).
Mendonça et al. (2009) argue that FITs are an 
inherently more inclusive financial mechanism to 
support RETs when compared to the tax credits 
scheme used in the United States. Taking the example 
of the development of wind energy in Denmark, they 
state that ‘..it was driven from the bottom-up, with 
enthusiasts influencing the political process in such 
a way that Government then engaged in providing 
the enabling conditions to boost the development 
of the sector, through economic incentives and 
favourable ownership restrictions’ (p. 384). Taken 
together, Mendonça et al. argue that this institutional 
organisation in Denmark, and the process of creating 
a strong domestic political agenda to support RETs 
(in particular wind energy), was the product of what 
Danish academic Frede Hvelplund terms ‘innovative 
democracy’. Specifically, this is understood as a process 
whereby stakeholders were actively engaged at all 
stages and levels of policy formation and where the 
development of community-owned wind farms spread 
the investment costs, and the income benefits, of wind 
energy down to the household level. This ensured both 
a high level of community ‘buy in’, as well as strong 
and longer term rural support for on-shore wind 
energy, the lack of which has been a major barrier in 
the UK, for example.
FITs are rarely used alone in support of renewable 
energy. In both Germany and Denmark, a 
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combination of investment subsidies for individual 
projects (worth as much as 30% during the early 
days of promoting wind energy in Denmark), tax 
exemptions, soft loans and publicly funded R&D also 
played a major role. While these additional direct and 
indirect financial incentives for investing in RET were 
relatively expensive, it should be remembered that the 
costs of RETs per MW installed capacity have fallen 
dramatically since the 1970s, in large part thanks to 
the pioneering industry support and development that 
was achieved in countries like Denmark.
Criticisms and shortcomings of FITs in OECD 
countries
While FITs have been very successful in many EU 
countries, if judged in terms of RE capacity installed, 
they have some drawbacks and detractors. According 
to ‘standard’ neo-classical theory, as a form of cross-
subsidy FITs should act as a drag on domestic 
economic growth, productivity and competitiveness. 
In reality, the direct economic impact of FITs is almost 
negligible, at least in high-income countries. In part, 
this is due to the relatively small component that 
electricity comprises for most household and business 
expenditure (indeed the share of electricity has steadily 
declined as an input factor among OECD countries 
since 1990). In ‘pioneer’ countries such as Denmark 
and Germany, tariff support for renewable energy also 
helped nurture a new multi-billion euro industry and 
created thousands of manufacturing and engineering 
jobs, though these are ‘one-off’ benefits that can only 
be captured by such pioneering states. 
Taken at face value, fixed-rate FITs do not create 
competitive pressure between electricity producers 
since investors are able to calculate, with a higher degree 
of certainty, their rate of return based on the long-term 
structure of tariff support, i.e., they have a guaranteed 
fixed income. This can be compared to the policy of 
providing premium payments, or bonuses, on top of 
the market (i.e., variable) price of electricity, which in 
theory provides operators with a greater incentive to 
reduce their costs in order to maximise project returns. 
However, this assumes that the premium is not set too 
high, in which case it can lead to excess profits if the 
market price of electricity increases significantly, as 
was the experience in Spain. In an attempt to manage 
the cost of financial support to RE generators, Spain 
introduced floor and ceiling prices to its system of 
feed-in premiums in 2007.
Consequently, FITs as a generic policy are often 
criticised by free-market and fossil-fuel lobby groups 
as an expensive means to support investment in RE 
generation, and specifically because the cost of tariff 
support may become unsustainable once the share 
of RE generation becomes significant. As such, free-
market advocates often argue that, by providing fixed 
payment levels, FITs are both inefficient and have a 
distortive effect on energy markets. In the EU, this 
has led some analysts to conclude that, if the cost of 
FITs were to rise significantly, they would undermine 
the Union’s wider policy agenda of creating a single, 
liberalised European energy market (Sijm, 2002). 
However, given the years of experience gained with 
FITs within many EU member states and the steady 
rise of RE installed capacity across the EU, energy 
policy debate has begun to centre on proposals to 
harmonise the support provided to RE. The European 
Commission favours ‘well-adapted’ FITs as the ‘most 
efficient and effective support schemes for promoting 
renewable electricity’ (Commission of the European 
Communities, 2008), a position supported by various 
academic studies, including Haas et al., 2011. Indeed, 
in July 2010, the European Energy Commissioner 
Günther Oettinger called for a harmonisation of FITs 
between EU Member States (Euractiv, 2010). As well 
as seeking to optimise net support for RE across the 
27-Member State bloc, such policy harmonisation 
stands to reduce market distortions in anticipation of a 
region-wide energy trading system.
To a large extent, the success of FITs depends upon 
the stability and certainty they provide for investors. 
As such, too many changes made to FIT values can 
have a detrimental effect on the market by eroding 
investor confidence. In Europe, since 2008 the 
stability of some FIT regimes has been undermined 
by economic recession and government austerity. 
Although they are not directly financed by government 
budgets, FITs do contribute to a higher net tax burden 
94
for the economy, which has made them the target of 
governments wishing to reduce economy-wide costs, 
despite the greater long-term benefits of minimizing 
dependence on imported fossil fuels. Indeed, it is easy 
for governments to target FITs amid an economic 
recession, and in countries such as Spain that have 
a relatively high FIT bill, pressure to streamline the 
economy is also coming from the European Central 
Bank and international credit rating agencies. 
FITs have also been the victim of their own success 
in many European countries, such as Spain and Italy, 
where investment in solar PV projects have greatly 
exceeded expectations, thus exacerbating political 
pressures to reduce the levelised cost of FITs among 
all ratepayers. In 2011 the UK government announced 
it would conduct a review of its FIT law, less than a 
year after it came into effect, which is highly likely to 
damage the country’s nascent solar power industry. 
Such policy change can greatly undermine investor 
confidence in the stability of FITs. However, even 
if necessary economic incentives are introduced 
via a well-designed, clear and stable FIT, the rapid 
deployment of RETs (whether small or large-scale) 
can be hindered by unfavourable planning regulations, 
import taxation etc., depending on the circumstances 
in each country.
The pre-requisites and characteristics of successful FITs 
are as follows:
• Eligible RETs should be clearly defined, and 
include ‘dispatchable’ base-load generation 
technologies such as biomass, hydro and 
geothermal, as well as variable RETs such as 
wind and solar PV in order to encourage a 
diversified energy portfolio.
• Countries should conduct or commission in-
depth renewable energy resource assessments 
and mapping and impact assessments, so that 
investors (be they public or private) know which 
RETs and locations are optimal.   
• Tariffs should be technology-specific and 
based on the cost of generation, as opposed 
to final consumer prices or ‘avoided’ costs, so 
as to provide a clear and stable internal rate of 
return to investors (typically between 7-10%), 
while avoiding the risk of windfall profits at the 
expense of consumers.
• Apply a hybrid rate of tariff decline, i.e., where 
the annual rate of decline in tariff support has a 
fixed baseline, with the option to reduce tariffs 
for new projects further if and when major cost 
reductions are achieved for a specific technology.
• Especially in developing countries, FIT 
policies should be developed in conjunction 
with wider macro-economic policy-making 
and calculations so as to understand 
their likely impacts on the economy and 
development goals.
Sources: Couture and Gagnon, 2010; 
Mendonça and Jacobs, 2009; Haas et al., 
2004; Haas et al., 2011.
Designing FITs for developing countries
Despite the success of FITs in various OECD countries, 
particularly in Europe, there are some basic reasons 
why they may have to be adapted to work in developing 
countries. Of fundamental importance is the fact that 
most developing countries have a smaller proportion 
of consumers connected to the grid, often less than 
25% in sub-Saharan Africa, meaning that FITs will not 
in themselves help address the need to expand energy 
access. Indeed, they may even undermine policies to 
increase access to electricity in areas where demand can 
be met by lower-cost centralised thermal generation, 
especially in urban areas (though energy security 
and fuel-mix diversification are common concerns 
that reduce the cost benefits of conventional thermal 
generation). In countries where there is an abundance 
and high use of low-cost primary energy for electricity, 
such as with coal in South Africa, the cost of FITs will 
need to be relatively high in order to level the playing 
field between competing technologies. This is likely 
to make FITs politically unpopular, and in the case of 
South Africa, in 2011 the National Energy Regulator 
(NERSA) launched a review of the country’s 2009 FIT 
with a remit to reduce tariff support by as much as 
42% for solar PV.6
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Secondly, businesses and households in developing 
countries that do consume electricity generally spend 
a higher proportion of their income on it, meaning 
that any marginal tariff increase will have a greater 
economic impact. As such, the funding mechanism 
for FITs may have to be structured differently in 
developing countries, for example, with financing 
from international donors or centralised national 
funds, instead of by consumers. However, in countries 
that provide subsidies for fossil fuels, the net macro-
economic cost of financing FITs could be zero or 
negative if these are phased out during the time period 
of FIT support.
There is also a risk that centralised financing for FITs 
could undermine their economic and administrative 
simplicity, i.e., their strengths, and move them 
towards a more traditional form of industrial subsidy 
that is exposed to greater political interference and 
uncertainty. Alternatively, in order to help minimise 
the costs to consumers, FITs can be designed with a 
nationally appropriate cap placed on the percentage 
of installed capacity from RETs. While this is far 
from ‘ideal’, it does at least allow for a controlled 
expansion of the local renewable energy industry, 
which is more likely to develop without future 
support once the initial cost and experience barriers 
have been broken down (IEA, 2010; Mendonça and 
Jacobs, 2009).
In the context of developing countries, many of 
which still operate state-owned and/or monopolistic 
electricity utilities, it is useful to remember that FITs 
do not depend upon a wider framework of market 
liberalisation, although such a framework is likely to 
provide greater security for investors. The important 
basic elements of FITs are that they combine 
guaranteed tariff support, purchase obligations and 
regulated grid access, which, if not tampered with by 
governments, provide a stable investment framework 
for a diversity of independent power producers. This 
means that investors will look closely at the stability 
of the public utility in order to assess the security of 
power purchase agreements, adding to the argument 
for focusing commercial investments on low-cost RETs 
such as hydro and biomass in developing countries. 
There are also societal factors that stand to challenge 
the successful application of FITs, given that they 
have to be adapted to a particular set of national 
circumstances. For example, Mendonça et al. (2009) 
maintain that the conditions necessary to achieve 
the ‘innovative democracy’ that enabled the rapid 
deployment of RETs in Denmark are more likely to 
be found in industrialised and democratic societies, 
though they do not make sweeping statements to 
exclude all developing countries. It appears to be a moot 
point whether this process can be reverse-engineered in 
countries that do not have a strong culture of bottom-
up and/or truly democratic decision-making. 
In some developing countries, RETs are already cost 
competitive with conventional energy, especially 
where there is a high dependence upon small and 
medium-sized diesel generators. Where this is the 
case, the introduction of a relatively low FIT is 
likely to stabilise, and even reduce, the market price 
of electricity, especially when fuels are imported and 
continue to follow a long-run price increase. In these 
circumstances, the free-market response would be to 
argue that a FIT is unnecessary, since price signals alone 
would trigger investment in RETs. In theory yes, but 
in reality investors and governments alike tend to ‘stick 
to what they know’, even if there are clear short - and 
long - term costs in doing so. Given that FITs not only 
provide tariff support but also allow IPPs to connect 
to the grid, they can act as a ‘package’ enabling RETs 
to overcome the technological lock-in of conventional 
energy supplies. Nonetheless, it is evident that in 
most countries free-market price signals alone will not 
achieve the levels of deployment of renewable energy 
required to decarbonise our energy systems, hence the 
need for long-term bankable incentives. 
There is increasing evidence for and arguments in 
support of applying FITs to mini-grids, especially 
in developing countries (DBCCA, 2011; Solano-
Peralta et al., 2009). Developing business models for 
FIT application to mini-grids is especially relevant 
for geographically large developing countries with 
low levels of energy access. This could serve as an 
important economic bridge between the use of 
decentralised off-grid RETs used in mostly remote 
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and isolated locations, and the high cost of connecting 
communities that have a low demand load, located 
relatively far from the grid. However, given the small 
size of the systems, it is not clear whether RETs would 
really ‘feed in’ (i.e., contribute to) the mini-grid, or 
simply dominate them. In the latter case there is a risk 
that, in applying FITs to mini-grids, they would end 
up operating as a direct subsidy paid to remunerate 
RE generators, as opposed to providing support at the 
margins to enable RETs to compete with conventional 
energy technologies.
Following the COP15 in Copenhagen, the United 
Nations Secretary General’s Advisory Group on Energy 
and Climate Change (AGECC) requested Deutsche 
Bank Climate Change Advisors (DBCCA) to develop 
the idea of a public-private Global Energy Transfer 
Feed-in Tariff (GET FiT). The GET FiT concept is 
primarily designed to mitigate investment risk for RE 
projects in developing countries by passing the bill for 
FIT support on to donor agencies. DBCCA analyse 
FITs only from the perspective of investors, whose main 
criterion is to gauge the extent to which a particular 
policy framework is likely to achieve Transparency, 
Longevity and Certainty (TLC). This is a simple yet 
comprehensive approach to understanding policy ‘best 
practice’, though one focused on ‘de-risking’ business 
models and attracting mainly private investment in RE 
projects in developing countries. 
Rickerson et al. (2010) focus on Tanzania as a case 
study of a developing country that is attempting to 
implement a politically viable and investor-friendly 
FIT. Applying the measures of TLC to the Tanzanian 
government’s 2009 Small Power Producer (SPP) law, 
they conclude that the framework, which includes an 
initial FIT of US$0.077/kWh, is sufficient to attract 
investment in the ‘low-hanging fruit’ of RE projects 
such as small hydro and biomass, but not enough to 
promote wind or solar power projects.7 Rickerson et 
al. maintain that the key shortcoming in the design 
of the Tanzanian FIT is that the value is calculated 
on the basis of avoided costs, not technology-specific 
generation costs, which would provide greater certainty 
for investors who need to calculate a project’s internal 
rate of return. At the same time, the Tanzanian SPP is 
praised for its transparency and for covering payments 
for projects connected to both grid and rural mini-
grids. This is particularly significant in a country 
where less than 20% of the population have access 
to electricity.
Finally, the GET FiT concept maintains that FITs 
will not be successful in developing countries unless 
local financing is secured in RE projects, even though 
financial markets in developing countries (especially in 
sub-Saharan Africa) often lack diversity and flexibility 
and generally regard RE projects as high risk. Rickerson 
et al. argue that local financing can be secured by the 
provision of technical assistance to local lenders aimed 
at minimising fears regarding investment in alternative 
energy projects, and by sharing the financial risk with 
foreign investors and donor agencies. However, it is 
not yet clear how the necessary international funds can 
be secured in the long term to provide the financing 
for FITs that investors (whether local or foreign) are 
likely to demand. The problem of long-term financing 
is currently being addressed by the GET FiT initiative, 
including the possibility of tapping into bond markets, 
backed up by long-term annual commitments from 
donor agencies. Nonetheless, this centralised approach 
to financing FITs is inherently more risky in terms of 
longevity and certainty, especially since the cycles of 
donor financing do not currently fit this model.
Conclusions
Many studies have concluded that RETs are a viable 
means to increase access to electricity in developing 
countries, as well as helping to reduce emissions of 
greenhouse gases. Yet it is not always obvious how to 
reconcile a desired expansion of access to affordable 
electricity with an increase in the installed capacity 
of RETs that generally have higher per kWh up-front 
capital costs than fossil fuel generation. Nevertheless, 
when combined with grid expansion (and possibly 
mini-grids), FIT-backed renewable energy can also 
achieve co-benefits by facilitating wider investment 
in rural areas, e.g., with community electrification 
and generation programmes. This requires FITs to 
be implemented in conjunction with other rural 
development programmes. However, implementing 
a FIT alone does not guarantee that investments 
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in renewable energy projects will follow, and it is 
important to remember that their success in many 
OECD countries has also been bolstered by other 
financial support mechanisms.
Further, FITs should be regarded as just one element 
in wider efforts to create an ‘enabling framework’ 
for investment in renewable energy, albeit a central 
element and one that can go a long way in helping to 
‘de-risk’ RE projects in both developed and developing 
countries. However, in understanding the relative 
success of FITs the devil lies in the detail. There exist 
a wide variety of FITs across countries, all of which 
have a specific set of national circumstances. Good, 
location-specific design and implementation is key. 
Although FITs aim to reduce economic barriers and 
create a level playing field for a variety of electricity 
generation technologies, they are ultimately an 
expression of political will and, as a form of price-
setting regulation, cannot easily keep pace with 
technological progress or reflect cost reductions. This 
process requires regular monitoring in order to control 
costs, maintain industry stability, keep CO2 reductions 
and RE expansion targets on track, and maintain and 
enhance public support. The growth of a national 
RE industry and the creation of new business and 
job opportunities will inevitably bolster this support. 
Alternatively, countries can opt for tenders for a 
specific capacity volume, which imposes a ceiling and 
floor price for RE generation, thus creating a hybrid 
incentive mechanism that blends a price target with 
a quantity objective. This kind of performance-based 
incentive is similarly effective as FITs and appeals to 
countries with different economic models and cultures, 
e.g., Chile with its strict market orientation. 
By providing fixed income support for RE generation, 
FITs will always be the target of free-market critics eager 
to brand such interventions ‘inefficient and expensive’. 
However, this accusation is often unfounded and/
or exaggerated and fails to appreciate the far larger 
costs associated with conventional energy systems. 
For example, little or no mainstream recognition is 
generally given to the higher external (non-market) 
costs of conventional fossil-fuel electricity generation, 
principally their CO2 emissions, contribution 
to air pollution and the simple fact that they are 
finite resources. 
While the electricity sector in many countries is no 
longer in receipt of direct subsidies following a wave 
of privatisation and liberalisation policies (promoted, 
in the case of developing countries, by the IFIs during 
the 1990s and 2000s), the value of historical state 
subsidies, direct and indirect, provided to conventional 
fossil fuel-based and nuclear electricity generation 
runs into hundreds of billions of dollars – a history 
that has helped ensure the current low prices through 
technological development. 
In conclusion, FITs can help investors overcome some of 
the strictly financial barriers to investing in RE projects. 
However, for effective scaling-up of investment in RE, 
there also needs to be concerted efforts to overcome 
the non-financial barriers, including low levels of 
stakeholder participation in decision-making processes 
and community ownership of individual projects. 
Although it is unwise to generalise, a particular risk 
in implementing a FIT in developing countries is that 
utility prices, including energy, are an easy target for 
political manipulation by governments keen to be seen 
as tackling poverty and providing politically popular 
welfare benefits. Even if strong and stable political 
support is provided for FITs, they may fall victim 
to cut-backs at times of economic constraint, as has 
happened in various OECD countries, including the 
UK, Spain and Italy. 
On the plus side, FITs are conceptually simple and 
democratic, which makes them an appealing policy 
tool to help create a viable enabling framework for 
significant investment in renewable energy. While they 
have had most experience and success in developed 
countries, FITs can be considered by governments and 
NGOs in less developed countries where there is plenty 
of scope to innovate and adapt the basic elements of tariff 
support to suit local circumstances. However, in order 
to optimise the broader development benefits resulting 
from the scaling up of RETs, coupled with reduced 
environmental impacts, due consideration should 
be given right at the planning stage to institutional 
capacity and resource and impact assessments. 
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Endnotes
1. FITs should be distinguished from net-metering policies, which 
allow for usually small-scale generators of RE electricity to 
consume their energy on site, while remaining customers are 
connected to the grid. Although net-metering policies enable 
generators to supply the grid when their supply exceeds demand, 
the price paid for this electricity is normally equal to the market 
spot rate, i.e., unsubsidised and sometimes even zero.
2. However, according to the Germany Ministry of Environment 
(BMU), the cost of FIT support is rising rapidly in Germany, 
largely due to the explosion of growth in higher-cost Solar PV 
installations. BMU estimates that the average cost of FITs will be 
more than 10 EUR per household per month (equivalent to 14% 
of the bill) in 2011. (Reference: BMU, April 2011, ‘what effect 
does the promotion of renewable energies have on the domestic 
price of electricity?’ (Welche Wirkung hat die Förderung der 
erneuerbaren Energien auf den Haushalts-Strompreis?).  
www.erneuerbare-energien.de/files/pdfs/allgemein/application/
pdf/hintergrund_ee_umlage_bf.pdf .
3. This conclusion has been reached by a number of authoritative 
studies, including the 2006 Stern Review into the economics 
of climate change mitigation. Stern reports that ‘comparisons 
between deployment support through tradable quotas and feed-in 
tariff price support suggest that feed-in mechanisms achieve larger 
deployment at lower costs.’
4. At almost 17,000 MW, Germany’s installed solar PV generation 
capacity accounted for more than 50% of the global total in 2010, 
most of which is grid-connected.
5. NIMBY: ‘Not In My Back Yard’.
6. However, in the case of South Africa, the key barrier to the success 
of FIT is that Eskom (the state-owned electricity utility) is the sole 
buyer of electricity and has no obligation to buy FIT-supported 
renewable electricity (Pegels, 2009).
7. Examples of low-cost RE projects could include those identified 
by the Poverty Alleviation through Cleaner Energy from Agro-
industries in Africa (PACEAA) project in East Africa. Funded 
by the European Commission’s COOPENER programme, the 
project addressed the issue of rural electrification as a means of 
alleviating poverty, in particular by using electricity from agro-
industries. www.paceaa.org/ .
Transmission lines in South Africa
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Abstract
The carbon intensity of the South African economy is 
among the highest in the world: the amount of CO2 
emitted per million international dollars generated 
reaches almost twice the world average. The first steps 
have been taken by the South African government 
to tackle the challenge of decarbonisation, such as 
the introduction of a renewable energy feed-in tariff 
(REFIT) in 2009. However, REFIT is a showcase 
for potential pitfalls in the implementation of 
renewable energy support policies: a stalemate lasting 
two years after the introduction of REFIT ended 
with the abandonment of the scheme in favour of a 
competitive bidding process in 2011. This paper seeks 
to analyse the underlying reasons for this and to offer 
recommendations for similar situations in the future.
The paper identifies three main barriers to the 
implementation of REFIT: 1) social priorities other 
than the deployment of renewable energy technologies, 
2) a lack of coordination and capacity at the policy-
making level, and 3) strong lobby groups with interests 
in fossil fuel technologies. These barriers not only 
exist in South Africa, but in most other developing 
countries. Therefore, many of the recommendations 
for South Africa can be transferred to other country 
contexts, such as: 
• informing the public about climate change and 
stressing the positive side-effects of renewable energy 
technologies, thereby building public support 
• making use of international mechanisms to build 
political momentum
• forming clean-energy coalitions with powerful 
groups in society
• communicating support rules as early and clearly as 
possible, and keeping later adjustments to the rules 
predictable to maintain investment certainty
• establishing inter-ministerial groups with oversight 
authority to enhance political coordination
• supporting established energy suppliers in their 
discovery of renewable energy tariffs (RETs) as a new 
business field
• strengthening the position and capacity of renewable 
energy newcomers.
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Should South Africa support renewable 
energy technologies?
Since the Fourth Assessment Report of the 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate change (IPCC) 
in 2007, there has been a widespread consensus that 
climate change is one of this century’s most serious 
problems. However, while the strongest impacts are 
only expected to start in several decades time, bold 
and – most importantly – global action to prevent the 
worst has yet to be taken today. Most national policies 
do not yet reflect this fact. 
Even though the total contribution of South Africa 
to global CO2 emissions is still moderate (about 1 per 
cent in 2007), its per capita emission rate of 7.6 tonnes 
of CO2 in 2007 was above the global average of 4.6 
tonnes and more than nine times higher than the sub-
Saharan average of 0.8 tonnes. The amount of CO2 
emitted per million international dollars generated 
is almost twice the world average (World Resources 
Institute 2010).1
Most South African emissions come from the use of 
coal, which is the main source of electricity production 
(IEA 2010b). South African electricity demand is 
currently at about 240 TWh per year (Statistics 
South Africa 2011a). Electricity production stands at 
about 260 TWh, coming from an installed capacity 
of about 41 MW. Most of the electricity is provided 
by Eskom, the South African state-owned electricity 
utility. Demand is expected to increase by 4 per cent 
annually and to double by 2025. Bearing in mind the 
need to decarbonise, renewable energy technologies 
(RETs) will have to play a prominent role in added 
capacity, especially as capacity can be added quickly 
with wind power or solar photovoltaics, easing Eskom’s 
narrow electricity supply reserve margin of less than 
10 per cent. 
Furthermore, RETs could contribute to solving some 
of South Africa’s most pressing social and economic 
issues. The development of a nascent industry 
could lead to substantial job creation, at least in 
the longer term. At 24 per cent, the South African 
unemployment rate is high (Statistics South Africa 
2011b). The potential of strong renewable energy 
support to create new jobs has been proved in other 
countries: the gross employment effect in the German 
renewable energy sector, as an example, was estimated 
at 340,000 jobs in 2010. Admittedly, the German 
job creation experience cannot be transferred one-to-
one to South Africa. Germany enjoyed a first-mover 
advantage in technologies such as wind energy, which 
cannot be replicated by countries that follow her. 
While the South African government does see job-
creation opportunities in the manufacture of RETs, it 
cautions that at least in the short term ‘employment 
expectations should not be unduly raised’ (Department 
of Minerals and Energy 2003, 40). Furthermore, the 
proactive German support strategy was comparatively 
costly. The additional costs caused by the German 
feed-in tariff were EUR 4.65 billion in 2008, rising 
to EUR 8 billion in 2010 (Wuppertal Institute 2011). 
These costs are, inter alia, caused by the success of the 
support scheme in stimulating the growth of solar 
photovoltaic installations. In addition, Germany’s 
relatively poor solar resource base necessitates a high 
level of support per kWh produced. 
In contrast, the South African renewable energy 
resource base is excellent – particularly solar energy. 
The total area of high radiation in South Africa 
amounts to approximately 194,000 sq. km, including 
the Northern Cape, one of the best solar resource areas 
in the world (Eskom 2002). The technical potential 
of 2,700 sq. km, or 1.4 per cent of the area, could 
meet total projected South African electricity demand 
in 2025 (Eskom 2002; du Marchie van Voorthuysen 
2006, 6). This would correspond to the scale of solar 
energy projects planned in the DESERTEC project in 
northern Africa (Desertec Foundation 2011).
Admittedly, benefitting from the vast South African 
solar resources is not within the realm of ‘low-hanging 
fruits’. Utilising the potential through renewable 
energy generation would require large investments not 
only in generation utilities, but also in transmission 
lines from the areas of high radiation to the main 
electricity consumer centres. However, given the scale 
of the low-carbon development challenge, just reaping 
the ‘low-hanging’ fruits will not suffice.
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Is a feed-in tariff appropriate to support 
renewable energy technologies?
To be appropriate, a support measure needs to be 
effective and efficient. Many countries, mostly in the 
OECD, have proved the effectiveness of feed-in tariffs. 
Designed in ways that guarantee reasonable profits 
over a long-term planning horizon and accompanied 
by enabling conditions such as lean application 
processes, they can significantly stimulate renewable 
energy growth (Haselip 2011). This has been shown 
by markets as diverse as solar energy in Germany and 
wind energy in China.
To be efficient, tariff rates have to be designed carefully. 
They must be high enough to stimulate investment, but 
should not generate excessive profits. As high resource 
endowments make renewable energy projects more 
profitable, tariff rates can be adapted regionally. Also, 
tariff degression over time can account for decreasing 
marginal costs. Ultimately, RETs are expected to 
reach grid parity – that is, become competitive with 
fossil fuels. 
South Africa not only has a good renewable energy 
resource potential, but also a good financial, 
technological and industrial capacity base. This will 
be conducive to the long-term development of a 
renewable energy industry.2  However, local companies 
will clearly need support in the initial stage. To 
maximise benefits for local industry, some countries 
have linked renewable energy support to local content 
requirements. As an example, support is only granted 
if a certain share of equipment and installations is 
purchased from domestic suppliers. China practised 
this strategy successfully: until early 2010, it required 
wind turbines installed in the country to have at 
least 70% ‘domestic content’ in terms of the value of 
incorporated materials and components. However, this 
requirement is no longer necessary, as today virtually 
all turbine installations are Chinese-produced. The 
requirement was therefore abolished in early 2010 
(Altenburg et al. 2010). 
In contrast to price-based mechanisms such as feed-
in tariffs, quantity-based mechanisms can be used to 
support RETs. Some countries introduced renewable 
energy quotas, where electricity consumers, suppliers 
or producers are obliged to source a certain percentage 
of their electricity from renewable energy. To increase 
efficiency, this system is often complemented by a 
green certificate scheme. Under ideal conditions, 
price-based and quantity-based mechanisms are 
equally efficient (Weitzman 1974). However, under 
imperfect real-world conditions, quota systems have 
had less impact (European Commission 2008; Butler / 
Neuhoff 2008). One reason may be that they provide 
less investment certainty. If there are few actors in 
the market, price fluctuations can be high. Once 
the quota has been reached or even exceeded, prices 
for renewable electricity decrease and threaten the 
profitability of projects. This results in additional risk, 
which is priced at a premium by the private sector and 
acts as an unnecessary obstacle to investment.
With their long-term, stable investment framework, 
feed-in tariffs seem to be among the most effective and 
efficient support measures available today. Designed 
carefully, they can at the same time contribute to 
lowering emissions, stabilising electricity supply and 
creating ‘green’ jobs at reasonable costs. However, the 
South African experience shows that often the devil is 
in the detail.
The South African feed-in tariff: From REFIT 
to REBID
When the South African feed-in tariff (REFIT) first 
emerged, the national energy regulator NERSA 
planned for rather low tariff rates subject to annual 
degression. Each technology was eligible for a different 
tariff, since the costs of electricity production differ 
in each case. The differentiated tariff system was to 
allow project developers to recover the full cost of their 
projects plus a reasonable return. However, developers 
did not see any scope for profitable projects on the 
basis of the low REFIT rates. Furthermore, with 
rates guaranteed for fifteen years, the time-span for 
investment planning was short compared to the capital 
life-spans of renewable energy investments of 25–30 
years assumed in NERSA’s initial calculation. 
NERSA then invited and received a number of 
comments on the REFIT from stakeholders and the 
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public in the form of submissions and public hearings. 
Renewable energy project developers and their 
associations used these forums to voice their concerns 
about the profitability of projects. After deliberations 
in early 2009, NERSA took the final decision on tariffs 
and contract length (see Table 1). The tariffs were 
raised considerably – wind energy support doubled, 
CSP support tripled – which was well received by 
investors and environmental organisations (Pegels 
2010). Furthermore, the period for which tariffs 
were guaranteed was extended from 15 to 20 years to 
enhance investment certainty. The South African feed-
in tariff thus had a very promising start.
However, despite the attractive rates, no projects have 
been implemented on the basis of the REFIT. This does 
not result from any lack of investor interest: according 
to the South African Wind Energy Association, wind 
project developers alone have invested about ZAR 400 
million (EUR 41 million) into the development of 
project proposals (Naidoo 2011). 
Instead, the uncertain regulatory environment has 
been the bottleneck. Since its introduction, the 
REFIT has experienced considerable implementation 
issues. Although tariff rates were set in 2009, project 
developers could not enter into contracts with Eskom, 
the single buyer determined by the government, as 
they had to wait for the issuing of standardised power 
purchase agreements. After two years of standstill, 
the South African energy regulator NERSA issued 
a consultation paper on a tariff review (NERSA 
2011). These reviews had initially been announced to 
take place on an annual basis for the first five years. 
Adjusted tariffs were to be applied only to new projects 
to safeguard investors’ long-term planning horizons 
(NERSA 2009a). However, tariffs remained unchanged 
in 2010 and thus continued to be the planning basis 
for project developers. The reductions proposed by 
NERSA in March 2011 were considerable and took 
project developers by surprise: some tariffs were cut by 
more than 40 per cent (see Table 1).
In addition to the size of the cuts, project-developers 
criticised the timing of the announcement, which 
prevented the imminent release of a request for 
proposals for the first 1025 MW of renewable 
energy projects. More than the reduction of expected 
profits, developers and investors deplored the loss of 
investment certainty and trust.
Table 1: 2009 versus 2011 REFIT rates
Source: NERSA 2011; NERSA 2009a; NERSA 2009b 
Technology 
 
 
REFIT 2009 
ZAR c/kWh 
(EUR c/kWh) 
REFIT 2011 
ZAR c/kWh 
 
Percentage change 
2011/2009 (%) 
 
Wind 125 (12.8) 93.8 -24.9 
Landfill gas 90 (9.2) 53.9 -40.1 
Small Hydro 94 (9.6) 67.1 -28.6 
CSP, trough with storage (6 hrs./day) 210 (21.5) 183.6 -12.6 
CSP, trough w/o storage 314 (32.2) 193.8 -38.8 
CSP tower with storage (6 hrs./day) 231 (23.7) 139.9 -39.4 
Large-scale grid connected PV (≥1 MW) 394 (40.4) 231.1 -41.3 
Biomass solid 118 (12.1) 106 -10.1 
Biogas 96 (9.8) 83.7 -12.9 
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Shortly thereafter, statements by the National Treasury 
questioning the legality of the REFIT policy itself 
intensified uncertainty. The comments were based 
on the legal requirements relating to public-sector 
procurement in South Africa: the Constitution of 
1996 states that organs of state need to purchase goods 
or services in a fair, equitable, transparent, competitive 
and cost-effective manner. Referring to the fixed 
tariffs, the National Treasury questioned REFIT’s 
competitiveness and cost-effectiveness. In July 2011, 
Energy Minister Dipuo Peters determined that price 
competition will indeed be part of the first renewable 
energy procurement round. Even though project-
developers remained hopeful, NERSA concurred 
with the inclusion of price competition into the 
procurement process shortly thereafter. 
In early August 2011, the Department of Energy 
eventually released details of the process, together with 
a request for proposals from renewable energy project-
developers. The subsequent selection process involves 
two sets of criteria. Qualification criteria include 
economic development, legal, land acquisition and 
use, environmental, financial and technical elements. 
Project-developers who pass all thresholds of the 
qualification are further assessed on the basis of two 
evaluation criteria, economic development and price, 
weighed 30 per cent and 70 per cent respectively. The 
submitted price needs to be below a given ceiling 
approximating to the 2009 REFIT rates. REFIT, as 
introduced in 2009, was then abandoned in favour of 
a competitive bidding process. 
In international comparison, bidding processes 
and quotas have a less positive track record than 
renewable energy feed-in tariffs. Several countries, 
such as Ireland, Italy and the United Kingdom, have 
abandoned or at least complemented their competitive 
bids with feed-in tariffs (Ecofys et al. 2009). South 
African policy-makers therefore opted for the less 
proven scheme. In addition, the opaque process and 
stepwise deterioration of purchasing conditions could 
have led to considerable confusion and a loss of trust 
among investors. Fortunately, the interest of project-
developers seems to have remained high. In the first two 
months after the release of the request for proposals, 
more than 300 project-developers representing 27 
GW of potential capacity expressed their interest in 
bidding (Creamer 2011c). However, policy-makers 
must avoid further confusion in the implementation 
of the support scheme. It is therefore conducive to 
analyse the underlying reasons for the cumbersome 
conversion from REFIT to REBID.
Why so cumbersome?
The South African REFIT process highlights some of 
the potential pitfalls in the effective support of RETs 
worldwide. Steering coal-based economies towards 
low-carbon development is an extremely complex task 
– and an unfamiliar one. Having focused on energy 
access for the past fifteen years, South Africa’s policy-
makers now have to add the requirements of low-carbon 
development to their considerations. At the same time, 
they cannot lose sight of the continuous developmental 
challenge. They share this challenge with numerous 
other developing countries, where issues other than 
climate change mitigation are more pressing and take 
precedence over renewable energy support – at least 
when this support involves additional costs. Some of 
the issues South Africa faces are highlighted below, 
followed by a discussion of the barriers to effective 
renewable energy policy implementation located in the 
economic and political economy spheres.
Differing social priorities
The issues prevalent in many developing countries that 
RETs might help to solve – such as a lack of electricity 
access, high unemployment rates and electricity 
demand exceeding supply – at the same time hinder 
renewable energy support policies. In areas where the 
extension of the national grid has long been promised, 
people may not accept renewable off-grid solutions. 
Some South African rural communities, for example, 
see electricity stand-alone systems as ‘second-class’ 
electricity (IEA 2010a). This narrows the potential 
support for renewable energy policies, which might 
be seen as a distraction from the core responsibilities 
of the state. High unemployment rates work in the 
same manner: voters reward policies they can directly 
connect to lower unemployment rates more than 
those they associate with environmental protection 
– or potentially even perceive as donor-driven. 
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Furthermore, the need for higher social spending 
due to unemployment lowers the scope of action 
in other policy fields. As electricity supply in South 
Africa can hardly keep up with demand, policy-makers 
tend to focus on bulk electricity generation rather 
than on decentralised, small-scale projects. However, 
most renewable energy projects are among the latter. 
The focus on centralised solutions implies specific 
technological pathways that may have contributed 
to the country being locked into emissions-intensive 
development. 
The economics of renewable energy 
technologies (RETs)
If RETs were price-competitive or even cheaper 
than fossil fuel-based technologies, they would be 
much easier to advocate in the face of the challenges 
noted above. However, in most cases they are not. As 
environmental costs are usually not reflected in the 
price of coal-based electricity, this form of energy is 
still comparatively cheap. Most RETs, in contrast, are 
still rather costly. Support schemes have to be financed 
either through higher taxes or higher consumer 
prices for electricity. The effects depend on the level 
of support, but also on the success of the scheme 
in promoting investment in RETs. The higher the 
amount of ‘green’ electricity supported, the stronger 
the impact on taxes or electricity prices. The German 
renewable energy law is estimated to have caused 
a price increase of about 12 per cent between 2002 
and 2006 (BMU, 2007, 13). This moderate increase 
may be due to the already comparatively high price 
of electricity in Germany. However, the situation may 
differ in South Africa, where electricity prices are low. 
In general, energy prices tend to be a very political 
issue in developing countries. Governments fear and 
can actually face social unrest when consumer prices 
increase rapidly. This was shown by widespread protests 
in Indonesia in 2008, caused by a steep rise in oil prices 
(Reuters 2008). While the steeply rising electricity 
prices in South Africa have not led to social unrest, 
they do attract public opposition, being perceived as 
a threat to the aims of economic growth and poverty 
reduction. The political success of South Africa’s ruling 
party, the African National Congress (ANC), is closely 
linked to and dependent on progress in reaching these 
aims (Pegels 2010). 
The lack of state capacity and power dynamics
In addition to the complexity of effective renewable 
energy support, many South African government 
departments lack implementing capacity and 
experience and struggle to recruit and retain qualified 
personnel.3  The effect of Broad Based Black Economic 
Empowerment (BBBEE) rules on the performance of 
government departments is still unclear. While these 
rules certainly have merit in restoring equality after 
the apartheid period, they also divert staff selection 
towards criteria other than expertise. This potentially 
has negative effects on overall performance, especially 
if employees are enticed by the private sector as soon as 
they have acquired relevant working experience. 
Furthermore, power dynamics seem to have played 
an important role in the conversion from REFIT to 
REBID. In general, policy-makers are embedded 
in a dense network of social ties that structure their 
interactions, with social and business actors but also 
in-between government bodies (Foresti et al. 2011). 
Some of those actors are more influential than others: 
as long as Eskom’s predominance in the South African 
electricity sector remains untouched, independent 
power producers (IPPs) will find it challenging to enter 
the market and supply significant amounts of clean 
energy. While attempts by the Department of Energy 
to liberalise the energy market in support of IPPs are 
underway, there is still no level playing field. At present, 
IPPs can sell their electricity only to the state-owned 
electricity supplier Eskom, who then distributes it to 
consumers. Being a competitor of IPPs and the single 
buyer of their electricity at the same time, Eskom 
clearly faces a conflict of interest. In his State of the 
Nation Address in early 2010, South African President 
Jacob Zuma therefore announced that an independent 
contractor would be established separately from Eskom. 
One year later, the Department of Energy published 
a draft bill for the establishment of an Independent 
Systems and Market Operator (ISMO), along with a 
request for comments. The passing of this bill may be 
an important step in limiting Eskom’s market power 
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and creating an enabling environment for renewable 
energy power-producers. The ISMO would be 
responsible for planning generation capacity, entering 
into power purchase agreements with generators, 
dispatching the power generated and coordinating the 
wholesale market for the generation of electricity. 
However, the process of transition from the current 
centralised system to a new and independent agency 
is not yet clear. Eskom favours an incremental process 
with various stages of independence, beginning with 
an entity ring-fenced within Eskom itself. Renewable 
energy project-developers, in contrast, see Eskom’s 
role as single buyer of renewable electricity as a major 
impediment to IPP activity and would prefer a fully 
independent entity to be established sooner rather 
than later (Creamer 2011b).
However, power struggles not only occur between 
the renewable and fossil-fuel industries, but also 
between government entities themselves. The fractured 
responsibilities in South African energy policy 
make the different actors prone to turf wars (Fakir 
2011). Conflicts of competence seem to involve the 
Department of Energy, other government departments 
and the energy regulator NERSA. In expert interviews 
conducted by the author in May 2011, several 
interviewees stated that NERSA may have stretched 
– if not overstretched – its mandate in determining 
the REFIT tariffs. This view was confirmed by the 
National Treasury (Creamer 2011a). Naturally, 
NERSA disagreed and even secured a confirmatory 
legal opinion on the matter. This did not, however, 
prevent the government from abandoning the REFIT 
scheme preferred by NERSA. Although drafted 
and introduced by NERSA, REFIT was altered and 
eventually abolished by the Department of Energy and, 
most notably, the National Treasury. The conflicting 
positions clearly indicate a lack of coordination among 
the departments and government entities involved 
(SAIIA 2008; Fakir 2011).
What can be learned?
South Africa is well endowed with renewable energy 
resources, especially solar energy. Tapping into this 
resource would help meet both the emissions and the 
energy supply challenge. In addition, the deployment 
of renewable energy can lead to considerable job 
creation – even if South Africa will most likely not 
be able to repeat the first-mover countries’ growth in 
‘green’ jobs. 
While rising electricity prices will improve the 
competitive position of RETs in the future, these 
technologies will still need support if they are to be 
deployed on a commercial, large-scale basis. This 
support is needed as soon as possible, since investment 
cycles are comparatively long in the energy sector. 
Investments in fossil fuel-powered stations undertaken 
today lock these technologies in for decades to come. 
The South African government has acknowledged 
this and consequently taken measures to support 
private investment in renewable energy and other 
clean technologies.
However, in spite of a high resource potential, there 
has so far been little progress in the deployment of 
renewables. As a main barrier, this paper identifies the 
instability of the required political support. Insecurity 
about the level of tariffs, delays in the issuing of 
power purchase agreements, conflicting messages 
from different government entities and the eventual 
reorganisation of the entire scheme resulted in a loss of 
investment security.
Rebuilding this security through stable policies will not 
be easy, as the underlying challenges are structural. First, 
the public pressure on South African policy-makers to 
safeguard issues other than the decarbonisation of the 
economy is high: electrification, unemployment and 
public infrastructure take priority. Secondly, RETs are 
not yet economically competitive with conventional 
energy technologies. This complicates their advocacy 
in the light of the social priorities mentioned above. 
Thirdly, while some South African policy-makers can 
show outstanding qualifications and performance, the 
technical capacity of many to manage the extremely 
complex energy transition efficiently is low. This 
lack of expertise is often compensated for by advice 
from energy experts based in fossil fuel companies. 
Their main interest is, of course, not in RETs. Power 
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struggles and a lack of coordination between the 
political proponents of RETs further exacerbate 
the situation.
However, the recent decision for a competitive bidding 
process may mark the beginning of a more stable 
system of support for RETs. The National Treasury, 
one of the most powerful and capable South African 
government departments, is backing the scheme. Even 
though competitive bidding does not have as positive 
an international track record as feed-in tariffs, it may 
provide a starting point. South African policy-makers 
may address the above-mentioned structural challenges 
and strengthen the impact of the newly established 
process by
• informing the public about climate change and 
the need for a low-carbon energy transition, 
thereby building public support. In parallel, they 
may stress the positive side effects of RETs, such 
as reduced air pollution, rural electrification 
and job creation. 
• making use of international mechanisms to build 
political momentum, such as those established 
under bi- and multilateral development 
cooperation or the United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change. Many of the 
barriers to renewable energy deployment, such 
as the additional financial burden on consumers 
caused by feed-in tariffs, high investment costs 
for grid extensions, the need for additional 
education and research, and risk cover for 
early-stage technologies, can be overcome with 
external funding and technological assistance. 
The upcoming climate-change negotiations in 
Durban may provide an excellent opportunity 
to advance respective support mechanisms on a 
multilateral level. Additional opportunities exist 
on bilateral levels.
• forming clean energy coalitions with powerful 
groups in the society. In South Africa, energy-
intensive firms may not support RETs for 
environmental reasons alone, but they may 
be willing to pay price premiums for quickly 
installable electricity generation to secure 
supply. Compared to fossil fuel-based bulk 
generation, decentralised and small renewable 
energy solutions have a competitive advantage 
in this area. 
• communicating support rules as early and as 
clearly as possible. Any later adjustments to 
the rules must be predictable if investment 
certainty is to be maintained. This also means 
that rules have to be negotiated and coordinated 
internally (i.e., within and between government 
bodies) before they are communicated to the 
outside world, thereby avoiding conflicting 
messages. Coordination can be enhanced by the 
establishment of inter-ministerial groups with 
oversight authority, such as the South African 
Inter-Ministerial Committee on Energy. 
These groups, however, require the necessary 
training to build up the expertise needed for 
effective oversight.
• supporting established energy suppliers, such 
as Sasol and Eskom, in their discovery of RETs 
as a new business field. As Eskom’s single 
shareholder, the government should exert its 
influence towards the use of cleaner and non-
finite sources of energy. The capacity and 
expertise in RETs built up in these companies 
can be drawn upon when policy advice is 
needed. This may help to balance the current 
bias towards fossil fuels. 
• strengthening the position and capacity of 
independent power producers (IPPs). As long 
as Eskom’s predominance in the electricity 
sector remains untouched, IPPs will find it 
challenging to enter the market and supply 
significant amounts of clean energy. The 
planned outsourcing of the Single Buyer’s 
Office from Eskom to an independent entity 
is an important step, and the implementation 
strategy should be clarified as soon as possible.  
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Endnotes
1. The international dollar is a hypothetical unit of currency that has 
the same purchasing power as the US dollar at a given point in 
time. The benchmark year used by the World Resources Institute 
(2010) is 2005.
2. Personal interview with a South African wind-energy project-
developer, May 2011.
3. Personal interviews with a South African policy think-tank, an 
NGO and a representative of academia, May 2011.

Biogas from household biodigesters is not only used for cooking, but also for lamps in Cambodia 
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Promotion of renewable energy in 
Latin America: Policy and lessons
Judith A. Cherni
Imperial College, London
Abstract
While historical contributions to greenhouse gas 
emissions (GHG) from Latin America have been 
minor in comparison with those of other areas around 
the globe, all the major countries have introduced or 
revised existing laws, regulations and incentives in 
order to contribute to international mitigation efforts. 
In particular, governments in Latin America have 
promoted legal frameworks, market incentives and 
other options to increase the rates of renewable energy 
penetration in the national energy mix through price 
or demand certainty. By comparison with fossil fuels, 
a singular benefit of renewable energy is that it can 
reduce GHG emissions to zero during the generation 
phase. Against the backdrop of international 
investment in the region, the article analyses the main 
renewable energy policies of Latin American countries, 
indicates the extent to which different policies have 
been introduced and where, seeks to draw some lessons 
from their experience and notes the nevertheless 
limited expansion of renewable energy in the region. 
Together with national targets for future share of 
energy from renewable sources, price and quantity-
driven regulatory frameworks have focussed primarily 
on feed-in tariffs, quotas and competitive bidding, 
instruments analysed in this article. The article 
also stresses that, while emissions reductions are an 
important objective of the promotion of renewables in 
Latin America, developing positive market conditions 
for independent energy producers, addressing the 
regional shortfall in energy supply and tackling the 
problem of poor rural populations without energy all 
determine the character of renewable energy policy in 
Latin America. The cases of Argentina, Brazil and Peru 
are discussed in particular.
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Introduction
Since the 1990s, many developing countries have 
deregulated electricity markets and embraced 
privatisation. In this context, governments also 
sanctioned policies to reduce GHG emissions in their 
own energy systems. All the major South American 
and Caribbean countries (collectively referred to here 
as Latin America) have introduced or revised existing 
laws, regulations and incentives to stimulate the use 
of alternative sources of energy and attract investment 
to enhance the penetration rates of renewable energy 
technology and increase the energy efficiency of their 
domestic energy mix. Market and other stimuli have 
been devised to increase price or demand certainty 
through instruments such as renewable quotas, feed-
in tariff schemes, tendering, fiscal incentives and 
dedicated auctions. While this article explains crucial 
liberalisation policies and investment trends for the 
region, it focuses on national energy policies, regulation 
and economic and fiscal incentives in Latin America 
(LA) that promote the uptake of renewable energy 
technologies – small hydro, wind, solar, biomass waste 
and biogas.
By promoting renewable energy, LA governments 
have demonstrated considerable enthusiasm for 
joining international efforts to tackle climate change 
in the light of the forecast rise in both regional 
energy demand and GHG emissions. It is predicted 
that by 2030 lower-income non-OECD countries 
will be showing the strongest per annum increases in 
electricity demand, almost four times greater than that 
of the OECD countries, as they expand their power 
grids to support economic growth (EIA, 2008; World 
Bank, 2009). According to these predictions, energy 
demand in developing countries will double over the 
next two to three decades, primarily due to economic 
activity, electricity generation, intensification of land 
use and motorisation. Energy-related global GHG 
emissions, mainly from fossil fuel combustion, are 
projected to rise by over 50 percent by 2030 (IPCC 
SRES, 2000). However, historically, the contributions 
to GHG emissions from LA have been minor in 
comparison with those of other regions. For example, 
in Argentina and Peru, a large proportion of electricity 
generation comes from hydro and natural gas, so that 
their baseline emissions factor is relatively low.
Yet, increasing access to energy is crucial for 
economic growth in order to reduce poverty, promote 
specialisation and labour productivity, and build 
infrastructure in the LA region. To the extent that fossil 
fuel continues to be the main energy source, this would 
add significant GHG to the atmosphere. In order to 
mitigate emissions, the IPCC stresses the urgency 
of developing targeted economic and regulatory 
initiatives and appropriate energy technology 
(IPCC, 2007). 
Arguably, the most important benefit of renewable 
energy is that, by comparison with fossil fuels, 
it dramatically reduces GHG to zero during the 
generation phase (IPCC, 2007, p. 13). However, the 
purpose of introducing renewable energy regulation 
in LA has also been to develop market conditions for 
independent energy producers, as well as to address 
other energy-related problems of the region, especially 
shortages of energy supply, the fact that 26% of the 
rural population are without access to energy (WEO, 
2002, 2010). In fact, renewable energy can make a 
notable contribution not only to emissions reductions, 
but also to ensuring energy independence and security 
and promoting rural electrification (REN21, 2011; 
Cherni, 2008; Ghosh et al., 2002; Anderson et al., 
1999; Karekezi and Ranja, 1997). Recognition of 
such attributes has shifted renewable energy from 
the fringe to the mainstream of not only sustainable 
development technologies in both the developed and 
developing worlds (Martinot et al., 2002), but also of 
energy policy in LA.
Discussion of policies for the promotion of renewable 
energy in connection with climate change mitigation 
in LA must therefore refer to the pervasive impact of 
market reforms on the strategy for the energy sector, 
regional energy security, and equitable and affordable 
energy access. In this analytical context, and making 
reference to figures that point to the still minor 
deployment of renewable energy in the region, this 
article analyses the legal and regulatory frameworks that 
have been designed by governments in LA to promote 
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the adoption of renewable energy technology and asks 
how they relate to the above issues. The experiences 
of three countries in particular are analysed, namely 
Argentina, Brazil and Peru.
Reform policies and investment trends in 
renewable energy in LA
The electricity market has been at the centre of many 
energy reform programmes (MacKerron, 2000), 
including those undertaken in Latin America. Indeed, 
in a few countries in LA privatisation was expected 
to provide the resources for the replacement of a 
decaying state infrastructure and to increase access to 
energy. Yet, the contribution of wind, small hydro, 
geo-thermal and solar technologies remains marginal, 
and electricity generation from renewable sources is 
highly uneven across sub-regions.
The structural reforms implemented in most LA 
countries have created a new environment for public 
policies, with remarkable effects on energy policy and 
the choice of instruments for promoting renewable 
energy (Bouille, 2010). Although this article does not 
aim to analyse the impact of economic restructuring 
on the expansion of renewable energy in the region, it 
should be noted that liberalisation policies have been 
widespread and significant for the region. In fact, of 
all developing regions that had implemented energy 
market reforms by the late 1990s, privatisation of 
power distribution assets was greatest in LA (44%), 
regions where corporate restructuring was also 
significantly more advanced (72%) (Bacon, 1999). 
Under the neo-liberal reforms of the 1990s, where 
possible management and investment were provided 
by the private sector, with the state confining itself to 
the regulation of the market. 
For national governments and rural populations in 
particular, a considerable hope had been that electricity 
market reform would also finance and deliver the 
extension of transmission and distribution networks 
to provide greater access to electricity (Cherni and 
Preston, 2007). However, uncertainties and fears 
emerged concerning the likelihood of renewable energy 
technologies expanding – many of which could be 
used precisely to increase both access to electricity and 
power supply in LA – under the new schemes which 
reduced R&D expenditures and tax credits (Rickerson 
and Grace, 2007, in Mendonça, 2010). As a response 
to the introduction of electricity restructuring, and 
since renewable energy sources were not competitive 
within a market that did not include the full social 
and environmental costs of fossil electricity, in the 
mid-1990s the US and EU agreed that additional 
policies were required to promote their positive 
benefits. The Renewable Portfolio Standards (RPS; 
also called, e.g., Renewables Obligations, Renewable 
Purchase Obligations or RPO, and Mandatory 
Renewable Energy Targets) were then developed to set 
quotas to force suppliers to utilise renewable energy 
resources. RPS has been implemented in at least 49 
countries worldwide, including Chile and Uruguay 
in LA. 
As a result of reforms, the development and deployment 
of renewable energy are expected to be largely financed 
by the private sector (Wagner, 2010; Stern, 2007). Off-
grid electrification comprised almost 10 percent of the 
total assistance to electrification provided by the World 
Bank in 2003-2005, a proportion that is expected 
to grow along with progress to universal access, as 
remaining populations will be harder to connect using 
conventional grid extension arrangements (ESMAP, 
2007). However, the considerable investment in 
renewable energy in LA in the mid-2000s was 
sporadically interrupted: while global financial 
investment in renewable energy was higher than ever 
during 2008-9, most of Latin America (and a large 
part of Africa) attracted little investment during that 
period (UNEP, 2010; DB, 2009). In 2010, regional 
investment trends again favoured LA, an indication of 
some encouraging government regulatory frameworks, 
as well as an acknowledgement of the availability of 
appropriate natural resources for generating energy. 
In 2010 alone, LA, excluding Brazil, saw the biggest 
absolute increase in renewable energy investment 
in the developing world (Africa achieved the largest 
percentage increase, after China, India and Brazil; 
investment increased significantly in Argentina, 
Mexico and Chile; for details of investment growth, 
see REN21, 2011). After China, Brazil has led the 
renewable energy market in developing countries 
(Science Daily, 2009).
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Notwithstanding the increase in regional investment 
in LA, the contribution of renewable energy to total 
energy generation stands at less than 20% (IEA, 
2008): 19.1% mainly from sugarcane waste and 
biomass geothermal energy, and 0.5% from small 
hydro, solar and wind. While the contribution of large 
hydro plants to electricity generation in the region is 
relatively large at 10.6%, LA’s primary energy supply 
relies heavily on fossil fuels (40.7% oil, and 20% gas; 
ibid., 2008). Therefore, in the context of liberalisation, 
the government still has the crucial role of providing 
a stable framework of incentives and establishing 
policies that stimulate changes in energy provision 
(IPCC, 2011; Stern, 2007 p 409). Although there is 
no one-size-fits-all policy, the existence of an enabling 
policy environment could facilitate the deployment 
of renewable energy and the evolution to low-cost 
applications (IPCC, 2011). Policy frameworks that 
are transparent and sustained in order to reduce risks 
and that enable attractive returns over a relevant 
investment facilitate the deployment of technology. In 
LA, the promotion of renewable energy technologies 
has been undertaken centrally by governments, with 
the tendency being towards regulation, although 
countries’ experiences differ markedly. 
By 2010, renewable energy support policies continued 
to be a driving force behind the increasing shares of 
renewable energy globally, despite setbacks due to the 
lack of long-term policy certainty (REN21, 2011). In 
LA, policies to promote renewable energy have mostly 
mirrored practices elsewhere, with a considerable 
number of governments having endorsed a wide range 
of regulatory instruments.
Policy and regulatory instruments to 
promote renewable energy
Most of the countries producing the largest amounts 
of renewable energy have pursued proactive policies 
to promote renewable energy technologies (REN21, 
2011). For both emissions-mitigation and energy-
security reasons, many industrialised and developing 
countries have introduced and increased subsidy 
schemes for the production of electricity, heat and 
transport fuels based on renewable energy sources 
(IPCC, 2007). Many countries, including in LA, have 
also set up regulations, quantitative targets, and various 
important energy schemes. Regulatory measures are 
particularly important because in almost every Latin 
American country with low rural electrification rates 
there is a large potential for renewable energy.
Although the main motivation for investing in 
renewable energy is its contribution to both sustainable 
development and climate change mitigation, these 
technologies still do not tend to provide the most 
economically viable option for electricity generation, 
despite their desirable non-market benefits (see, e.g., 
Valverde et al., 2010; Karekezi and Kithyoma, 2003; 
Martinot et al., 2002). Since they are particularly 
capital-intensive, financial issues can be a huge 
barrier to renewable energy development. Moreover, 
in general electricity liberalisation policies have done 
little to emphasise the potential strategic contribution 
of renewable technologies. Therefore, national 
policies in LA have been crucial in promoting a more 
substantial deployment of renewable energy in the 
region. For example, the regulation of feed-in tariff 
schemes in particular has been designed to reduce the 
above difficulties. Policy targets for various penetration 
levels of renewable energy as part of future energy 
supplies continue to proliferate. Targets to increase the 
share of renewable sources in the energy mix now exist 
in at least 98 countries, more than half of which are 
developing countries (REN21, 2011). To foster and 
facilitate the use of renewables in LA, the majority of 
countries have deployed some form of legal framework, 
adopted quantitative targets, or introduced regulatory 
instruments and a variety of supporting schemes. 
The stage of development of renewable energy policy 
frameworks varies considerably among countries 
in LA, though, in addition to Argentina, Brazil and 
Peru, most other Latin American countries have 
implemented some sort of legal initiative (see Annex 
I in Bouille, 2009).
Four main types of regulatory generation-based policies 
have been used in LA to increase the share of renewable 
energy in the electricity grid: i) feed-in tariffs; ii) 
quotas; iii) competitive bidding; and iv) green energy 
tradable certificates. This article looks specifically at 
how feed-in tariffs, quotas and competitive bidding 
have developed in the region.
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Feed-in tariff (i) and quotas (ii) are price-driven 
regulatory instruments which, instead of establishing 
a target, offer financial assistance per unit of electricity 
or capacity for the generation of renewable energy. The 
schemes accompanying these instruments either pay a 
predetermined price per unit of production (feed-in 
tariffs) and do not depend on the cost of production, 
or else they pay as quota, in which case the market 
price of electricity increases by the premium set. 
Competitive bidding (iii) and green energy tradable 
certificates (iv) are regulatory instruments whereby the 
relevant authority specifies the amount of renewable 
energy to be generated from particular renewable 
energy technologies by a determined date. Quantitative 
regulation ensures market share through government-
mandated targets or quotas. Following calls for tenders 
and a selection process, designated bidders sign 
contracts with the government for a set period and 
have a guaranteed tariff. Green tradable certificates 
(iv) are a scheme to complement tenders that require 
renewable energy in their mix, allowing the parties 
(generators, utilities retailers and renewable energy 
producers) to trade at market prices and exchange 
certificates in order to comply with the contracts (IEA, 
2010c; Bouille, 2009).
At least eight countries in Latin America have 
introduced feed-in tariffs (Argentina, Brazil, Chile, 
Ecuador, Honduras, Nicaragua, Peru and Panama), 
two employ quotas (Chile, Uruguay), and one (Brazil) 
employs a tradable green certificates system. To achieve 
their quota targets (see below), Argentina and Brazil use 
a combination of feed-in tariffs with long-term (15 or 
20 years) tendering systems, complemented by price-
driven instruments such as tax relief and investment 
incentives. Finally, Colombia, Guatemala, El Salvador, 
Mexico and the Dominican Republic have introduced 
legislation to provide fiscal and economic incentives to 
increase the deployment of renewable energy in their 
national energy mix (Bouille, 2009).
Of all the policies employed by governments globally 
to promote renewable energy, feed-in tariffs (also called 
premium payments, advanced renewable tariffs and 
minimum price standards) remain the most common 
(REN21, 2011). Advocates of feed-in tariffs argue that, 
while most other support mechanisms for renewable 
energy require very high levels of regulation and steps 
towards the liberalisation of energy markets, feed-in 
tariffs can play an important role, as they are simple in 
design and easily adaptable to all sorts of energy market 
frameworks (e.g., Mendonça et al., 2010). Also, the 
IPCC (2007) emphasises that incentives to support 
‘green power’ by rewarding performance, such as feed-
in tariffs, are preferable to a capital investment grant 
because they encourage market deployment while 
simultaneously promoting increases in production. 
The price-driven feed-in tariff scheme has been 
implemented in more than 57 countries, 26 of which 
are developing (Global Feed-In Tariffs, 2010). Tariffs 
are normally calculated to offer a 5-8 percent return 
on initial investment, which, with adjustments for 
inflation, could rise to 7-10 percent. At the household 
level, the incentive also states that any income derived 
from residential renewable electricity will not be 
taxable (for a detailed explanation of feed-in tariffs, see 
the article by J. Haselip in this collection). 
In contrast to the vast literature and avid debate on 
the European and US experience with regulatory 
instruments to promote renewable energy uptake to 
increase the latter’s share in the energy mix (particularly 
with feed-in tariffs), the LA experience with the same 
type of policies has received less scrutiny. Lessons from 
policy frameworks that promote renewable energy 
have only recently started to emerge, and therefore an 
examination of the experiences of certain countries is 
useful in order to learn more about their procedures, 
difficulties and achievements.
Promotion of renewable energy in 
Argentina, Brazil and Peru
This section analyses the introduction of specific policy 
instruments, particularly, but not only, feed-in tariffs, 
in three LA countries, namely Argentina, Brazil and 
Peru. Argentina and Brazil have set the same, relatively 
high mandatory quota share of 8% by 2010 and 10% 
by 2029 of total electricity generated from renewable 
sources; the target in Peru is lower, at 5% by 2014. The 
design and effectiveness may vary widely among these 
countries, as does the stage of implementation (in many 
countries there have been implementation difficulties, 
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such as lack of finance, grid infrastructure and/or 
regulatory framework for full policy implementation), 
but significant similarities also exist. 
Argentina
One factor that has impacted on the structure of the 
renewable energy sector in Argentina is the tendency 
of the privatised energy companies to operate within 
the urban and industrial sectors while ignoring the 
rural areas, particularly where electricity access was 
significantly deficient, which in 1994 prompted 
the Argentine government to introduce PAEPRA 
(Programme for the Provision of Electricity for the 
Rural Population of Argentina), a fee-for-service plan 
to supply the rural population of the country with 
electricity (Dubash, 2002). In 1999, the Argentine 
government and the World Bank launched the 
competitive bidding and concession project PERMER 
(Renewable Energy Project for Rural Electricity 
Markets) with the objective of reinvigorating the 
original PAEPRA.
A further element that has had an effect on the 
furthering of renewable energy in Argentina has been 
the increasing role of natural gas. The 1991 privatisation 
policy adopted in the electricity sector provided for 
the current energy generation mix to be determined 
by liberalised market competition (Haselip and Potter, 
2010). Since Argentina has the third largest reserves of 
natural gas in Latin America, as the cheapest option 
for electricity production, 46 percent of total power 
produced in 2003 came from natural gas (EIA, 2006). 
Renewable technologies, on the other hand, make up 
a very small part of national electricity generation in 
the country. Therefore, the availability of substantial 
amounts of natural gas and hydropower in Argentina 
makes other grid-connected sources uncompetitive.
In line with its comprehensive energy market reforms, 
Argentina has taken a lead in making strong statements 
about tackling climate change. It was one of the first 
developing countries to ratify the Kyoto Protocol and, 
in 1999, was the first to establish a voluntary target 
under the UNFCCC. The aim was to reduce GHG 
emissions to between 2% and 10% below the projected 
baseline emissions for 2012 (Bouille et al., 2000). 
While there has been little monitoring of whether the 
country is on course to reach its target and no road map 
showing how this is to be achieved (ibid.), progress has 
been made, at least in producing relevant policies. The 
Argentine government introduced two main regulatory 
instruments to promote renewable energy: competitive 
bidding, and feed-in tariff schemes.
Competitive bidding and concessions quota. The 
increase in rural electrification using renewable 
technology and simple off-grid systems was part 
of the PERMER initiative (Kaufman, 2000). The 
first phase of PERMER took place between 1994 
and 2005 but was extended to 2008; in 2009 it was 
further prolonged into Phase 2 until 2011. PERMER 
aimed at the promotion of private investment and 
concessions together with government subsidies that 
would cover most of the initial costs. The innovation 
in the Argentine model of competitive bidding relates 
to the award of concessions to independent power 
producers that require the lowest subsidy to electrify 
regions; successful firms are also expected to provide 
electricity services through renewable technology to 
rural areas. The quantity or quota of renewable energy 
supply is stipulated in the bid (e.g., number of solar 
panels installed in households schools and public 
service buildings). The PERMER was financed by a 
World Bank loan, a donation from GEF, the Argentine 
Electricity Development Fund, the Concessionaires 
and customers themselves (World Bank, 1999). In 
other words, by absorbing major costs in the initial 
stages, PERMER paid subsidies for the installation of 
PV as an incentive for users and tendered for private 
investment. To qualify for these loans and grants 
from the international banks, however, the bottom 
line package of policies designed by the Washington 
Consensus had to be implemented by the hosting 
authority. Provincial electricity sectors must therefore 
comply with a certain level of deregulation and 
privatisation as a precondition for participating in 
PERMER. The customer tariff is set by the provincial 
government every two years and, with the return on 
investment for concessionaires anticipated at 14%, this 
is what makes investment relatively attractive (Alazraki 
and Haselip, 2007).
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Feed-in Tariff scheme. Argentina now has in place 
a system that facilitates the uptake of renewable 
energy into the national grid (Procopper, 2010). In 
Argentina, feed-in tariffs for supporting the generation 
of renewable energy, particularly electricity from wind 
and solar resources, started with Law No. 25.019 of 
1998 (IEA, 2010a). Where the electricity generated 
through these renewable sources was sold to the 
Argentine national grid or used for public services, the 
law pledged, for the first time, to pay a premium to 
independent power producers on top of the market 
price at the time of sale. This amounted to EUR 0.23/
kWh for wind energy and was secured for fifteen years. 
The same law also provided tax incentives in the form 
of delayed remittances of value-added tax for fifteen 
years (Davies, 2006).
However, Law 25.019 was too narrow, first because 
it applied only to wind and solar energy, and other 
renewable technologies did not qualify for any of 
the benefits. Secondly, it was introduced in 1998 at 
a time when the Argentine currency stood at around 
three times its current value: since the 2002 Argentina 
currency devaluation, the value of the subsidy has been 
considerably reduced (IEA, 2010b). As a result, the 1998 
national law no longer offered sufficient incentives and 
was accordingly superseded by Law 26.190, Promotion 
of Renewable Sources of Energy for Electricity 
Production, passed on 6 December 2006. The new 
Law includes financial incentives in terms of deferred 
tax payments and defines feed-in tariff premiums, but 
for a larger range of renewable technologies and with an 
entitlement period of fifteen years. The updated tariff 
for energy from photovoltaic systems is EUR 0.22/
kWh and EUR 0.37/kWh if electricity is generated 
through wind technology. For all other sources with a 
generating capacity of up to 30 MW (i.e., geothermal, 
tidal, biomass, biogas and small-scale hydropower), the 
feed-in-tariff paid by the Argentine government is EUR 
0.37/kWh (EIA, 2010b). Feed-in tariffs in Argentina 
are paid in local currency rather than in US dollars or 
EUR (as is paid in Ecuador, Nicaragua and Honduras 
and in other developing countries, e.g., Tanzania and 
Thailand) (DB, 2010).
Finally, the Argentine government launched the 
GENREN Programme (Generación por Energías 
Renovables), another initiative to promote public-
private investment in renewable energy. The state 
electricity company ENARSA (Argentine Energy, 
PLC, of the National Secretary of Energy) launched 
GENREN in 2009 in order to tackle the shortfall in 
energy supply, deal with organic waste (e.g., bagasse in 
the provinces of Tucumán and sawdust in Corrientes), 
reduce GHG emissions and increase electricity access to 
rural areas (Río Negro, 2009). The initiative attracted 
unexpected interest from national and international 
investors, and before the end of 2009 more than half of 
the projects (49 in total) had been sold (Renou, 2009). 
It is predicted that, due to the low generation power of 
each individual project, the GENEREN scheme will 
have an impact on both remote rural populations and 
people with low-energy demand.
Brazil
Brazil has adopted a quota system, feed-in tariffs, 
guaranteed sale and state financing. However, progress 
in incorporating renewable forms of energy into the 
national grid has been slower than planned, and their 
relative contribution to the energy mix is still low 
(Bouille, 2009).
Brazil is among the biggest producers of electricity 
from renewable sources in the developing world. In 
2009, it was the second largest producer of hydro-
electricity, including large hydro plants, after China 
(ObservEr, 2010), and in 2003 it accounted for 31% 
of the total generated by developing countries (IEA, 
2003). Early in the 1990s, the national Electric Energy 
Regulating Authority (ANEEL) introduced policies to 
stimulate renewable sources, including allowing free 
access to the grid, reducing bureaucracy and extending 
benefits previously available only for power generation 
from conventional fuels. For example, Law 9648/98 
extended the existing subsidies for diesel generation 
in isolated communities in the north of Brazil to 
renewable technologies (Goldemberg et al, 2005). In 
1994, Brazil promoted off-grid electrification of villages 
through the Program for Energy Development in State 
and Municipalities (PRODEEM). In November 2003, 
the government launched the federal Luz para todos 
(Light for Everyone) programme aimed at providing 
electricity generated from renewable sources. 
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The programme for Alternative Electric Generation 
Sources (PROINFA) was initiated in 2002 and 
established a target of 10% of power to be produced 
from wind, small-scale hydro and biomass within 
twenty years. PROINFA also sets prices for purchasing 
electricity generated using different sources of renewable 
energy (Goldemberg et al., 2005). PROINFA is 
funded by end-users through an increase in energy 
bills (exemptions exist for low-income households). 
Through competitive bidding, the national electricity 
firm Electrobras enters into twenty-year contracts 
with renewable energy generators, sets prices for 
purchasing electricity generated using different sources 
of renewable energy (ibid.) and buys, in local currency, 
energy from the green energy producers at pre-set 
preferential prices (feed-in tariff premiums), which 
are adjusted according to a market index. Electrobras 
guarantees a minimum income, and the Brazilian 
National Development Bank enables financing of up 
to 80% of capital for eligible projects (Boiulle, 2009). 
Peru
Like Argentina, the availability of cheaper natural 
gas in Peru has inevitably interfered with a more 
significant increase in renewable energy technologies 
in the country. Peru has the sixth largest natural gas 
reserves in the region, most of which are located in the 
Camisea area in the Amazon. While nowhere near the 
level of some of the region’s energy powerhouses, Peru’s 
natural gas has nonetheless been a spur to its economy 
(Spencer, 2009, 2010). Apart from renewable energy 
legislation, the Peruvian government has introduced 
comprehensive feed-in tariffs.
The Peruvian government has promoted renewable 
energy through a quota system, feed-in tariffs and 
preferential premiums. The Rural Electrification 
Law (REL) of 2002 was intended to provide energy 
solutions to rural and remote areas and recognised 
the need to access alternative sources of electricity in 
order to reach isolated locations (MEM, 2002). That 
renewable energy could play an increasing role in the 
future of the Peruvian electricity market was then little 
more than an aspiration; no specific commitment 
or plan had been formulated in 2002 (Cherni and 
Preston, 2007). 
The REL reflected the government’s decision to 
address some of the market failures ingrained in Peru’s 
electricity reforms, such as the large percentage of 
unmet energy demand of the rural population and 
the environmental consequences of increasing GHG 
emissions (Olivas, 2010). However, the failure of the 
REL to deliver significant improvements in rural access 
to electricity has created a pressing need to implement 
alternative ways of supplying electricity (ibid.). The 
2008 Renewable Energy Investment Promotion Law 
(REIPL, Decree No. 1.002) envisages that 5 percent 
of national electric energy demand will be met by non-
conventional renewable energy sources under 20 MW, 
such as wind, solar, geothermal and small hydro plants, 
between 2008-2013, totalling approximately 250 
MW of installed capacity (68 percent of Peru’s current 
energy mix comes from oil and gas).
Between August 2009 and February 2010, under the 
2008 REIPL law, the Peruvian government’s Energy 
and Mining Regulator (OSINERGMIN) held its 
first auction for licences to build 200 MW of energy 
generation through solar, wind and biomass provision, 
and a further 300 MW for mini-hydro to supply the 
national grid (UKTI, 2010; Olivas, 2010). The licence 
lasts for twenty years, and construction by the winning 
independent power producers is now underway. Total 
expected investment is around US$ 1 billion for the 
construction of three wind, four solar, two biomass 
and seventeen micro-hydro plants in the country’s 
interior (Portillo, 2010). By 2012, it is expected that 
the 26 energy projects will be operational and generate 
411.7 MW (UKTI, 2010). Under the 2008 REIPL, 
the Regulator is legally committed to hold a round of 
auctions for 500 MW of renewable energy generation 
every two years.
In addition, the government paid feed-in tariffs to 
auction winners. In the first auction the payments 
were US$ 0.087/kWh for wind energy, US$ 0.0225/
kWh for solar technology, US$ 0.0635/kWh for 
energy generated through biomass and US$ 0.06/kWh 
for hydroelectricity (Global Feed-in Tariffs, 2010) 
(NB: prices were significantly lower than the tariffs 
paid in Argentina). The first auction was considered 
a great success by investors in particular, given the 
certainty that the regulation provides for future cash 
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flows for any given project. However, while the quota 
for generating energy from water and wind sources 
was achieved, the auction did not attracted bidders for 
solar or biomass sources. Therefore, the objective of 
the second round of auctions was to construct 8 MW 
of solar and 419 MW of biomass generation capacity, 
but due to the low tariffs set by OSINERGMIN, 
only three companies were awarded licenses. Due to 
the extremely low prices set by OSINERGMIN, the 
second auction was unsuccessful, with only three 
companies being awarded licences (two mini-hydro 
plants and a biomass project; UKTI, 2010). 
A further development in relation to feed-in tariffs 
in Peru is the introduction of additional concessions 
in order to encourage investment for the further 
generation of electricity from renewable energy. The 
Peruvian government has not only guaranteed it will 
purchase from power plants using renewable energy, 
it has also set premiums on top of electricity tariffs 
to guarantee at least 12% profit to renewable energy 
producers (Boiulle, 2009).
The LA experience of policies to promote 
renewable energy: Reflections and lessons
LA countries have introduced both price- and 
quantity-driven regulations, including feed-in tariffs, 
quotas and competitive bidding. Governments have 
designed some unique combinations of competitive 
bidding, provided concessions and set premiums to 
increase the deployment of renewable energy in rural 
areas. The social component of part of the renewable 
energy policy in LA has also been notable. So far, the 
lessons to be drawn from LA are mixed, with some 
pointing to disappointments and difficulties, while 
others show some degree of success. 
In LA, governments had two main reasons to launch 
feed-in tariffs, quotas and competitive bidding price- 
and quantity-driven regulations, i.e., to expand the use 
of renewable energy technology in their countries, and 
to engage the private sector by offering a range of state 
subsidies, such as facilities, exemptions and premiums, 
to invest in renewable energy generation. Interestingly, 
some of the motivations that Latin American countries 
have shown in promoting renewable energy have been 
absent from similar policies in developed countries. 
Developed economies have introduced renewable 
energy policies in order to help achieve legally 
binding targets for reducing CO2 emissions (e.g., in 
Europe, the UK has a 15 percent target to generate 
total energy from renewable sources by 2020, and 
Germany has the more aggressive goal of 30 percent). 
Developing countries, on the other hand, have not 
only introduced or outdone previous legislation to 
promote renewable energy in order to to contribute 
to global GHG reductions and appeal to the private 
market. Renewable energy promotion policy has also 
been aimed to tackle the predicament over rural energy 
access, i.e., populations that remained cut off from the 
main national electricity distribution grid, were very 
poor and had low and irregular electricity demand. 
Whereas electrification levels in LA are among the 
highest in the developing world (93%), electrification 
in rural areas remains significantly lower. Competitive 
bidding and concessions for implementing renewable 
energy policy have been aimed partly at tackling the 
fact that electricity liberalisation policies favoured 
improving services to the urban market (which has a 
98.8% electrification connection rate) and overlooked 
rural areas (with 74% connection levels) (data from 
WEO, 2010). Indeed, the PERMER in Argentina was 
the first rural electrification concession project world-
wide. It was first implemented in the northern province 
of Jujuy, but has since expanded to remote rural areas in 
other provinces. By 1999, it had successfully supplied 
556 rural households and 43 schools with single PV 
SHS of different sizes (no data are yet available for 
the second phase). In total, PERMER has enabled 
electricity access to more than 10,000 households and 
1,800 rural schools and other public buildings. The 
programme aims to reach a further 18,000 homes 
(Best, 2011).
The engagement of the private sector, combined with 
public subsidies and regulated tariffs, was apparently 
more successful than the Peruvian approach at 
overcoming the lack of funds by the Argentine 
government to provide off-grid services to the rural 
poor. A key problem with such an approach, however, 
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is attracting a sufficient number of bidders to make 
the process competitive. In addition, there have been 
sufficient institutional and capacity barriers, particularly 
in provincial governments, to delay progress due 
to resource and staff capacity restraints, regulatory 
weaknesses and insufficient political interest among 
rural populations (Best, 2011, p. 12). 
Moreover, under PERMER, the cost to users of the 
connection and tariff has been subsidised to the tune of 
about 90% through subsidies paid to the concession-
holding energy company by the Government of 
Argentina. The payable 10% represents an onerous 
amount and, due to the market reform nature of the 
PERMER, the planned reduction of subsidies over 
time will likely be shouldered by the group of users 
in Argentina, rather than energy producers, for whom 
the return has been enshrined in law. Checchi et al. 
(2009) have documented the increasing popular 
discontent with market reform policies in LA. Should 
this discontent continue and escalate, it could put in 
jeopardy a backbone of the current policy to promote 
renewable energy, i.e., the return incentive expected 
from investment.
The PERMER represents a rigid renewable-energy 
delivery model that placed excessive expectations on 
the private sector and induced deregulation policies 
in the provinces, causing barriers to PERMER’s 
implementation in some provinces which had not 
privatised electricity services. In fact, the main reason 
for the Argentine government choosing the PERMER 
private concession approach ‘appears to be that it was 
consistent with the reform process under way and 
with the broader ideological drive for private sector-
led approaches, promoted by the Menem government 
and by institutions like the World Bank’ (Best, 2011, 
p. 19). 
Brazil PROINFA apparently encountered a number of 
problems in implementing renewable energy incentive 
policies. For example, it was initially difficult to comply 
with the requirement that 60% of total manufacturing 
investment be undertaken nationally: the price paid 
for feed-in tariff biomass was considered too low due 
to its opportunity cost, and state caps needed to be 
introduced to prevent excessive regional concentration 
of renewable energy contracts (Bouille 2009). 
A few general lessons also emerge from the experience 
of introducing legal frameworks and regulatory 
instruments to promote renewable energy in LA in 
general, and in Argentina, Brazil and Peru in particular. 
It is apparent that feed-in tariffs have tended to be 
more successful than other schemes for renewable 
energy markets and local industrial development. This 
is because feed-in tariff schemes are flexible and can be 
adjusted following technological changes and market 
trends, transaction costs are lower than for other 
schemes, and funding is accessible due to the 15-20 
years of guaranteed prices. These factors significantly 
reduce green energy producers’ uncertainties while 
allowing for competition among small and medium 
producers (Mendonca et al., 2010; Bouille, 2009). 
The flexibility of price-driven feed-in tariff schemes has 
increased confidence among green energy producers 
and enabled small and medium producers to compete 
on equal terms. However, the level of the premium is a 
key factor, as it should guarantee both the development 
of renewable energy in a country and avoid market 
distortions, as may happen if tariffs remain unmodified 
and the prices paid are unnecessarily high.
A key lesson of the Argentine experience, and of the 
LA region generally, is that it is impossible to overlook 
the remarkable availability of natural gas, which has a 
dominant place in the current energy mix and market 
(e.g., Peru has aimed to become a large exporter 
of liquid nitrogen gas; OAS, 2007). Furthermore, 
Argentina’s reliance on large hydroelectricity plants 
cannot but inhibit prospects for the introduction of 
small-scale renewable energy technologies.
The introduction of renewable energy policies in 
LA has been a response to several objectives: first, to 
create national renewable energy markets and reduce 
CO2 emissions; secondly, to enhance energy access in 
rural areas and in zones off the national grid; thirdly, 
to increase energy efficiency and security of supply 
through diversification of a country’s energy mix; and, 
finally, to reduce oil bills, contribute to sustainable 
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development and open up new markets for innovative 
energy technologies (OAS and ESG, 2007). While 
these are compelling reasons for LA governments to 
increase the share of renewables in their national energy 
mix – and there is indeed significant natural resource 
potential in LA – the spread of energy generation 
from renewable technologies remains woefully small. 
Whereas renewable sources supply about 30% of total 
electricity generated in LA, large hydroelectric power 
is the main renewable energy source. By contrast, 
only about 1.4% of total of energy in LA is generated 
from solar, wind, micro-hydro and biomass waste 
(Tradingeconomics, 2009). 
Advancing renewable energy policy in LA
Since the early 1990s, the governments of Argentina, 
Brazil and Peru have initiated numerous policies, 
attracted private capital and provided public funds 
to drive the deployment of renewable technology. 
The introduction of feed-in tariff regulation in a 
few LA countries, including connection to the grid, 
electricity purchases and preferential premiums, has 
provided the legal requirement for independent power 
producers to access the renewable energy market. 
A few of the legislative bodies in countries such as 
Argentina and Peru have gone quite a long way and are 
as comprehensive in their approach as are European 
countries – at least on paper. It is likely that to 
consolidate existing renewable energy policies further, 
regulators will need to consider whether the adoption 
of renewable purchase obligations by the large 
electricity providers would make a definite impact. 
Deployment of renewable energy in LA countries 
might be boosted if some form of mandate, such as the 
Renewable Purchase Obligations used in Europe and 
the US, were enforced in more LA countries (as noted 
above, only Chile and Uruguay have RPOs). 
Critically, as an additional tool to promote the use 
of renewable energy technology, Latin American 
governments could create (where lacking), implement 
and monitor supportive institutional economic and 
policy frameworks similar to those found in Denmark 
and Germany. Specifically, it is recommended that 
feed-in tariffs become part of larger policy frameworks 
to develop renewable energy technology in general to 
mitigate GHG emissions, as well as to ensure regional 
sustainable development. More comprehensive and 
inclusive policy objectives could pave the way to 
funding for national feed-in tariff schemes under 
national and international emission trading schemes. 
From a market perspective, tariffs need to be high 
enough to cover costs and encourage the development 
of particular technologies. Not least they must be 
guaranteed for a long enough period to assure investors 
of a sufficient rate of return. The appropriateness of 
pricing laws is also determined by factors such as 
charges for access to the electric grid, limits set on 
qualifying capacity, and the ease of permit acquisition 
and siting, influenced by the existence and specific 
requirements of national and regional standards 
(UN, ECLAC and GTZ, 2004, p. 125). However, 
three other elements may be crucial. First, regulatory 
instruments must guarantee that the offer is sufficiently 
attractive and carries hardly any commercial risk. 
Secondly, policy will be more attractive to both private 
and international aid organisations if renewable 
energy schemes incorporate aspects, such as social 
equity components, that do not necessarily respond 
to liberalisation market ideology and are designed 
also to tackle regional energy problems, and if policy 
structures are relatively stable and reliable. Thirdly, it 
is recommended that the costs of feeding renewable 
energy into the grid, or of supplying energy services 
to unconnected areas, be passed on to consumers via a 
system benefit charge or paid for by a carbon tax (e.g., 
Girardet and Mondonca, 2009; OESD, 2007). Clarity 
regarding the costs to end-users is of paramount 
importance, particularly for rural populations.
Conclusion 
This article has analysed the policy frameworks that 
Latin American governments have designed in order 
to promote renewable energy. The region has large 
untapped renewable energy potential, which, even 
if only partially developed, could have a positive 
impact on the continent’s energy security, significantly 
improve universal access to electricity and definitely 
contribute to global GHG mitigation. This study 
has shown that there is relatively rich experience in 
designing policy frameworks for promoting renewable 
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energy in LA, with some frameworks being highly 
advanced, such as the combination of competitive 
bidding with concessions in Argentina, feed-in tariffs, 
and guaranteed purchase and top premiums in Peru. 
The general impact that national liberalisation policies 
have had on the structure of energy policy and on 
renewable energy in particular has been notable. 
The exclusion of energy service for rural areas has 
been a main feature of market reforms in the region. 
Undoubtedly international investment in renewable 
energy has been growing in the region (but nowhere 
sufficiently to increase the actual share of renewables in 
the energy mix), and competitive bidding instruments 
have incorporated rural energy through renewable 
sources. However, it is likely that further governmental 
support will be required to boost deployment among 
the most needy populations and to ensure that the 
costs that subsidies may not cover do not fall on the 
end consumer. 
It is likely, therefore, that not only climate change 
mitigation, but also regional energy security, economic 
development and rural electrification will constitute 
key policy-drivers for renewable energy and energy 
efficiency development in the region. The low 
penetration of renewable generation technologies 
relative to the region’s resource potential provides 
an opportunity to develop new renewable energy 
projects for which both price and quantitative 
policy initiatives could offer a low risk and attractive 
framework. Excluding conventional hydro, the LA 
region has a relatively insignificant share of alternative 
sources of energy generation, despite having abundant 
natural resources. But these natural sources (e.g., 
solar radiation, wind and agricultural waste) remain 
mostly untapped due to the costs of exploration, 
reliance on and availability of fossil fuels, and policy 
barriers. Technological improvements, combined with 
regulatory incentives such as adequate feed-in tariffs 
and incentives, could generally increase the acceptance 
and deployment of alternative energy technologies in 
Latin America.
The existence of numerous legal frameworks, 
comprehensive policies and some elegant instruments, 
some of which have been put into operation but still 
face numerous difficulties, points to the relatively 
advanced stage of renewable energy policy in many 
Latin American countries. Yet, the implementation of 
these considerable bodies of policy seems to be lagging 
behind when specific and relevant indicators are 
considered. The records for actual installations and the 
amount of power generated by alternative sources have 
been somewhat disappointing. It is likely, now that 
more information has been gathered and some lessons 
drawn from the LA experience with the promotion of 
renewable energy that greater attention will need to be 
paid to policy implementation.  
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Abstract
India offers a conducive environment for accelerating 
the use and internalisation of bioenergy technologies 
(BETs). Nearly 25% of its primary energy comes 
from biomass resources, and close to 70% of 
rural population depend on biomass to meet their 
daily energy needs. India has over two decades of 
experience in demonstrating bioenergy packages. The 
Ministry of New and Renewable Energy (MNRE) 
recognises this potential. MNRE, state governments, 
and central and state regulatory commissions 
have developed a number of policy instruments 
(tariff support) and financial incentives (capital 
subsidy, interest subsidy etc.) to support bioenergy 
development. Despite this, empirical evidence shows 
that the rate of spread of BETs is rather low because 
of institutional, technical, informational, market 
and financial barriers.
This study analyses the barriers and proposes 
recommendations to overcome them. If carefully 
constructed, these policy instruments will not 
only demonstrate the effectiveness of BETs in a 
developing country such as India but will also help 
the government meet its renewable energy targets. 
This is particularly important bearing in mind that 
India is likely to be at the centre of discussions in 
the next round of global negotiations in South Africa 
(December 2011).
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Introduction
Energy is the primary driver of the world’s economies. 
Increasing populations and expectations of improved 
standards of living are accelerating the demand for 
energy. Theorists have acknowledged the positive or 
direct relationship between economic growth and 
greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. One of the key 
variables affecting this positive relationship is increased 
energy demand as a result of economic well-being. India 
is one of the fastest growing countries in the world, 
with a GDP growth exceeding 8% consistently for the 
last two years, and this trend is expected to continue. 
India’s energy demand is expected to be more than 
three to four times its current level in another 25 years 
(Planning Commission, 2005).
Present primary energy use in India is dominated by 
fossil fuels: 40% of primary energy supply and 59% 
of power generation come from coal (IEA, 2007). The 
rising energy demand in India is expected to lead to a 
further increase in the use of fossil fuels. This will not 
only lead to growing GHG emissions and increased 
environmental problems, but will also to vast social 
problems such as inequalities between rural and 
urban populations, health-related disorders, and other 
community-level issues. 
Whilst looking to reduce fossil fuel use, India faces 
a tough task in meeting its energy needs, especially 
rural energy needs. The rural population of India, 
which constitutes close to 70% of the population, 
consumes less than 40% of the total energy supply and 
one-third of the total power generated. Furthermore, 
though 74% of Indian villages were electrified as of 
March 2005, only 54.9% of households had access 
to electricity, compared to 92% of urban households. 
Close to 45% of rural households still depend on 
kerosene for lighting and about 75% still depend on 
fuel wood (in traditional stoves) for cooking (Census 
of India 2001; NSSO, 2007).  
India has large potential for the adoption of renewable 
energy, a potential that goes beyond addressing 
environmental concerns. Overall, the underlying 
principle is to gain from the current worldwide interest 
in renewable energy for three reasons:
1. To meet the growing demand for energy within 
the country, especially in rural areas 
2. To reduce GHG emissions and help contribute 
to climate change mitigation
3. To capitalise on the expanding market for 
renewable energy and secure an early market 
advantage
India, together with other developing countries, has 
for the first time given indications that it is reducing 
GHG emissions, as is evident in the Cancun Climate 
Agreement of 2010.  Although the emissions cuts are 
not currently legally binding, policy-makers have made 
it clear that reliance on traditional sources of energy 
will no longer suffice as a policy option.
The market for renewable energy systems in rural and 
urban markets in India is set to grow exponentially. 
Of these, bioenergy is especially prominent. 90% of 
rural energy needs and 40% of urban energy needs are 
met by biomass (TERI, 2010). Despite this, bioenergy 
does not figure in most energy studies and is classified 
as ‘non-commercial’ energy. Bioenergy data are 
considered as ‘inadequate and not up-to-date’, since 
it is not transacted on the market (FAO, 2010). While 
India has progressed well in initiating renewable energy 
programmes in general, increasing  renewable energy 
(electricity) share from 2% (1628 MW) in 2002 to 
11% (18,155 MW) in 2010, bioenergy programmes 
have not been on par with traditional sources of energy 
and  at their full potential (MNRE, 2010).   
The article highlights the evolution of bioenergy from 
an institutional and policy standpoint, underlines 
progress and achievements, identifies barriers and 
proposes recommendations for their removal. 
Although the article focuses on India, it is hoped that 
its recommendations are relevant to other developing 
countries looking to further their bioenergy technology 
(BET) agendas.  
Bioenergy technologies 
Bioenergy consists of organic matter derived from 
trees, plants, crops or from human, animal, municipal 
and industrial wastes (Meshram and Mohan, 2007). 
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Table 1. Key Bioenergy Technologies
Source: CGPL, 2010; Pathak, et al., 2009; Ravindranath et al., 2000; Ravindranath et al., 2010 
 Bioenergy 
Technologies 
Features Benefits 
Fo
r 
Po
w
er
 
Biomass 
Gasification 
• Biomass converted to 
combustible gas for use in 
internal combustion engines for 
mechanical or electrical 
applications 
• Capacities in the range of 10 
kg/h to about 500 kg/h 
• Possible to meet rural electricity 
needs and feed into grid 
• Requires sustainable supply of 
biomass 
• Small-scale gasifiers (of 20–500 kW) 
have the potential to meet all the 
rural electricity needs and leave a 
surplus to feed into the national grid. 
• Diesel savings of up to 80% possible 
in dual fuel systems and 100% diesel 
savings possible in 100% producer 
gas 
• Rural employment generation 
• Degraded land reclamation 
• Fossil-fuel substitution 
• Carbon sequestration due to forestry 
in degraded lands 
Biomass 
Combustion 
• Biomass is burnt in a boiler to 
generate steam which is used to 
generate power 
• Possible to meet rural electricity 
needs and feed into grid 
• Requires sustainable supply of 
biomass 
• Degraded land reclamation 
• Fossil-fuel substitution 
• Carbon sequestration due to forestry 
in degraded lands 
• Relatively more economical  
• Employment generation 
Fo
r 
co
ok
in
g 
Biogas • Ideal fuel for cooking 
• Simple and indigenous 
technology 
• High first cost but economical  
• Large experience of 
dissemination 
• Forest plantation and tree 
conservation 
• Reduced indoor air pollution 
• Large improvements in quality of life 
• High forest carbon sink conservation 
potential due to fuel wood savings 
Efficient cook 
stoves 
• Fuelled by small pieces of wood 
or special pellets made from 
dried and compressed 
agricultural waste 
• Emit less smoke and give more 
energy than dried wood or cow-
dung cakes 
• Can reduce wood consumption 
by 50% or more 
• Low cost of device 
Forest plantation and village tree 
conservation 
• Large improvements in quality of life, 
especially women 
• Moderate forest carbon sink 
conservation potential 
 
Fo
r 
tr
an
sp
or
t 
Bio-fuels • Extracting oil from  non-edible 
seeds in plants like Jatropha 
curcas, Neem, Mahua and other 
wild plants; to be mixed with 
diesel/petrol 
• Technology not fully evolved in 
India 
• Land and water constraint  
• Self-reliance 
• Transport fuel demands can be met 
• Fossil fuel substitution and therefore 
GHG mitigation 
 
 
 
132
Table 1 presents the features and benefits of key 
BETs in meeting power, cooking and transport 
energy requirements.
 
Biofuels are fairly new to the market, and there are no 
available examples of projects implemented or lessons 
learnt. Improved cooking stoves have been in use since 
the late 1980s and deserve a separate discussion. 
Bioenergy in India
Policy and institutional evolution of BETs
Renewable energy promotion in India, including 
bioenergy, was stepped up in response to the oil crisis 
of the 1970s. The Fuel Policy Committee (FPC) 
(1974) and the Working Group on Energy Policy 
(1979) (WGEP) were set up in response to this 
focus to understand the energy situation in light of 
developments both nationally and internationally. The 
two committees were tasked with developing a solid 
plan and recommendations for appropriate policy 
measures for available energy resources and non-
conventional energy resources for the ensuing five to 
fifteen years. Despite the emphasis the two committees 
placed on the need for a new energy plan, no formal 
institutional mechanism was established immediately.
Institutional mechanisms were first set up in the 
early 1980s. A Commission for Additional Sources of 
Energy (CASE) was created in 1981 in the Department 
of Science and Technology. This was converted into 
a separate department, the Department of Non-
Conventional Energy Sources (DNES), in 1982. 
In 1983, the Advisory Board on Energy (ABE) was 
instituted. ABE proposed and provided for the Nodal 
Energy Conservation Organization (NECO), whose 
observations and recommendations were binding on 
all central and state government agencies, as well as 
on the prescribed authorities (Dey, 2007). NECO 
was soon replaced by the Energy Management Centre 
(EMC) in 1989. 
Bioenergy policies during this period (1980s) focused 
on technologies (Shukla, 1997):
• Improving efficiency of traditional biomass use 
(e.g., improved cooking stove programme)
• Improving the supply of biomass (e.g., social 
forestry, wasteland development)
• Improving the quality of biomass use 
through technologies (e.g., biogas, improved 
cooking stoves)
• Introducing biomass-based technologies (wood 
gasifiers for irrigation, biomass electricity 
generation) to deliver services provided by 
conventional energy sources
• Establishing institutional support for 
programme formulation and implementation.
Shukla (2000) further indicated that the BETs 
that had been implemented lacked institutional 
mechanisms to support their continued operation and 
maintenance, and accelerate replications. Economic 
and financial support was mainly a matter of capital 
subsidies. Various evaluations showed a large number 
of installed devices did not function for a variety of 
reasons. Strategies to promote devices were oriented by 
assigning targets to state government agencies for the 
implementation of programmes and lacked a market-
oriented approach. 
Following liberalisation in 1992, some changes were 
made to strategies to accelerate bioenergy to address 
some of the gaps identified above. To expand further 
the scope of the activities to promote RE in India, 
government upgraded DNES to a fully fledged ministry, 
the Ministry of Non-Conventional Energy Sources 
(MNES), in 1992. MNES thus came into existence 
with the responsibility for supporting research and 
development, and the promotion and coordination 
of renewable energy sources, including bioenergy 
(MNRE, 2010). MNES was later renamed the Ministry 
of New and Renewable Energy (MNRE) in 2006. The 
Ministry has regional offices, three specialised research 
institutions and a non-banking financial company, 
the Indian Renewable Energy Development Agency 
(IREDA), under its administrative control to promote 
its policy and programme initiatives. 
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The Energy Conservation Bill was passed by the Indian 
Parliament in September 2001. The Act provides for 
a legal framework, institutional arrangements and a 
regulatory mechanism at the central and state levels 
to promote an energy efficiency drive in the country. 
The Bureau of Energy Efficiency (BEE) was created 
to implement the provisions of the Act, which was 
critical in laying the foundations for future energy 
policy formulation. 
The eleventh five-year plan (2007-2012) highlighted 
the severe shortages of energy, the dominance of coal 
and the need to expand resources through exploration, 
energy efficiency, renewables, and research and 
development (Planning Commission, 2007). 
Further to this, the most recent policy initiative to 
be developed is the National Action Plan on Climate 
Change, launched in June 2008. This is partially in 
response to global concerns to address climate change. 
Though India does not have any binding emissions 
targets, the initiative is aimed at showcasing national 
responsibility. Eight national missions comprise the 
main response to addressing climate change, covering 
Solar Energy, Enhanced Energy Efficiency, Sustainable 
Habitat, Water, Sustaining the Himalayan Eco-system, 
Green India, Sustainable Agriculture and Strategic 
Knowledge for Climate Change. The National 
Mission on Enhanced Energy Efficiency estimates that 
these initiatives will yield 10,000 MW of savings by 
2012 and result in business of approximately USD 
16 billion. The National Mission for a ‘Green India’ 
aims to achieve afforestation of 6 million hectares of 
degraded forest lands and to expand forest cover from 
23% to 33% of India’s territory by 2022. (MNREa, 
2010). However, there is no emphasis on harnessing 
and nurturing biomass resources and biomass 
technologies. 
BET programmes and implementation 
strategies
Biomass power 
MNRE and several other agencies have therefore 
realised the potential and role of bioenergy in the 
Indian context. Over the last decade, biomass 
power has become an industry attracting an annual 
investment of over USD 130 million (INR 600 crore), 
generating about 5000 million units of electricity and 
yearly employment of more than 10 million man-days 
in rural areas (MNREb 2010).  
A key programme of the MNRE is the Biomass Power/
Cogeneration Programme under which a number of 
financial and fiscal incentives for the manufacture and 
installation of gasifier systems have been provided. 
Another important programme is the biomass gasifier 
programme, which promotes demonstrations that can 
be taken up by village-level organisations such as village 
panchayats (the Indian government has decentralised 
several functions to the panchayats, which consist of 
respected village locals forming a committee to address 
local problems). The gasifier programme is being 
implemented through state nodal agencies with the 
involvement of energy service companies (ESCOs), 
co-operatives, panchayats, NGOs, and manufacturers 
or entrepreneurs (TERI, 2010).  
The central government has also introduced support 
schemes such as the National Biomass Resource 
Assessment Programme (NBRAP), aimed at developing 
biomass assessments. The Indian Renewable Energy 
Development Agency (IREDA) provides loans for 
setting up biomass power and bagasse cogeneration 
projects. State-level actions also support the central 
initiatives. These include:
• Buyback/Wheeling/Banking of generated 
electricity by the State Electricity Boards. State-
specific incentives in the form of preferential 
tariffs have been introduced for the purchase of 
biomass power. For example, in Andhra Pradesh, 
an incentive has been introduced equivalent to 
Rs 2.63 per unit at 1% escalation for five years. 
In Haryana, a much higher incentive of Rs 4.00 
per unit at 2% escalation every year is provided.
• State Electricity Regulatory Commissions have 
been guided to provide Renewable Portfolio 
Standards (RPS). RPS places an obligation on 
energy supply companies to produce a specified 
fraction of their electricity from renewable 
energy sources.  Specified RPSs include 10% 
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in Tamil Nadu, 7-10% in Karnataka, 3-6% 
in Maharashtra and 5% in Andhra Pradesh, 
among others.
• Funding opportunities including grants and 
contracts, loans, equity investments, and direct 
incentive payments for bioenergy projects for 
pre-development activities, the installation 
of small and large systems, and business 
development and equity.
• Sales tax  exemptions, in certain states from a 
purchase of biomass gasifiers.
• Accelerated depreciation, i.e., 80% depreciation 
in the first year, can be claimed for gasifier 
equipment such as pressure boilers and vapour 
absorption refrigeration systems.
• Concessional import duty, excise duty, 
tax holiday for ten years. The benefits of 
concessional custom duty and excise duty 
exemption are available on equipment required 
for the initial setting up of biomass projects 
based on certification by MNRE.
The key achievements of the programmes and 
incentives provided thus far have been (MNRE, 2010):
• Deployment: a total of 259 biomass power and 
cogeneration projects aggregating to 2312MW 
capacity have been installed for feeding power 
to the grid.  In addition, 135 biomass power 
and cogeneration projects aggregating to 1700 
MW of electricity are under implementation.
• Manufacturing capability: a majority of the 
infrastructure and equipment required for 
setting up biomass projects can be procured 
from indigenous sources. For instance, biomass 
gasifiers in the capacity range of 5 kW to 1 MW 
equivalent electric capacity have been developed 
indigenously and are being manufactured by 
around 15 MNRE-approved manufacturers in 
the country.  
• Supply chain development: a number of 
multinational companies are currently involved in 
the supply chain of biomass power plants in India. 
Biogas 
The Central Sector Scheme on National Biogas 
Programme, which mainly caters to setting up family-
type biogas plants, has been under implementation 
since 1981-82. The scheme, which is still functional 
today and is managed by MNRE, is called the 
National Biogas and Manure Management Programme 
(NBMMP). Its objectives are as follows (MNREc, 
2010):
• To provide fuel for cooking purposes and 
organic manure to rural households through 
family-type biogas plants;  
• To  reduce the drudgery of rural women, 
reduce pressure on  forests and increase the 
social benefits;  
• To improve sanitation in villages by  linking 
sanitary  toilets with biogas plants.
The programme is being implemented by State Nodal 
Departments and Agencies and the Khadi and Village 
Industries Commission (KVIC), Mumbai. The 
NBMMP provides for:
• Central subsidy in fixed amounts 
• Turn-key job fee linked with three years’ free 
maintenance warranty 
• Financial support for repair of old-non 
functional plants 
• Training of users, masons, entrepreneurs etc. 
• Publicity and extension 
• Service charges or staff support 
• State-level Biogas Development and Training 
Centres (BDTC) 
• Financial support for institutions for cattle 
dung-based power generation plants etc. 
The key achievements of the programme have been 
highlighted by MNRE. The estimated potential 
of biogas plants in India is 12,339,300 units. As of 
December 2009, the cumulative achievement has been 
4,185,442 units. Thus, the programme has been a 
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moderate success only, implementing approximately 
34% of the estimated potential as indicated by MNRE 
(2010). The latest figures for 2009-2010 suggest a 
similar success rate, with 34% of family-type biogas 
plants being implemented. 
Summary of success of programmes
Table 2 indicates that, despite the enormous potential 
for BETs to tap into in a country such as India, and 
taking into consideration the renewable energy policies 
and programmes set out by the government, actual on-
field implementation of BET’s is falling short. Overall, 
the policies and programmes instituted have led to 
only sporadic success. Looking at the overall picture 
is disappointing since the policies and programmes 
put forward by the Government have not succeeded 
in achieving their optimum technical potential. 
This has been highlighted on many occasions in the 
literature (Ghosh S., et al., 2004; Pathak et al., 2009; 
Ravindranath et al., 2004; Ravindranath et al., 2010; 
Ravindranath and Balachandra, 2009; Singh and 
Gu, 2010).
Barriers and lessons learnt
The slow rate of spread of BETs such as biomass 
power and biogas, despite a seemingly strong policy 
framework, leads to questions concerning the potential 
barriers to BET dissemination in India. Several studies 
have identified the existence of a number of barriers, 
as well as the inadequacy of policies and measures to 
address them (TERI, 2010; Ghosh, D et al, 2005; 
Ravindranath and Hall. 1995). These barriers need 
to be explored in more detail, so that policies and 
programmes targeting BETs in the future will have a 
more bespoke role to play in closing the gap between 
existing and potential capacity. 
The existing barriers are divided into technology-
specific barriers and generic barriers.
Technology-specific barriers
BETs are multi-faceted and differ in many ways, 
for instance, input resources needed (i.e., woody 
biomass, rice husk, cow dung etc.), length of life cycle 
(short, medium, long-term), types of usage (cooking, 
thermal etc), and maintenance required (daily, weekly, 
monthly). Inconsistencies in the nature of bioenergy 
technologies and uncertainties in technological 
performance are a key concern for policy-makers 
(Ghosh, D. et al., 2002). Policies and programmes 
initiated by the MNRE have made an attempt to 
address the distinct features of these BETs (Rao and 
Ravindranath, 2002). The technology-specific barriers 
are highlighted in Table 2. 
Generic barriers
Generic barriers are barriers that affect all BETs. They 
include institutional, informational, financial, policy-
related, and overall market barriers. 
Institutional barriers
Initially, in promoting BETs the government followed 
a technology-push approach. This approach focuses 
on introducing new innovative technologies through 
research and development, regardless of demand. 
BETs in their nascent stages were offered as possible 
improvements on existing rural energy sources. The 
abundance of biomass was initially the push needed 
to promote BETs. There was therefore little or no 
interaction with rural communities in formulating the 
technologies. This approach almost entirely led to the 
isolation of a multitude of actors, who potentially could 
become crucial players in the adoption and use of BETs 
(Shukla, 2000). In traditional innovation theory, the 
technology-push approach can be differentiated from 
the demand-pull approach. A demand-pull approach 
refers to innovation driven by changes in demand 
through competitive market structures (Scherer, 
1982). Stakeholders’ demand for and understanding 
of the economic benefits of the technology are critical 
to this approach.
 
The shift in the government’s focus to a demand-pull, 
essentially market-centric approach promised greater 
inclusion through a more consolidated institutional 
framework incorporating the whole gamut of potential 
stakeholders. Participation by the local community, 
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Table 2. Technology-specific barriers
Bioenergy 
Technologies 
Technology-specific Barriers 
Biomass Gasification Gasifier-engine and distribution related 
• Dual fuel systems do not seem economically feasible, and hence the focus 
is on producer gas. But 100% producer gas engines still are not very 
common, not readily available at all capacities  
• Gas cleaning systems are still not robust and hence high in terms of 
maintenance 
• Variations in power delivered depend on quality of biomass – ensuring 
either quality of biomass or governing the power delivered is still not 
robust 
• Tar generated during gasification is still not under control – they 
vary/increase with time elapsed 
• Very few systems have gone through  life-cycle operations, so there are 
significant deficiencies in terms of designing operation and maintenance 
protocols 
• The complications are much higher with lower kilowatt scale capacities 
• To evacuate power, an active grid is a necessity. But in rural set-up this is 
not well established, and dedicated 11 kV lines are essential.  
• Evacuating small power in the existing grid is still not favoured by utilities 
(who consider up to 500 kW small ). Synchronising quality of power 
produced by the gasifier power plant and the grid is still not well 
established. 
Biomass-related 
• Absence of package of practices and quality seed material or clones for 
high yields for energy plantations 
• Sizing techniques (choppers, cutters) used have low processing capacity 
and are not very safe 
• Poor understanding of managing moisture content  
• Biomass drying techniques are not well established 
 
Biomass combustion  • Do not have supply of systems in capacities less than 2 MW 
• The present biomass combustion system is not very flexible, with varying 
fuel quality and quantity 
• Negative impact on flue gas cleaning 
• Operational risks of boilers 
Energy plantations:  
• Absence of package of practices and quality seed material or clones for 
high yields for energy plantations 
• Techniques for bailing and sizing of biomass are yet to established 
(choppers, cutters)   
• Poor understanding of drying and managing moisture content  
 
Biogas units • Biogas units are less successful in the interiors of villages, due to 
difficulties in arranging for land and water required for the plant  
• Biogas plants are successful in homes situated on village outskirts or in 
fields.  
 
 
 
Source: Akshay Urjha, 2010; Ravindranath et al., 2000 
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grassroots organisations, including NGOs, and local 
government agencies, among others, was a cornerstone 
of the new shift in policy (Sudha, et al., 2003). 
While a more inclusive institutional structure is good 
strategically, in practice in a country as vast and esoteric 
as India, it leads to problems in implementation if it is 
not managed and monitored effectively.
As indicated above, all BET programmes, the Biomass 
Power/Cogeneration programme, National Biogas 
and Manure Management Programme (NBMMP) 
are all budgeted and planned at the national level. A 
critical problem has been overcoming issues arising 
out of bureaucracy. In the case of BETs, this includes 
dealing with cumbersome paperwork, delays in issuing 
planning permission and other contractual details. 
Many developers have mentioned the significant 
periods of delay in obtaining technical approvals. 
Additionally the programmes are driven largely 
by targets. For instance, the NBMMP sets annual 
targets for the number of biogas units to be installed 
(Kumar and Mohan, 2005). While a target-driven 
approach is important to ensure institutions function 
in an accountable fashion, the targets are not regularly 
monitored and are mostly based on antecedents. Thus 
institutions often end up chasing targets that are 
extraneous and unachievable, instead of developing 
innovative approaches to sustainable dissemination at 
the local level. 
Further, the institutional framework in India currently 
lacks a viable strategy to empower local communities. 
Community organisations and institutions are 
rarely involved in the planning, implementation 
and management of, say, the rural electrification 
programme through biomass gasifiers. The failure of 
a large number of small village systems, such as biogas 
plants, and stand-alone gasifiers is to a large extent 
related to the fact that there is no coordinated local, 
institutional and government support (Kaundinya et 
al., 2009). 
Informational barriers 
Information asymmetries are present on various 
levels and between various players, institutions, rural 
communities, consumers, financing institutions, 
entrepreneurs, and all other stakeholders in the 
supply chain. The information barrier is central to any 
debate on climate change. The Stern Review identifies 
raising awareness as one of the three elements of 
the coordinated policy package that is needed to 
tackle climate change, alongside carbon pricing and 
innovation support (Stern, 2007). Traditionally, the 
rural community responds to more conventional fossil 
fuel-based energy as a ‘rich man’s fuel’ and therefore 
expectedly believes this to be the most reliable and 
efficient. Intermediate stakeholders such as NGOs, 
industry groups and micro-finance institutions that 
often play a key role in delivering products and 
services, as well as policy-makers, are also unaware 
of the benefits of bioenergy, which often results in a 
greater push for other renewable energy technologies, 
such as wind and solar (Ghosh, D. et al., 2006).
This represents a critical barrier for the development 
of BET in India. Such uncertainties for BETs in rural 
areas could be a result of:
• Lack of knowledge 
• Uncertainty and distrust in the source of 
information
• Climate change is not being seen an immediate 
threat or priority for rural communities 
• Social behaviour and expectations
• Absence of an enabling environment, i.e., 
government, local organisations, village 
panchayat
• Inadequate training, capacity-building and 
user-education programmes. 
 
Information and knowledge dissemination, in the 
right form and using appropriate tools, is not currently 
available to the larger public using BETs. There is also 
no monitoring of the translation of  theory into practice. 
Pathak et al. (2009) observed a number of installed 
biogas units become immediately inoperative under 
the NBMMP. Agencies are not technically upgraded 
for periodic collection monitoring on the usage and 
mitigation potential of biogas plants. A sampling 
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plan can be developed for some representative biogas 
plants in different districts for regular monitoring of 
biogas use. 
The information dissemination policies of the MNRE 
are very generic in nature. They seldom provide 
information on the failure or poor performance of 
bioenergy systems and the reasons for them. This lack 
of information and awareness regarding the correct 
methods of operation and maintenance, as in the case 
of both biomass gasifiers and biogas plants, acts as a 
barrier to the long-term acceptance of such systems.
Financial barriers 
The high initial costs of BETs are perceived by many 
as a key barrier to the penetration of BETs vis-à-vis 
conventional technologies (Bhattachrya and Cropper, 
2010; Nouni et al., 2007) The principal capital cost of 
biomass power projects includes the costs of the gasiﬁer, 
the engine generator, civil construction, biomass 
preparation unit, electricity distribution network and 
electrical and piping connections to the site of gasifier 
installation and need subsidisation (Buragohain 
et al., 2010). 
While subsidies have been introduced as an incentive 
to induce early adoption, implementation has not 
been well thought out. In some cases, subsidies are set 
too low to overcome the burgeoning gap between the 
cost of generation and the level of financial assistance 
provided by the government. In other cases, subsidies 
which should ideally be phased out in line with cost 
reductions have continued for more than two decades, 
thus becoming defunct as an incentive to improve 
performance. Additional fiscal policies such as 
depreciation benefits given to biomass power projects 
by MNRE have had a very marginal impact on BETs. 
Mainstream financial institutions have been reluctant 
to take risks in lending due to a long history of poor 
recovery of loans in rural areas (Rao and Ravindranath, 
2002). Even though IREDA’s financial intermediary 
scheme provides incentives such as interest subsidy 
and covers the transaction costs, existing financial 
institutions participating in these schemes have not 
shown a sustained interest due to falling returns, high 
technological risks, and the high costs of servicing 
these dispersed and low-volume markets (Planning 
Commission, 2006). 
Policy barriers
A fundamental barrier to the diffusion of BETs is 
government policies. A key government policy that fails 
the renewable energy sector in general is the distortion 
of energy prices. Energy pricing policies in India tend 
to favour fossil fuel-based energy sources (electricity, 
kerosene, LPG, petrol, diesel). Since the conventional 
technologies are also supported by subsidies, there is 
no level playing field for the new technologies that 
compete with them (UN, 2004). 
One example of policy-induced energy inefficiency 
relates to the low agricultural tariffs (subsidies are as 
high as 80%– 90% in most states) that have resulted 
in gross overuse of both electricity and groundwater. 
For domestic and agricultural suppliers, electricity 
pricing is kept below the cost of supply with additional 
subsidies. The energy efficiency of agricultural pump 
sets in India is extremely low, which coincides with 
policies that heavily subsidise electricity use for 
farmers. Replacing most pump sets would be fully 
cost-effective if electricity were priced at marginal cost; 
however, the subsidies to electricity have prevented 
their replacement (Phadke, 2006).  
A National Electricity Plan and National Tariff Policy 
were drafted as part of the Electricity Act in 2003. The 
National Tariff policy states that the tariffs for all new 
generation and transmission projects are to be decided 
on the basis of competitive bidding after a period of 
five years or when the regulatory commission feels 
the market is suitable for bidding. Since then, the 
Central Electricity Regulatory Commission (CERC) 
has designed a cost-plus approach to determining 
the tariff levels for renewable energy technologies. In 
estimating, it sets varying parameters for the individual 
technologies. For instance, biomass projects based on 
Rankine Cycle technology (i.e., biomass power plants 
relying on combustion to generate power) are given 
their own set of assessment parameters. Individual 
states can use CERC guidelines and determine variable 
tariff levels. This system, while an improvement from 
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the previous system, is still riddled with loopholes. 
Developers complain that tariffs in certain states 
such as Karnataka (Rs. 2.85/kWh) are significantly 
lower than the tariffs in Haryana (Rs 5.52/kWh) 
and Punjab (Rs. 5.49/kWh) (KERC, 2005; CERC, 
2010). A key concern is that that there are no agreed 
centralised or state-level parameters to fix tariffs for 
biomass gasification projects. CERC indicates that 
the tariff designed for combustion will also hold true 
for gasification. However, these are not adaptable in 
their entirety to biomass gasification projects, and 
duplicating the assumptions is fallacious.
Ravindranath and Rao (2002) stated that the 
land-tenure policy acts as a barrier for farmers and 
communities entering into any long-term contract to 
supply wood-fuel to the bioenergy utility. 
Overall market barriers
The BET market is not an easy market for new entrants. 
For instance, there are only approximately twelve 
MNRE-approved manufacturers and suppliers of 
biomass gasifiers in the country. The initial investment 
required for such technology is huge. Government 
policies on licensing requirements, limits on access 
to raw materials, pollution standards and product 
testing regulations further make it difficult for new 
competitors to enter the market. 
Recommendations  
India has one of the most progressive set of renewable 
energy policies in the world. BETs consist of a number 
of technologies with diverse applications from cooking 
to power generation and assisting the poor. Thus 
the transfer or diffusion of some BETs pose many 
challenges. First, BETs are still in an evolving phase, 
which makes it difficult to decide what exactly should 
be diffused in terms of knowledge, techniques and 
hardware. Secondly, it requires a series of difficult 
technological choices concerning biomass sources, 
production, transportation, conversion and end-
use. Finally, a multitude of actors are involved at 
the various stages, including the poorest. In the 
above context, appropriate policies, institutions 
and financing play a catalytic role in technology 
transfer and the diffusion of BETs (Ravindranath and 
Balachandra, 2009). The existence of barriers prevents 
the large-scale dissemination and deployment of BETs. 
Recommendations and policy options to overcome 
the barriers need to be assessed. The categories of 
interventions required include technical, institutional, 
educational, awareness and regulatory interventions.
Increased assistance to R&D
Rigorous R&D aimed at promoting innovation in 
BETs, for cost reduction, improved reliability and 
efficiency is important for the large-scale spread of 
BETs in India. Investments in R&D on renewables, 
particularly BETs, has declined (Balachandra et al., 
2010). MNRE needs to foster a conducive environment 
for R&D in India through:
• Increased budget allocation for all R&D 
activities spawning BETs, including biogas, 
ICs, biomass power and biofuels. The 11th five-
year plan mentions increased R&D to ensure 
an improvement in the yield of jatropha and 
other oilseeds for biodiesel. This needs to be 
further expanded to include other BETs in the 
new plan. 
• Provision of grants and funds for R&D, which 
would lead to greater interest among the premier 
research institutions to explore BET and 
translate R&D leads into scalable technologies.
• Promoting collaboration between industry 
and academia, for field demonstrations, and 
promoting feedback and communication 
between developers and implementers. 
Training and skills development
There is need for a large number of entrepreneurs 
and skilled personnel for building biogas plants and 
maintaining small-scale biomass power systems. 
Both current and future suppliers of BETs need to 
be equipped with the necessary skills to integrate the 
novel technologies into their functioning. With BETs, 
it has been observed that, even when the technology 
is ready and has been demonstrated, a skills shortage 
has been a hindrance to successful implementation. 
The development of training schemes could provide a 
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route to alleviating this skill shortage. It is important 
to ensure that all staff involved in training and 
development have been adequately trained themselves. 
Use of R&D institutions in training could be beneficial 
(see BERI case study, Section 6).
Large-scale demonstrations
Demonstration projects are critical to overcoming 
technical barriers and creating confidence in the 
users. They showcase the technologies to prospective 
developers and investors. Demonstrations are likely 
to be more successful when they are conducted on 
a larger scale. The lessons leant must be transferred 
and publicised by MNRE. Successful pilot schemes 
must be followed up to ensure implementation. 
Demonstrations must also incorporate aspects that 
allow for community participation.  
Need for quality control
BETs, especially small-scale systems, are often 
manufactured by the unorganised sector. Unlike 
solar photovoltaic or wind turbines, biogas, and even 
biomass gasifiers, are manufactured in small-scale 
industries and even in rural areas. Biogas plants are 
built in situ by local skilled persons so quality control 
is very necessary for high performance. The issuing 
of performance and product guarantees needs to be 
addressed (see BERI case study). 
Technology transfer
Technology transfer for BETs poses a challenge due 
to the small and decentralised scale of operations 
and the presence of a large number of entrepreneurs. 
Transferring any new biogas design to thousands of 
entrepreneurs is a challenge. India may not require 
import of BETs since most of BETs are designed by 
Indian institutions. 
Revise tariff structures
Feed-in-tariffs (FITs) have been a successful tool in the 
promotion of renewable energy-based power systems. 
There is an abundance of literature highlighting the 
positive relationship between tariffs and accelerating 
investment in renewable energy (Bilharz 2006), 
which can provide long-term financial stability for 
the renewable energy markets. However, if they are 
not properly designed, FITs can be economically 
inefficient. Thus tariffs must be designed with care, 
keeping in mind the individual characteristics of 
different BETs. Bespoke tariff models must be 
developed through interactions with the local, rural 
population, as was the case in Hosahalli in Karnataka 
(Ravindranath, et al. 2004) and the Sundarbans in 
West Bengal (Mukhopadhyay 2004).  
Performance based subsidies
Since subsidies do not guarantee improved performance 
or cost reductions, subsidies as a policy instrument 
must be time-bound with a sunset clause and must 
be justified on the basis that they are definitely 
promoting technological advances and organisational 
learning. Importantly, subsidies should not be based 
on capital costs but should be linked to performance 
or output. The costs of the commercial scaling-up 
of biomass production, processing, transportation, 
market development etc., are yet to be established (see 
Bahalupani case study, section 6).  
Awareness and training programmes
Awareness needs to be created in rural areas of the 
requirement to shift to efficient energy systems. 
Women will have to be trained in using the new 
cooking designs. Biogas plant and biomass gasifier 
operators need to be trained (see Alwar case study, 
section 6).  
Technology-specific programmes
In addition to all-encompassing recommendations 
and options, each technology is unique and requires 
prescriptions in line with its idiosyncrasies. Key 
recommendations are highlighted in Table 3. 
Case studies
Case studies are critical in highlighting the barriers 
and providing recommendations. They show that 
converging with the application of new technologies 
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Table 3. Recommendations for BETs
 Technology options Financial options 
Policy and 
institutional options 
Biomass gasification • Facilitating design 
change with greater 
operational 
effectiveness 
• Supporting 
pilot/demonstration 
projects 
• Developing 
information 
packages on 
technology to be 
distributed to all 
stakeholders  
 
• Innovative loan 
schemes to reduce 
costs 
• Well-designed tariff 
plans that take into 
consideration high 
initial costs of 
setting up power 
generation systems 
• Incentives for 
enhanced private-
sector participation 
• Encouraging skilled 
personnel and 
entrepreneurship 
development 
programs 
• Effective 
monitoring and 
evaluation systems 
• Increased support 
for R&D in projects 
highlighting 
performance 
enhancement 
under 
practical/field 
conditions 
Biogas units • Exploring new 
designs for using 
organic household 
wastes and leaf 
biomass in biogas 
plants 
• Supporting 
pilot/demonstration 
projects for new 
designs  
• Placing fees on 
manure treatment 
in biogas plants. 
Fees should be paid 
by farmers in case 
no organic waste is 
available. 
• Facilitating design 
change and 
innovative loan 
schemes to reduce 
costs 
• Increasing public 
awareness  
• Increasing funding 
for R&D  
• Monitoring use of 
biogas plants 
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were activities focused on the provision of operational 
experience, mobilising local community, extensive 
R&D and firming up institutional arrangements, 
through the intervention of implementing partners. It 
should be reiterated that the following examples are 
studies of projects involving extensive personal ﬁeld-
level expertise of the authors.
Biomass Energy for Rural India (BERI), Tumkur, 
Karnataka (UNDP, 2010)
Initiated in 2001 by UNDP and the Government 
of Karnataka, the project aimed at biomass gasifiers 
to provide electricity to the 24 project villages and 
community biogas systems for the provision of 
clean energy. 
The project’s progress on the overall objectives has 
been tardy. A host of barriers had to be overcome 
to get the project to its current stage, including a 
shortage of biomass feedstock, the availability of land 
for biomass production, the non-availability of readily 
available, off-the-shelf gasifier systems, community-
level problems in uptake, and the higher cost of 
biomass power compared to the tariff and subsidised 
centralised power.  
The Indian Institute of Science (IISc), a premier 
R&D institution, was engaged to supervise, advise 
and train locals on the gasifier plant operation. 
Extensive community mobilisation was actuated 
through the creation of no less than 26 Village Bio-
energy Management Committees (VBEMC), 26 
Village Forest Committees (VFC) and 72 Self Help 
Groups (SHGs) led by women, and the strengthening 
of 68 old SHGs, 31 Water User Associations and 33 
Biogas User Groups. The development of biomass was 
activated through ‘energy’ plantations. About 2015 
ha of common land was taken under forestation. A 
nursery with nearly two million seedlings was set up, 
alongside tree-based farming over 900 hectares of land. 
To address the immediate need for a cleaner cooking 
fuel, community biogas plants were built. Irrigation 
problems were reduced through drip irrigation. 
On the technical front, the poor performance of the 
turnkey contractors led to alternative steps being taken 
to complete performance guarantee tests and warranty 
runs. Furthermore, the evacuation of electricity 
produced from gasifiers required the grid to be active. 
This required dedicated 11 kV lines, which were 
not present at the gasifier sites and therefore had to 
be constructed as a priority. All the gasifiers are now 
connected to evacuate electricity to the grid. A total of 
1,050 kW is the cumulative installed capacity through 
the 11 gasifiers, of which 900 kW is from 100 per cent 
producer gas.  
Operation and maintenance charges are not recovered 
from users since power is sold to the grid, against which 
electricity is supplied to the users at subsidised tariffs. 
The present tariff ranges between Rs.2.85 per kW to 
Rs.4 per kW. The actual cost of generation ranges 
from Rs. 7 to Rs. 15 per kW, depending on the plant 
load factor.
As of July 2010, a total 383 MWh of green energy had 
been generated, leading to reductions of 11,880 tonnes 
of CO2 after taking into account carbon sequestration. 
Alwar, Rajasthan
The key to the success of this project was the multi-
layered strategy  to strengthen the institution of rural 
women and improve their sources of livelihood, 
conserve bio-diversity and promote biogas as means of 
energy, establish mechanisms for better cattle health 
care and productivity, and enhance incomes from 
animal and land resources. 
To ensure effective implementation and monitoring 
of the above objectives, institutional links with the 
government were a pre-requisite. Two federations of 
self-help groups (SHGs) were set up, all activities being 
implemented through them subsequently. Women 
were trained as community leaders, being educated 
and trained on the biogas project, its objectives, activity 
implementation and outcomes in relation to livelihoods 
and bio-diversity conservation. A total of 2500 women 
emerged as trainees, of whom 45 became the leaders of 
institutions. Three local masons were also trained and 
employed to construct and repair the plants. 
143
The successful installation of biogas plants depended 
on an efficient supply of animal waste. For this, the 
health of the existing livestock became quintessential 
to the running of the project, as was the need to 
purchase more cattle. Women were to be trained as 
animal health workers or Pashu Sakhis (para-vets), and 
government resources were mobilised to provide better 
credit facilities to promote purchases of cattle. To 
augment the income from land resources, a subsidiary 
initiative promoting horticulture and organic farming 
was introduced alongside; however, it did not have 
much success owing to land constraints. 
Today, forty biogas plants are up and running in as 
many households spread across fifteen villages. Clear 
evidence of the success of the project lies in the ever-
increasing demand for more plants from the villages 
falling within the project region. 
Bahalupani, Orissa
The project’s vision was to build a self-reliant, energy-
efficient community in a remote biosphere reserve 
consisting of tribal villages not connected to the grid. 
A Village Energy Committee (VEC), comprising the 
villagers themselves, was constituted to spearhead the 
initiative. To obtain technical expertise and mobilise 
local resources, links were established with the Light 
a Billion Lives (LaBL) Campaign supported by TERI 
(Solar light campaign), the Forest Department and 
the District Rural Development Authority (DRDA). 
The project received funding from the Orissa 
Renewable Energy Development Agency (OREDA). 
The implementing agencies were quick to identify 
the pressing need in the village, which was to serve 
as the first entry point for renewable energy in the 
tribal realm, thus easing the strain in cooking. Energy-
efficient stoves were introduced to gain the confidence 
of the villagers. Henceforth, it was easier to integrate 
biomass gasification into the energy mandate. 
To feed the Biomass gasification unit, the VEC 
ensured that fuel wood was planted. The VEC now 
collects 1.5 kg of biomass daily from each family and 
Rs. 1.50 as consumer fees. The energy production is 
10 kW per day, of which 6 kW is directed towards 
household consumption and remainder used for 
commercial purposes as and when required. A block 
level federation pays Rs. 5 per hour for a commercial 
honey-processing unit. The biomass power unit is now 
the mainstay of the energy sphere of the village.
Conclusions
India has an aggressive renewable energy programme. It 
has increased its share of renewable energy (electricity) 
from 2% (1628 MW) in 2002 to 11% (18,155 MW) in 
2010. Though the government has put forward policy 
instruments to encourage BETs, the strengthening 
of policy instruments is critical if the full estimated 
potential is to be realised, especially for the BETs, as 
they have the potential to energise rural areas, plough 
back money into rural markets and the rural economy 
and create employment.  Tariff structures for biomass 
power have been developed; subsidies for improved 
cooking stoves and biogas units have been introduced, 
and are continually being fine-tuned. 
BETs consist of a complex mix of technologies that face 
different types of barriers, requiring different policies 
for large-scale dissemination. This study has provided a 
high-level analysis of the opportunities and challenges 
presented by BETs in India. The barriers identified in 
the report need to be discussed further with various 
stakeholders to rank and prioritise the barriers so that 
targeted policies can be developed. The case studies 
further highlight the fact that targeted policies can 
be successful if designed with care. If targeted policies 
are evolved, these will not only demonstrate the 
effectiveness of BETs in a large developing country 
such as India, but will also help the government meet 
its renewable energy targets. 
The key policy options to overcoming barriers and for 
the promotion of BETs include R&D for cost reduction 
and reliable performance, large-scale demonstrations, 
capital cost subsidies and other performance-based 
financial incentives, competitive tariffs for biomass 
power, performance guarantees, the creation of a large 
network of entrepreneurs and skilled persons for the 
construction, operation and maintenance of bioenergy 
systems, and education and awareness regarding BETs. 
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Abstract
Although the importance of Technology Transfer 
(TT) in Climate Change Mitigation is well accepted, 
the role of IPR (Intellectual Property Rights) in 
facilitating TT is a controversial issue. While there are 
extreme views on whether or not IPR presents a major 
barrier to technology transfer, the mainstream debate 
has moved beyond such polarised positions. Scholars 
have advanced nuanced positions, supported by 
empirical research. These include the use of alternative 
models like Open Innovation that go beyond 
traditional approaches on innovation and IPR, in 
order to facilitate TT, which is the focus of this article. 
The article discusses Open Innovation and Open 
Source Models, and various options like patent 
pools, and clearinghouses. The scope and limitations 
of these models, and the options in facilitating 
TT are discussed. The topic is assessed by way of a 
hypothetical example regarding the application of 
an Open Innovation Model to develop and transfer 
a technology relevant to climate change mitigation, 
i.e., development of rice varieties with enhanced 
nitrogen use efficiency. The article concludes that 
Open Innovation Models can play an important role 
in facilitating TT in the context of climate change 
mitigation.
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Introduction 
The need for Technology Transfer (TT) in climate 
change mitigation is well recognised. The IPCC 
(Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change) defines 
technology transfer (TT) as ‘a broad set of processes 
covering the flows of know-how, experience, and 
equipment for mitigating and adapting to climate 
change.’ (IPCC, 2000; 3). Thus TT is much more than 
the transfer and installation of equipment, involving 
transfers of know-how and experience, including 
information about processes. TT enables the recipient 
to use the technology transferred, understand it and 
absorb it. 
Innovators invest money and other resources in 
inventions of new products and processes, which 
results in innovation. Innovators need protection from 
others free-riding on their innovation. Intellectual 
Property Rights (IPR) constitutes a legally sanctioned 
mechanism to challenge such free-riding and to 
ensure that innovators’ interests are protected. IPR is 
an incentive for innovation as the innovator receives 
specific rights in exchange for the disclosure of 
knowledge through patents etc. The rights available 
under IPR are subject to limitations as specified in 
the laws.  
The role of IPR in TT, particularly in climate change, is 
contested. It has proved controversial in the UNFCCC 
(United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change) negotiations, and developing nations and 
developed nations had disagreed about it (Gerstetter et 
al., 2010). In the final text of the Cancun Agreements 
there was no reference to IPR. Whether the proposed 
Technology Mechanism will handle IPR issues is 
not currently certain. In the debate over the role of 
IPR, many alternative models, which go beyond the 
traditional approaches to invention and transfers of 
technology, have been suggested (Reichman et al., 
2008). This article examines the scope and limitations 
of some of the alternative models in relation to IPR/
TT issues in respect of climate change mitigation. 
The article is structured into six sections. The second 
section reviews the literature and conclusions drawn 
in it. The third section discusses the regulation of IPR, 
asking whether it facilitates or hinders TT, as well as 
the relevance of the TRIPS (Trade Related Intellectual 
Property Rights) Agreement for TT. The fourth section 
deals with open innovation models, the case for patent 
pools, commons and clearing houses and their scope, 
and the limitations in TT. The fifth section provides 
a hypothetical example of the application of open 
innovation for TT in climate change mitigation. The 
last section provides the conclusion.
Empirical evidence for IPR and climate-
change related technology transfer
A survey of the literature shows that there are divergent 
views on whether IPR hinder or promote TT in climate 
change. According to Maskus (2010; 136), ‘how IPR 
and ITT (i.e., International Technology Transfer) 
interact in these areas are highly context specific and 
broad claims are not particularly helpful. Secondly, 
economists have barely begun the task of analysing 
the task of linkages between public-goods externalities 
and ITT’. Finally, as noted above, it is possible that 
transparent and enforced IPR could reduce the cost 
of TT.  
The various positions expressed in the literature can be 
broadly classified as follows:
1) IPR is not a barrier to TT; in fact IPR is a 
necessary incentive for innovation. Although 
many factors affect TT, IPR is not the factor 
that hinders it (Brandi et al., 2010; Copenhagen 
Economics and IPR Co., 2009).
2) Those who argue that IPR is a barrier point out 
the North-South gap in terms of ownership of 
technology and royalty and licensing income. 
They cite previous experiences to argue that the 
North has been reluctant to transfer technology 
to the South. The roots of this position can be 
traced to the North-South divide on TT issues 
(Kariawasam, 2007, Ockwell et al., 2010). It 
is contended that the global legal regime has 
not been effective in achieving technology 
transfers to poor nations and that the market 
factors that determine the trade in technology 
are increasing the technological gaps between 
nations (Krishnachar, 2006). This view is similar 
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to those expressed by the G77 (Group of 77) 
and NGOs like TWN (Third World Network) 
(TWN, 2008).   
3) It has been argued that in climate change 
TT, IPR is not a barrier, as most of the old 
technologies are in the public domain and 
developing nations’ innovative capacity has 
increased (Barton, 2007).
4) Even if IPR seems to be a barrier, it is not an 
insurmountable one and should not become 
part of the UNFCCC negotiations. Many 
solutions are available for governments to 
intervene and facilitate TT. Proponents of 
this view (Lane, 2011; Ueono, 2009) point 
out that private-sector firms have successfully 
transferred climate change-related technology 
to developing countries without IPR becoming 
a barrier. Options are available under TRIPS, 
and caution is needed in taking steps that may 
undermine the role of IPR as an incentive for 
innovation (Maskus, 2010).  Another view is 
that it is better to deal with the specific issues 
and to keep the IPR issue out of the UNFCCC 
negotiations (Drahos, 2009).
5) A group of scholars associated with the 
University of Sussex, UK, have concluded that 
a better approach to addressing this issue is to 
consider TT and IPR on a case-by-case basis 
rather than assume at the outset that IPR is or is 
not a barrier (Mallett et al., 2009; Ockwell et al., 
2007; Watson  et al., 2011). These authors have 
made their conclusions following extensive case 
studies on TT in climate change technologies to 
China and India and point out that factors like 
the capacity to absorb technology affect TT and 
vary from sector to sector. Hence generalisations 
are not helpful in formulating policies for TT. 
They have also come up with suggestions for 
addressing this complex issue.
6) Some studies examine TT and climate change 
with reference to TRIPS (e.g., Hutchison, 
2006) and analyze how TRIPS can hinder or 
promote TT. I discuss this in the third section. 
Although Mallett et al., (2009), Ockwell et al., 
(2007) and Watson  et al., (2011), and, Lane (2011) 
and  Ueono (2009) argue on the basis of case studies, 
their conclusions are not identical: while the former 
group situate their findings within a broader context 
of innovation policies, IPR and other factors like 
technology absorption and the market for technology, 
the latter two take into account only those  studies 
where TT by private firms has been successful and 
argue on that basis. 
Similarly Barton (2007) takes the position that 
most of the relevant technologies are in the public 
domain or are old. Since developing countries have 
become innovative, he argues, access and TT will 
not be hindered by IPR. However, the TWN bases 
its arguments on the historical experience and the 
North-South gap in technology ownership. Some 
studies (Maskus 2010; Maskus and Okediji 2010) 
take a nuanced position in making suggestions, while 
Brown (2010) calls for a holistic perspective on climate 
change-related TT. 
The World Bank (2010) states that, ‘[t] here is no 
evidence that overly restrictive IPRs have been a big 
barrier to transferring renewable energy production 
capacity to middle-income countries. […] In low-
income countries, weak IPRs do not appear to be 
a barrier to deploying sophisticated climate-smart 
technologies’ (p. 310). This resonates with the view 
that IPR protection is not the most important or 
deciding factor in TT and that its role in influencing 
TT can vary from technology to technology.  
In recent years there has been much empirical research 
on patenting trends, patents in selected technologies 
and the ownership and transfer of technology in climate 
change mitigation (e.g., Dechezleprêtre et al., 2010; 
Lee et al., 2009; UNEP-EPO-ICTSD, 2010). These 
studies indicate that, while a handful of countries own 
a significant percentage of patents, some developing 
countries are also catching up. These studies point out 
that the top three or four countries have a significant 
share in all the relevant technologies. Thus, the debate 
has moved beyond these polarised views, and many 
new ideas, like using open innovation models, have 
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been put forward for facilitating TT. I discuss some of 
them in Sections 4, 5 and 6.  
It is necessary to understand the gaps in the literature, 
some of which are listed below.
1. These empirical findings are limited to certain 
technologies. There are not many case studies 
on IPR issues in TT in the context of climate 
change (both in adaptation and mitigation).
2. Many studies give more information on 
patenting and the ownership of patents and 
less about commercialisation or patterns in 
licensing and their impact on TT, particularly 
TT to developing countries.
3. Most of the studies on developing nations are 
limited to just a few countries. There is not much 
in the literature on TT to LDCs (Least Developed 
Countries) or to other developing countries. 
Thus today, despite the above gaps, the literature has 
provided a nuanced and balanced idea of the role of 
IPR in TT in climate change mitigation and has also 
suggested new ideas and solutions.
The role of IPR in technology transfer and 
relevance of TRIPS
The Expert Group on Technology Transfer (EGTT) 
of UNFCCC has identified Enabling Environments 
(EE) as one of the five themes in the framework to 
promote, facilitate and finance TT to non-Annex II 
Parties, particularly developing countries. Enabling 
Environments have been  defined as  ‘government 
actions, such as fair trade policies, removal of technical, 
legal and administrative barriers to technology transfer, 
sound economic policy, regulatory frameworks and 
transparency, all of which create an environment 
conducive to private and public sector technology 
transfer’(FCCC/CP/2001/13/Add.1). IPR regulation 
is part of the enabling environment as it provides an 
incentive for innovation and transfer of technology. 
It is a part of the regulatory and trade policies of any 
nation. An IPR regime can thus hinder or promote TT.
Prima facie it may appear that the stronger the level 
of IPR protection the greater will be the tendency to 
transfer technology, as IPR are protected and respected. 
If so, how the state should regulate IPR protection and 
whether it should opt for stronger IPR protection as a 
strategy to encourage flows of technology through TT 
are the main questions.
A survey of the literature shows that there are no 
easy answers to such questions, and cautions against 
over-generalisation have been made by academics (see 
UNIDO, 2006; Hall and Helmers, 2010; Maskus, 
2010; WIPO 2011 for surveys of the literature, while 
Johnson and Lybecker, 2009 can be consulted for an 
extensive survey of literature on TT). In the case of 
Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and TT, in general 
the literature points to a positive correlation between 
IPR enforcement and TT via FDI, while other factors 
like country risk, investment policies, market size and 
the availability of low-cost skilled labour also influence 
TT through FDI. In other words, IPR enforcement 
may be necessary as an attractive factor, but it may not 
always be sufficient for TT through FDI. For example, 
despite the weak IPR protection, China could attract 
FDI and TT on account of other factors. In cases of 
TT through licensing, while the strength of the IPR 
protection does influence flows of TT, other factors 
like absorptive capacity are important for a country 
to benefit from the TT. Thus, while IPR protection 
does encourage TT, other factors too are important, 
and firms consider other factors as well, instead of 
deciding on the basis of IPR protection only. In other 
words, the specificities should be taken into account in 
understanding the flow of TT and a country’s ability 
to benefit from it. 
The historical evidence cautions us against taking a 
view that all countries should opt for stronger IPR 
protection as a strategy to attract TT and promote 
innovation. Kumar (2003) and Kim (2002) also arrive 
at the same conclusion and point out that Korea, Japan 
and Taiwan actually benefited from a weaker IPR 
protection regime in the early phases as this enabled 
substantial technological learning. On the other hand, 
the Commission on IPR and Development has drawn 
attention to the question of access to technology 
through TT and its implications for development of 
the host country (CIPR, 2002). WIPO (2011) points 
out ‘that there is no one single intellectual property law 
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and policy that maximises the transfer of technology 
in any given country’ and underscores the differences 
in the dynamics of TT and its relationship with IPR 
regimes across countries (p. 18). Hence it is reasonable 
to argue that a strong IPR regime is desirable as a factor 
to attract TT, though it has to be balanced with the 
need to absorb technology and develop the capacity to 
innovate through learning-by-doing. 
However, countries do not have an infinite number of 
choices in IPR law and policy, as most countries have 
become Members of WTO (World Trade Organization) 
and hence are bound to implement the TRIPS 
Agreement. The TRIPS Agreement is the outcome of 
protracted negotiations in the Uruguay Round and 
lays down the ground rules for IP protection. Being 
part of WTO Agreements, it has a strong linkage with 
WTO’s Dispute Settlement Mechanism (see Maskus 
and Reichman (eds.), 2005 for articles on TRIPS 
and TT). TRIPS has provisions that emphasise the 
development dimension of IP rights and the role of TT 
in enabling countries to establish a sound technological 
base. Articles 7, 8 and 66.2 underscore this, while the 
latter also states: ‘Developed country Members shall 
provide incentives to enterprises and institutions in 
their territories for the purpose of promoting and 
encouraging technology transfer to least-developed 
country Members in order to enable them to create a 
sound and viable technological base’. However, as the 
TT through Article 66.2 has not met the expectations 
of LDCs, suggestions have been made to establish 
mechanisms and provide incentives to facilitate TT by 
using Article 66.2 (Moon, 2011). 
Some authors are skeptical about the positive role 
of TRIPS in facilitating TT (e.g., Correa, 2005). 
Referring to TT, climate change and TRIPS, Adams 
(2009) argues that TRIPS may impede the transfer 
of environmentally sound technologies (ESTS) to 
developing countries, while Hutchinson (2006) 
points out that countries can take advantage of the 
flexibilities of TRIPS. He is less sanguine about the 
positive contributions of TRIPS to TT. On the other 
hand, O’Regan (2009) takes the view that, while IPR 
is a hurdle in TT to developing countries, it can be 
overcome by various means. 
Open innovation and similar mechanisms  
to facilitate technology transfer 
The discussion in the previous section indicates that, 
while the role of IPR in facilitating TT is controversial, 
the TRIPS Agreement can either facilitate or hinder 
TT. Instead of thinking solely in terms of limitations 
and barriers in TT on account of IPR, innovative 
solutions that combine the flexibility within the IPR 
regime and novel paradigms in owning and sharing 
knowledge and technology can be explored as potential 
solutions to facilitate TT. This section discusses two 
such novel paradigms, Open Innovation and Open 
Source, and illustrates their relevance and limitations 
in facilitating TT.
Open innovation models
Open Innovation refers to a model of innovation 
in which firms seek ideas from a variety of sources, 
including users, universities, experts, etc. The core 
idea of Open Innovation is that firms can and should 
leverage ideas that are beyond the firm’s boundaries 
and develop strategies to use them by making the 
innovation process more open, and that this can be 
done proactively. According to Chesbrough  (2006), 
who pioneered the idea of Open Innovation, ‘At its 
root, Open Innovation assumes that useful knowledge 
is widely distributed, and that even the most capable 
R&D organisations must identify, connect to, and 
leverage external knowledge sources as a core process 
in innovation’ (p. 2). Herzog (2011) points out that 
the shift from ‘closed’ innovation to ‘open’ innovation 
needs to be accompanied by a change in the culture of 
innovation (p. 228).
Open Innovation is facilitated by advances in 
the distribution of knowledge and collaborative 
possibilities that are made available by information 
and communication technologies. Open Innovation 
networks can be organised for a specific purpose, 
while firms embrace Open Innovation as a philosophy 
and practice for pragmatic reasons. For example, 
companies are creating value by licensing intellectual 
property, establishing joint R&D ventures, or making 
other arrangements to benefit from technology outside 
the boundaries of the firm (Chesbrough, 2003, 2007). 
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The rationale for firms opting for Open Innovation 
stems from a pragmatic view that there are occasions 
in which cooperation in production and sharing can 
benefit all participants more than each participant 
trying to secure monopoly rights through patents and 
enforcing them. A study of 39 open-source initiatives 
in biopharmaceutical innovation highlighted the 
different ways in which companies are willing to share, 
excluding others outside the consortium but allowing 
access to members and opting for the joint management 
of knowledge assets so that all members can benefit 
and take advantage of knowledge and technology 
outside the firm (Allarakhia et al., 2010). Reichman 
(2003) and Foray (2004) point out that it makes sense 
to undertake cooperative knowledge production and 
open knowledge dissemination, as they provide joint 
benefits in circumstances when upstream discovery 
research cannot result in commercial products and 
when the costs of upstream competition are high.
Open source models
The Open Source model is a collaborative mode of 
production, testing and distribution in which voluntary 
labour is a key component and the IPR is handled by 
using licenses, either GPL (General Public License) or 
a license derived from it. The contributor to an Open 
Source project cannot use Open Source licensing to 
acquire monopoly rights or to block others from using 
the contribution made to the project. Lakhani and von 
Hippel (2003) have identified the three incentives that 
induce a firm to participate in Open Source projects. 
Open Source models are currently being applied 
and tested in diverse fields like drugs development, 
biotechnology (Srinivas, 2010; Hope, 2008) and 
product development in some industries (Balka, 2011; 
Jasski, 2007). There is a growing interest in applying 
Open Innovation and Open Source models in the 
context of climate change. For example, the Clean 
Energy Group has come out with a comprehensive 
report on the relevance of ‘open and distributed’ 
innovation for climate change (Morey et al., 2011; see 
also Rattray, 2009 for a discussion of the relevance of 
Open Source approaches). 
Open innovation and open source: 
Comparison and differentiation
Both models stress the need for collaboration and for 
tapping resources outside the boundary of the firm 
through collaborative processes and networks. This 
will facilitate flow of ideas and synergies in working 
and can result in solutions that a single firm or group 
alone would not have been able to develop. The 
major difference between them is that, while in Open 
Innovation efforts are usually made by the firm that 
is trying to innovate by reaching out to other firms or 
potential collaborators, in Open Source the problem or 
opportunity is the central point of focus that connects 
the people and organisations. In Open Innovation 
the firm is the centre of collaborative endeavor, while 
in Open Source the problem or opportunity is the 
connecting link, not any single firm. 
The big difference between Open Source and Open 
Innovation in terms of handling IPR is that with 
Open Innovation products can be protected within a 
proprietary framework that respects the patent rights 
of the firms involved in Open Innovation, while the 
Open Source model relies on GPL or similar licenses 
to protect and enforce IPR. Thus, the major differences 
are in organizing for innovation and in handling IPR.
Licensing 
Licensing is one method of deriving value from IP, 
and this can be exercised in many ways. For example, 
a firm can grant an exclusive license to a single party 
or can provide non-exclusive licenses to different 
parties on different terms. Licensing can serve both the 
purposes of benefiting from IP and controlling its use. 
Depending upon the considerations for licensing and 
the rights granted, there can be many different types 
of license, ranging from exclusive licensing to cross-
licensing where parties grant licenses to each other. 
Licensing can thus be converted into a collaborative 
practice for mutual benefit. 
In collaborative innovation, joint licensing may 
be desirable when there are different holders of IP 
rights (e.g., patents) and the technology covered by 
the patents is necessary for further innovation. Thus, 
153
to reduce transaction costs and to benefit from each 
others’ technology, the patent-holders can opt for 
cross-licensing to each other and/or to third parties. 
Some of the mechanisms that facilitate such sharing 
and transfers of technology are discussed below. 
Patent pools
The patent pool is a mechanism is which two or 
more patent-holders agree to share their IP with each 
other and/or with third parties through negotiated 
licenses, which might include cross-licensing. Patent 
pools can promote TT, facilitate innovation and 
promote diffusion. The Medicines Patent Pool (http://
www.medicinespatentpool.org/) is a recent example 
enhancing access for medicines for HIV in developing 
countries through voluntary licensing. In the case of 
TT in the context of climate change mitigation, patent 
pools can be formed for different sectors and type of 
need. For example, the patent pool or patent pools can 
be formed where access to one technology or group of 
patents is needed for furthering TT. Thus, a patent pool 
on renewable energy technologies can combine many 
patents relevant for an application (e.g., increasing 
energy conversion efficiency) and license them to 
encourage TT. Patent-holders also acquire access to 
necessary technologies that are not owned by them but 
necessary to commercialise some applications. While 
patent pools are not panaceas, they have been tested 
in many contexts in some industries and hence can 
also be relevant for TT in climate change mitigation. 
For example, Iliev and Neuhoff (2009) have indicated 
circumstances under which patent pools will be useful 
in facilitating TT. An extensive review of patent pools 
and clearing-house mechanisms in different industries 
and contexts is available in van Overvalle (ed.) (2009). 
Patent pools can be classified under Open Innovation 
Models, as the objective is to combine the specific 
resources of all parties to form the pool and to license 
them on mutually agreed terms. 
Patent commons
Under patent commons, patents are made available 
subject to certain rights and obligations. The commons 
is thus a collective resource which one can contribute to 
and draw from, subject to some rules. In 2005, a patent 
commons was created by Open Source Development 
Laboratories to enable the open source development 
community at large to make use of the resources from 
this Commons for open source development. While 
all users of this Commons may not be contributors to 
it, some are likely to be users as well as contributors. 
The major difference between a pool and commons is 
that a pool is a mechanism to aggregate and license, 
while a commons is a mechanism to aggregate and 
to share for the purpose of further development and 
diffusion, subject to some conditions. Usually such 
commons make use of the General Public License 
(GPL) or any of the derivatives from GPL to enforce 
rights and produce certainty about obligations. Thus, 
resources in such commons are not for free riding 
because there is also an obligation. 
In the context of climate change, the World Business 
Council for Sustainable Development based in 
Geneva launched Eco-Patent Commons in 2009. The 
objective of this is to enable the sharing of patents 
and to collaborate in furthering eco-innovation. As of 
now there are about a hundred patents available under 
this initiative. While for reasons of space I will not 
provide a detailed analysis of the pros and cons of this 
approach, such commons may facilitate TT (Boynton, 
2011; Hall and Helmers, 2011; Lane, 2011).  
A similar initiative drawing upon the principles of 
Creative Commons is the USA-based GreenXchange. 
Just as in Creative Commons, here too the holders 
of IPR, i.e., the patent-holders, permit some uses 
and give up some rights partially or fully subject to 
the licensing terms. For example, a patent-holder can 
permit the unrestricted use of some patents for product 
development and research by academic institutions, 
while insisting that any use by commercial firms will 
be restricted to licensing on commercial terms.
In Eco-Patent commons the patent-holders donate 
patents to the commons, while in GreenXchange 
they retain the patents but permit flexibility in using 
them and license them on specific terms. Both these 
approaches have their merits and demerits, but what is 
important is that they provide flexibility in making use 
of patents without denying IPR. 
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The Eco-Patent Commons is a typical example of 
an Open Source Model, as it enables the creation of 
Commons. 
The GreenXChange cannot be considered an example 
of an Open Source Model or Open Innovation because 
it is based on the Creative Commons principle, which 
is derived from copyright. Licenses under Creative 
Commons grant some rights to users automatically, as 
indicated in that category of license. Such uses can be 
relevant for participants in Open Innovation or Open 
Source projects.
Alternative licensing mechanisms
Normally licenses are commercial contracts that allow 
little flexibility. But in the wake of the crisis in access to 
medicines, the need for flexible licensing mechanisms 
was felt. So some alternative licenses for the use of 
patents have been developed. The use of GPL and its 
derivatives in (open source) software has inspired the 
use of licenses modeled after GPL or its derivatives 
in other sectors. Thus, today there are many licenses 
that offer flexibility in use and facilitate transfers of 
technology, and most of the alternative licensing 
mechanisms encourage non-exclusive licensing. One 
license that can be used with modifications for TT in 
climate change is EAL (Equitable Access Licensing). 
Under EAL a university for fair royalty payment 
will grant a non-exclusive license to use patented 
technology for production and the sale of research 
tools in poor countries. The licensee agrees to grant 
back to the university any improvements it has made 
and cross-license any other rights owned by it. The 
idea here is that licensee will not use its rights to block 
the production. The university can offer the research 
tool on similar terms to other parties. The objective is 
to make this licensing applicable to low- and middle-
income countries where access at affordable prices is 
a major issue. A neglected disease license permits the 
university to license the technology for research into 
neglected diseases and for commercialisation in poor 
or low-income countries (Hope 2009). This sort of 
mechanism would come under Open Source Models, 
as they are based on Open Source principles and make 
use of GPL or a license modeled on it. 
Clearing houses
A clearing house is a mechanism for matching the 
users and providers of goods, services, information 
and technology (Zimmerman 2009). For example, 
technology exchange clearing houses offer information 
services and enable technology providers and seekers 
to find partners and conclude contracts. Eco-Patent 
Commons can be considered an open-access clearing 
house. There is scope for other types of clearing houses 
in TT in climate change mitigation. The clearing 
house mechanism under UNFCCC has been more a 
clearing house for information than for facilitating TT. 
From the point of view of patent-holders, engaging in 
Open Innovation and/or choosing one of the above-
mentioned options makes sense only if they are able to 
derive more advantage out of them when compared to 
normal licensing practices. For example, it is beneficial 
to join a patent pool and contribute to it if joining the 
pool can result in more revenue with lower transaction 
costs, and/or if it provides access to a technology that 
is available only to members. For the recipients of 
technology, accessing a patent pool is preferable to 
dealing with many patent-holders individually, as the 
transaction costs will be lower and access to a bundle 
of technologies is ensured. But if the recipient does 
not need all the technologies made available through a 
pool but only some of them, then dealing with patent-
holders on a one-to-one basis may be less expensive. 
It is also likely that receivers of technology may prefer 
to opt for commercial licensing from a single firm if it 
provides all the technologies needed than access some 
from Commons/Patent Pool(s) and opt for commercial 
licensing for the rest, as the first option reduces legal 
uncertainties. In the case of licensing practices, while 
GPL and its derivatives have been used extensively in 
software contexts, their validity in non-software contexts 
is not clear, as there is not much case law on this. Some 
licenses like EAL that are being developed as a solution 
to a specific problem may not be relevant in other cases.
Using open source and open innovation for 
TT in climate change mitigation
In this section, an illustrative example is given of a 
hypothetical situation in which a climate mitigation 
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technology is the object of an open innovation model. 
The climate mitigation technology being illustrated 
here is the development of rice varieties with enhanced 
nitrogen use efficiency and transfer of technology to 
breeders and research institutions. Stern (2006) points 
out that a significant proportion of the greenhouse 
gases (GHG)  produced by agriculture are due to 
the application of nitrogen fertilizer alone, because a 
portion of the excess nitrogen not taken up by plants 
is released into the atmosphere as nitrous oxide, 
a potent greenhouse gas. Increase in nitrogen use 
efficiency by plants can result in lower applications of 
nitrogen fertilizer and thereby contribute substantially 
to mitigation of climate change. 
This is a hypothetical example and not a case study or 
description of an ongoing project. The three important 
steps in organizing the development of rice varieties 
and TT are described below. 
Step 1:  Form a consortium of institutions working 
on this project and organise it on the basis of Open 
Innovation. The consortium should cover all activities, 
from the start to the development of varieties and 
their transfer through commercialisation by public or 
private sector. It should also address further research 
and development activities. Under this project, 
applying conventional breeding for the development 
of such varieties and of genetically modified rice with 
this trait will be undertaken, as both are needed. 
Step 2:  This has two components, as below
The consortium should identify the IPR issues 
involved in each stage, from development to transfer 
and diffusion. Normally, germplasm is available 
under Material Transfer Agreements (MTAs) and as 
such cannot be patented. The use of research tools 
and patented genes or gene fragments can become an 
issue. Thus the mapping of the technologies and tools 
needed, the issue of respective patents and an analysis 
of the patenting landscape are necessary. For example, 
while access to and use of germplam might not be an 
issue, the relevant processes and research tools might 
have been patented, as might the genes and gene 
fragments. The MTAs may have restrictive clauses on 
usage of the transferred material. Thus the consortium 
can identify the ways to overcome this by examining: 
1) whether research exemptions are applicable, 2) 
what are the available alternatives, and 3) whether 
the resources available with the institutions in the 
consortium can be used to complement or replace the 
patented research tools, genes or gene fragments. 
If IPR is a pressing issue in accessing them, the 
consortium can find out whether the patentee(s) is/are 
willing to license them using humanitarian licensing 
or licensing under EAL or similar licensing on a 
non-exclusive basis for use in developing countries 
or LDCs.  Since this project envisages identification 
of the relevant gene from different crops and the 
development of genetically modified rice, access to 
the germplasm of crops like barley is important. The 
freedom to operate,  i.e., whether the consortium is 
free to market the developed product or not, depends 
on access to and the right to use patented technologies, 
materials and processes. Therefore, an analysis of the 
issues in Freedom to Operate is essential. 
The complexity in this can be illustrated by the fact 
that in the development of ‘Golden Rice’, transgenic 
rice enhanced with provitamin A, it has been estimated 
that 40 organisations hold 72 patents on the technology 
necessary to develop and disseminate this variety. 
A coordinated international programme resolved 
this issue by negotiating with the patent-holders by 
obtaining permissions and licenses (Dunwell, 2010).
In such efforts, organisations like the Public 
Intellectual Property Resource for Agriculture (PIPRA) 
or Biological Innovation for Open Society (BIOS) 
can help in mapping the IPR issues and identifying 
the options involved in using licenses and accessing 
alternative resources besides assisting in negotiations 
on IPR. Once this task has been completed, it is 
essential to ensure that all institutions have the same 
understanding of IPR issues and of access to, use of 
and sharing of resources covered by patents, MTAs 
and licenses.  
2) The consortium should develop a coherent IPR 
policy for use within the consortium and in dealing 
with external agents. In this the consortium can make 
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use of GPL or its derivatives to share its IP assets. For 
sharing within the consortium, there can be a patent 
pool. Novel arrangements for sharing knowledge and 
accessing others’ knowledge and technology can be 
established. The relevant examples of this are the SNP 
Consortium and the HapMap Project (NAP, 2010).
Step 3: Collaborative development of varieties 
and IPR issues
Once the varieties have been developed, it is necessary 
to seek IPR protection. Not all countries allow the 
patenting of plant varieties. Many developing countries 
provide Plant Breeders’ Rights (PBR) as IPR for Plant 
Varieties, while in the USA both patent protection and 
PBR are available. Often the varieties developed are 
transferred to seed companies or breeding companies 
that sell seeds or incorporate the innovation in Open 
Pollinated Varieties (OPV) or hybrids. Therefore, it 
is essential that the appropriate mode of Intellectual 
Property is sought. IPR can be enforced and can be 
linked with TT to breeders and seed companies. Even 
also in other cases, obtaining IPR will help prevent 
misappropriation by others and help assert rights in 
cases of infringements. 
In the above example, if the variety is a GMO, i.e., 
a genetically modified organism, then there are more 
issues to be addressed. Even if GM plants cannot be 
patented, the relevant processes, genes, gene fragments 
and research tools might be patentable. Hence, while 
PBR are applicable to plant varieties, IPR protection 
in terms of patents may be available for relevant 
processes, etc. 
Here too, it is for the consortium to have a definitive 
IPR policy on patenting and enforcing IP rights. It 
is a good practice to introduce patent protection as a 
defensive mechanism. Patents can be used for sharing 
on a quid pro quo basis, as a defensive mechanism 
against misappropriation and in bargaining for access 
to other patented technologies. Moreover, a strong 
IP portfolio is valuable in terms of income from 
licenses and in assessing the value of innovations. 
The consortium should use IPR for the benefit of its 
members, as well as to facilitate TT.
Open innovation is applicable here in terms of 
organizing for innovation, developing a structure that 
engenders open innovation and handling IPR. In open 
innovation, the core principle is to link with knowledge 
resources within the organisations and external sources 
in such a way that knowledge resources are leveraged 
for a shared objective. Open Source is useful as an 
alternative mechanism for using IPR in such a way 
that sharing is encouraged, further development is 
permitted and access is permitted on some condition, 
instead of enforcing monopoly rights to prevent others 
from developing a resource further or to ensure that rent 
maximisation is made possible by exercising that right. 
Thus, as described above, Open Innovation Models 
and Open Source Models can be used to develop 
technology and facilitate TT. 
Conclusion
While there is a consensus on the need for TT 
in climate change mitigation, the role of IPR in 
facilitating TT is controversial. The debate has moved 
beyond polarised positions. This has also resulted 
in a search for alternative models and mechanisms 
to facilitate TT. The Open Innovation model as an 
alternative mechanism has much relevance to facilitate 
TT. Some mechanisms, like Patent Pools and Clearing 
Houses developed in other contexts, are being applied 
here, while new initiatives are being developed to build 
Commons. Although they are not a panacea, they can 
play an important role and can complement other 
approaches in facilitating TT.
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